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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The purpose of this study is to achieve an understanding of the international attitudes and policies of Costa Rica from 1919 to 1939.

In this chapter, some of the is-

sues and concerns which predate that period, but which have
significance during it, will be discussed.
A natural starting point would seem to be an account
of the history of the birth of the nation.

With Costa Rica,

however, there is considerable difficulty in pinpointing the
actual date of birth.

Under Spanish colonial rule, Costa Rica,

along with its Central American neighbors, was governed as the
Captaincy General of Guatemala, whose administrative independence from the Viceroyalty of New Spain varied from time to
time under different circumstances.

Within that administrative

convenience called Guatemala, there had developed regional
groups whose self identity as "states" was quite distinct, despite their official affiliation, and who reflected the jealousies of rival states. 1

The usual difficulties in dealing

1Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, Central America 1824-1960 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1§61), p. 243.
1

2

with the nationalism of any state are thus complicated when
one speaks of any of the Central American nations.

Costa Ri-

oa in particular manifests differences not only from its
neighbors but also from the remainder of the hemisphere and
the world while at the same time being linked to them in a
unique manner.

For example, Costa Rican policies in the

early twentieth century emphasized isolation from the other
Central American nations, and the language of unity among
them was an effective tool used by Costa Rioa at times when
unilateral policies would not have sufficient force to resolve problems.
The independence of Central America from Spanish domination was achieved in conjunction with the establishment of
the empire of Agustin de Iturbide in Mexico.

With Iturbide's

fall from power, this affiliation ended and Central America
began a separate existence by the formation of a union of the
diverse "states" of the old Captaincy General.

The federal

association which was formed lasted from 1823 to 1839.

At

that time forces which had traditionally divided the "states"
of the Captaincy General brought about their division into
separate nations. 2 Despite this division, federal union was
muoh sought after throughout the nineteenth century by certain
individuals in each oountry. 3 There have been twenty-five

N.J.:

2Mario Rodriguez, Central America (Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 49.
3Chester Lloyd Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization in

3

attempts at federal union sinoe that first failure. 4

One of

the primary forces which brought about the separation was the
differences among the member states in size and population.
Guatemala alone had a population nearly eight times that of
Costa Rica, whose population was among the smallest of the
five member nations of the oonfederation. 5

The fear of the

smaller states that their confederation would be dominated by
the overwhelming populace of Guatemala, plus a growing awareness of the differing needs and goals of their states led to
the dissolution of the confederation in 1839. 6

For the major-

ity of Central Americans, independent national status had
begun with the formation of the confederation in 1823.
Another problem which would manifest itself in Costa
Rican national life as a consequence of this oonfederative beginning was the ill-defined status of boundaries between Costa
Rica and her neighbors.

The boundary disputes, which would em-

broil Central America during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, were both a cause and effect of the intense nationalism felt by the various states. 7 In discussions over unsure
boundaries, nationalism often came into play in the opinions
the Caribbean (Reprint of 1935 Edition, New York:
Russell, 1967>, p. 20.
4 Karnes, ~ailyre of Union, p. 243.

5Ibid., p. 6.

6 Ibid.

7Ibid., p. 247.

Russell i

of the contesting parties, becoming stronger as it was necessary to justify their own exalted positions.

At the same time,

boundary disputes were occasioned by feelings of nationalism
and the feeling that the nation should be extended to the farthest reaches possible.
For Costa Rica, there were serious boundary disputes
with both Nicaragua and Colombia that endured for nearly a
century each.

The Nicaraguan dispute would not be settled

until the 1930 1 & and the Colombian dispute, carried on by
the successor state, Panama, would not be resolved until
1941. 8 In both instances, the conflicts were responsible
for an increase of Costa Rican nationalism and the adoption
of a policy of isolationism in Central America.

More will

be said of these disputes below.
It is quite evident that dealing with the Costa Rican nation in isolation from its world environment is next
to impossible.

Of course. there were throughout the nine-

teenth and into the twentieth century certain issues and
problems which could be labeled as strictly national.

How-

ever, a strong case could be made that even among these "national" issues there were few that did not have some basis in
the world conununity and Costa Rica's relationship to it.
These will be dealt with at a later part of this study.

But,

8Howard L. Blutstein, et al., Area Handbook for Costa Rica (Washington, D.C.: Government Print!ng Off!ce, 1976>,

PP• 4~-~S.

5

whether one refers to strictly national or international questions, the self image of the Costa Rican nation would be the
starting point in determining the origin of policies and attitudes adopted.
Costa Rica's image of itself as a nation among other
nations emerged from various factors.

Fi~st,

and perhaps

most importantly, Costa Ricans prided themselves on the stability and continuity of their national goverrunents.

They

were extremely proud of the lack of political uprisings and
the absence of caudillo rule in Costa Rica. 9 Unlike their
neighbors, only four constitutions had existed during the
nineteenth century, discounting the various confederative
constitutions; also during the nineteenth century, there had
been only three presidential coups in contrast to f a.r more
elsewhere. 10 Whether this notion of stability is a true image is not within the scope of this study.

However, there is

some evidence that Costa Rican claims are somewhat justifiable
if only on a scale relative to their neighbors.
Second, the Costa Ricans felt themselves to be of a
higher cultural level than any of their Central American
neighbors.

The reasons for this relate to their claimed
racial homogeneity. 11 This homogeneity would also contribute
9Rodr!guez, Central America, p. 49.
10 James l·. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, University of Colorado Studies in ~oiitioai Soienoe, No. 2 (Bolder: University of Colorado Press, 1962), p. 6.
11Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, p. 141.

6

to the dominance of a select aristocracy or oligarchy in Costa
Rican political life which in part serves as a causal factor
12
in the relative political stability noted above.
There is
also the importance given education during the early national
life, making possible the boast that "Costa Rica has more
school teachers than soldiers. 1113 Even today Costa Rica has
no standing army, navy or air force, but relies on a police
force alone for domestic order which implies that this often
repeated boast is still true.1 4
A third factor shaping Costa Rican self image was her
dealings with foreign investors.

In the majority of oases,

foreign investments in Costa Rica actually served the best purposes of the nation without substantial loss of political selfdetermination which seemed to be the case elsewhere, since Costa Rica seemed able to turn foreign investments into national
projects rather than seeing the exportation of all profits from
such investments.

While the idea that Costa Rica had been free

from control by investors would be challenged in later years,
in the early twentieth century Costa Rica managed to achieve
at least economic independence from any other nation, mainly
12Ibid.

13u.s. Chargg Leo R. Sack at San Jos& to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1935, Records of the Department of
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 19301939, 818.20/16 1 National Archives, Washington, D.C.
14Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rioa, p. 4.

7

by means of

it~

foreign investors.

The question of the nation's

economic independence from the investors, however, was not
dealt with at this stage.

As will be demonstrated below, the

most important foreign investors were viewed in Costa Rica as
Costa Ricans, a status which they apparently accepted.

Fur-

ther, their profits were frequently put back into the national
economy in the form of roads, telegraph lines, eta.

Specific

examples of the positive results of large foreign investments
can be seen in the fact that through foreign investment, crop
diversification was first attempted in Central America by Costa Rica, allowing a lesser degree of dependence on a single
crop, coffee, and a consequent ability to bargain more freely
on world markets for necessary imports. 15 In addition, Costa
Rica was the first Central American state to produce an export crop of bananas.

This capability resulted directly from
the establishment of the banana industry by Minor c. Keith. 16
Keith serves as a prime example of the contribution made to
Costa Rican self sufficiency and economic independence by foreign investors.
As was mentioned, Keith and his fellow investors,
15chester Lloyd Jones 1 Caribbean Interests of the United States, American Imperialism--Viewpoints of United States
Foreign ~olicy, 1898-1941 (New York: Arno Press & The New York
Times, 1970), p. 158.
16Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization, P• 65. The Watt
Stewart biography of Keith does not deal specifically with the
broad issues of Keith's responsibility for changes or improvements in the Costa Rican economy.

8

insofar as the Costa Rican nation was concerned, were really
Costa Ricans, since they had married into prominent Costa Rican families and were genuinely conunitted to the national interests .17

Beyond the consistent reinvestment of profits,

this committment is reflected by the attitude of Minor Keith
himself in remembering the Costa Rican nation in his "Last
Will and Testament," in which he endowed a charitable institution of a kind to be determined by the nation with the funds
which remained after the settlement of his debts and provisions for his family. 18
Economic modifications made possible by foreign investors such as Keith did a great deal to enhance the prestige of the Costa Rican nation as a trader in world markets.
By crop diversification, Costa Ricans no longer had to view
themselves in the shadow of Brazilian price setting for coffee crops.

It can be assumed that the reinvestment of pro-

fits into public works or transportation and conununications
enhanced the Costa Rican self image by demonstrating their
modernity in such developments.

17 Keith 1 s wife was Cristina Castro Fern!ndez, whose
father, Dr. Jos& Mar!a Castro had twice occupied the presidency, been the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and was a
past minister of foreign relations. Her mother, Dofia Pacifica Fern~ndez de Castro was credited with the design of the
Costa Rican national flag and coat of arms. Watt Stewart,
Keith and Costa Rica, A Bio~aphical Study of Minor Cooper
Keith (Albuquerque: The University of New Mex1co Press,
1964), pp. 50-51.
18 Ibid., p. 197.

9
A final factor influencing Costa Rican self image
before 1919 is directly related to the trans-oceanic canal
projects undertaken or entertained by the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth canturies.

Cos-

ta Rioa in particular, and Central America in general, feared
United States domination of their nations if such plans were
brought to fruition.

The location of the Panama Canal to the

immediate south made Costa Rica especially important to the
defense of Canal approaches, but it would have no control
over how that defense might be implemented if the projects
remained solely a United States enterprise.

Thus as new

canal proposals were brought under discussion. Costa Rica
sought to have itself included as an interested party.

Of

particular concern here is the extremely bitter dispute
among the United States, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

The pro-

blem between Nicaragua and Costa Rica was rooted in their
long-standing boundary dispute.

At one point in the nego-

tiations over the disputed territory between the two nations,
a treaty was concluded in 1886 with the mediation of Guatemala, which provided that each nation had the responsibility
to consult with the other before concluding any treaty regarding the construction of a canal.19

This agreement was

disregarded by Nicaragua in the subsequent negotiation of a
19
charles P. Howland, American Relations in the Caribbean, American Imperialism--Viewpoints of United States Forergn Policy. 1898-1941 (New York: Arno Press & The New York
Times, 1970), p. 221.

10

canal treaty with the United States.
When the negotiations between Nicaragua and the United States became publicly known, Costa Rica immediately
raised the issue of its treaty with Nicaragua. 20 By the admission of the Costa Rican President, Ricardo Jimenez, the
issue of canal negotiations was of primary importance to the
Costa Rican nation, along with the continuing boundary dispute with Panama. 21 which might also be said to have canalrelated implications.

The principal concern of Costa Ricans

in this matter was apparently related to their understanding
of the nature of the "protectorate" which they understood was
to be established by the United States in Nicaragua.

They

had reached the conclusion that the treaty embodied, through
the use of something similar to the Platt Amendment for Cuba,
a surrender of Nicaraguan sovereignty. 22

Further, it was

felt that any such protectorate would "seriously affect the
autonomy of the Republic of Costa Rica." 23 They based their
20 Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of
Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937 ,
p. 245.
21

Message of President Ricardo Jiminez to the Costa
Rican Congress, 1 May 1914, in U. s. Minister E. J. Hale at
San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 17, 2 May 1914, United States, Department of State, Papers Relatin~ to the Forei n Relations of the United States, 1914 (WashJ.ngton, D.C.:
overnment rinting f ice,
2 , p.-,,0.
22 Minister of Costa Rica in Washington, D.C. (J. B.
Calvo) to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1914, 817.812/85,
ibid., p. 959.
23Ibid.
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fear on the "special ties" which linked the Central American
republics and probably on the fear of being surroWlded by two
24
United States "puppets."
The United States, in response to Costa Rican protests, noted that the 1886 treaty provided only that Costa
Rica be consulted but that it did not have the right to veto
any proposed treaty.

Further, the United States Minister in

Costa Rica assured the President that the United States had

Rican sovereignty in any way,
and that Costa Rica had nothing to fear from the treaty. 25

no intention of violating

Cos~a

Upon further consideration, the United States Minister suggested to Washington that Costa Rican national pride might
be assauged by a part ownership of any proposed cana1. 26 HoNever, Costa Rica continued to insist that its primary concern
in the matter was the preservation of sovereignty in Nicaragua and the related sovereignty of all Central America. 27
Late in 1914, it became evident that any attempt to
24rbid.

25 secretary of State to u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at
San Josg, 24 July 1914, 817.812/106a, ibid., p. 963.
26 u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1914, 817.812/134, ibid., p. 967.
27 Repdblica de Costa Rica, Memoria de la Secretar!a
de Relaciones Exteriores Gracia y Justicia Culto y Bene!icencia Presentada aI Congreso Constitucional por e! Secretario de Estado en el Des acho de esas carteras Manue! Castro
4an os :
1pogra a laciona ,
1 , p•
....,._...-..=-__.."'!""'I'"'!""'='-......... this publication varies by year--all subsequent references will note the year reported in the publication and the abbreviated title Memoria.

12
deal with Costa Rica on any other Central American matters
would be useless until the issue of the Nicaraguan treaty,
the subsequent Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, was resolved. 28 At
that time, reports of rebels gathering in Costa Rica to move
against Nicaragua were received in Washington.

The United

States sent word to Costa Rica to see to their removal but
Costa Rica chose to view the alleged rebels as foreigners residing in Costa Rica who were protected by the provisions of
29
Whether these individuals
the Costa Rican constitution.
were rebels setting out to disrupt Nicaragua cannot be determined.

It was obvious, however, that Costa Rica was not going

to cooperate with either the United States or Nicaragua to
ascertain the facts.

The United

State~

decided not to move

any further than its initial warning on the matter, 30 realizing that the true issue was not rebels bound for Nicaragua.
Negotiations were begun in 1915 with the Costa Rican
Minister in Washington to provide a canal treaty for Costa
Rica.

The issue of the so-called Platt Amendment in the Nica-

raguan agreement was also clarified so that in the view of
28 The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was concluded in 1916
and granted the United States the right to construct a canal
through Nicaraguan territory with important leases on land at
each end of the proposed canal. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic Bister of the American Peo le, Seventh Edition (New York:
ppleton- entury-Crofts, 196 , p. 676.
29
u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Josg to the Secretary of State, No. 51, 25 December 1914, 817.00/2386, Papers
Relating to Foreign Relations, 12..!!:!:,9 pp. 183-184.
30

secretary of State to u. S. Minister E. J. Hale at
San Jos,, 29 December 1914, 817.00/2382, ibid., p. 184.

13
the secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, Costa Rica
understood that there would be no protectorate in Nicaragua
of the magnitude which Costa Rica feared. 31 All seemed well
on the path to resolution for the time being.

However, in

less than a month the United States Minister in Costa Rica
reported that it was apparent from the local press in San
Jose that the misunderstanding over the treaty persisted.

He

further indicated that Costa Rican national pride in the matter could not be "bought off" as he had initially believed.
Rather, he now felt that Costa Rica would have to be assured
further that its national rights were not being violated by
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty and any payments to be made to Costa Rica for similar treaties must be made in proportion to
the rights of Costa Rica. 32
Costa Rica went even further in pressing the United
States on the issue of the canal.

The Minister of Foreign

Affairs in San Jos,, Manuel Castro Quesada, assured the representative of the United States that Costa Rica did not wish
to interfere in any way with a canal which would be beneficial
to it as well as to the rest of the hemisphere.

However,

Costa Rica maintained that the United States, in any negoti31 secretary of State to u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at
San Jose, 28 January 1915, 817.812/1066, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1915 (Washington, D.C.: Government
1'ilinting Office, 1924)-;-p:' 1104.
32 u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 63, 3 February 1915, 817.812/110, ibid.,
pp. 1105-1106.

14
ations regarding canal treaties or any other matters, must
respect the treaties already in existence. 33 Thus, they
stated that the United States must respect the NicaraguanCosta Rican treaty of 1886 and must consult Costa Rica before
concluding any canal treaty with Nicaragua.
Negotiations continued throughout 1915, while at the
same time the United States was considering the Bryan-Chamorro
Treaty in the Senate.

Compounding the Costa Rican resistance

to the treaty was the growing belief in Central America that
the United States was attempting to subvert any attempts at
federation there.

34

When the treaty was at last approved by

the United States Senate in February of 1916, Costa Rica,
along with El Salvador and Colombia, complained bitterly that
it subverted their rjghts. 35 Although only Costa Rica had a
treaty with Nicaragua (1886) which was violated by the BryanChamorro agreement, El Salvador and Colombia joined in the
protest due to the potential threat to other similar bilateral agreements to which they adhered.

They were met with

Secretary of State Robert Lansing's reply that there was no
jeopardy to their rights implied or stated in the treaty and
that the matter was concluded between two sovereign states,
33 u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 65, 12 February 1915, 817.812/111, ibid.,
p. 1108.
34

Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 252.

35 Notter, Origins of Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. 497.

15
t~e

United States and Nicaragua, and was of no concern to
them. 36
At this point, Costa Rica took the matter to the Central American Court of Justice which had been formed following
the 1907 Central American Conference held in Washington, D.C.
as a means to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes
among the Central American states. 37

Filing its petition for

a review of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in March, 1916, it re•
ceived a ruling favorable to its position in September of
that year. 38

Secretary of State Lansing responded to the de-

cision by stating that the Court had no jurisdiction over the
matter. 39 Then, in a serious error of judgment, both political
and legal, the United States and Nicaragua proceeded to completely ignore the decision of the Court and viewed the Treaty
as final.~O

Both acted completely out of self interest and

with total disregard for the procedures which had been established for the. Jnaintenanoe of peace and cordial relations in
Central America.
The Central American Court of Justice, as another attempt at joint action by the Central American republics, was
36 Ibid.
37The Central American Court of Justice is not fully
treated in any of the sources cited here. However 9 the most
complete description can be found in Karnes, Failure of Union,
p. 202.
38 aowland, American Relations, p. 223.
39Notter, Origins of Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. ~97.
4 °Karnee, Failure of Union, p. 252.
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already well on the way to failure before this incident.

How-

ever, it can be argued that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty administered the final blow to the institution which the United
States had promoted so strenuously only ten years before. 41
More important to the study here, however, is the effect of
this course of events on Costa Rica.

The disregard shown by

the United States for the sovereign rights of the Costa Rican nation would prove a galling sore to Costa Rican national
pride and hinder amicable relations between the two nations
for some time to come.

The issue of the canal treaty was re-

solved by the acceptance of Costa Rica in 1921 of a payment
from the United States in return for a cession of canal
rights through Costa Rican territory. 42 But the enthusiasm
of the Costa Rican nation for the Central American Court of
Justice was probably the last time the Costa Ricans became
seriously involved in any attempts at joint action on the
part of the Central American nations until the economic
union formed after the Second World War.
The Central American Court of Justice was only one of
the results of the United States-Mexican sponsored Central
American Conference held in Washington, D.C. in 1907.

The

conference itself was brought about by a variety of factors,
not the least of which was the desire of the United States
41Ibid., P• 202.
42 Howland, American Relations, p. 224.

17
Secretary of State Elihu Root to begin modification of the
"Dollar Diplomacy" whioh had characterized policy of previous
years. 43

Root, in cooperation with Porfirio Diaz of Mexico,

sought a consensus among the Central American states on the
issues of peace and arbitration of disputes involving only
central American states.

The oonference produced several

agreements, most of which were ratified by the five participants, Costa Rioa, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

As stated previously, the Central American Court of

Justice, founded as a result of the Conference, was essentially destroyed as a result of the actions of the United
States and Nicaragua in ignoring the decision of the Court on
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 1916.

The goals of the Conference,

as expressed by its president Luis Anderson, a Costa Rican,
included attempts at peaceful and harmonious cooperation in
Central America as a reasonable alternative to confederation.qq
These attempts accepted the idea that confederation was simply
not a workable solution to Central American problems.

Essen-

tially it was hoped that with the measures adopted by the conference, including the Court of Justice, the Central American
states could reach the same spirit of cooperation they had
43 Wilfrid Hardy Calcott, The Caribbean Polic¥ of the
United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: 'i'iie Johns Hopkins Press,
!942), p. 220.
~qKarnes, Failure of Union, p. 191.

18

attempted in the past through confederation. 45

Thus it can

be seen that anything which adversely affected these measures
would be viewed as an obstruction to Central American unity.
Another measure of the 1907 Conference which fell into disrepute was the Tobar Doctrine, an agreement which would
deny recognition to governments which had gained power by
46
.
revo l ut ion.

Costa Rica, along with the other conference

participants, would adhere to this agreement.

But in this in-

stance, the Central American states themselves would find this
an unacceptable restriction following the problems encountered
by the revolutionary Tinoco regime in Costa Rica and the
equally revolutionary Mart!nez regime in El Salvador in achieving the recognition of the United States after having been recognized by the other Central American states.

The problems of

both of these regimes will be discussed at greater length in
subsequent chapters.

The important thing to note here is that

the Central American states reached a decision with regard to
an internal issue of order on the question of recognition,

whereas in the case of the Court of Justice, external pressures, combined with the cooperation of one Central American
state, brought about its demise.
The decision of the Central American states, led by
4 5Ibid.

~ 6 William L. Neumann, Jr., Reco~nition of American

Governments (Washington, D.C.s Founaations for Foreign Affairs, Pamphlet No. 3, 1947), p. 13.

19
Luis Anderson, the Costa Rican theorist, to refrain from another attempt at confederation in 1907 prevented still another failure in the series of attempts to combine five separate
and sovereign states into a single unit.

Both the role of the

United States in these events and the leadership exercised by

a Costa Rican in the Washington Conferenoe would have an impact
on the events in years to follow.
Another aspect of the Costa Rican self image as a
"loner" or leader in Central American affairs was the continuing Panama boundary dispute, which was in many ways similar to
its problems with Nicaragua.

The national press of Costa Rica

reflected the concern that only isolationism would maintain
Costa Rican sovereignty with the existence of a United States
dominated sphere of influence just to the south. 47 Costa Ri-

ca assumed the attitude that it had to deal only with Panama
on this issue for fear of the interference of the United States.
However, as events developed, the United States came to the side
of Costa Rica in the boundary question, perhaps seeking a "trade
off" in the Nicaraguan question.

The support of the Costa Ri-

can position in the dispute came from the mediation of Chief
Justice White of the United States Supreme Court in 1914.

The

matter was submitted to him for investigation at the insistence

of Costa Rica and as far as Panama was concerned, it was to be
47La Republioa (San Jos,), 28 July 1908, cited in
Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 195.
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merely a clarification of the previous award mediated by
President Emile Loubet of France, which had ruled in favor
48
of Panama.
The White award reversed the Loubet decision
and indicated that the territory in question belonged to Costa Rica rather than to Panama.

All the objections of Panama

notwithstanding, the United States adhered to this decision
throughout the discussions which transpired during the 1920's
and 1930's, which will be discussed in a later chapter.

Panama

objected on the grounds that the United States had, by virtue
of its canal treaty with them, sworn to guarantee the territorial integrity of Panama, which the White award failed to
do.49
This position by the United States had a long-reaching impact on the position of Costa Rica in the Central American community.

If it were the intent of the United States to

seek a favorable Costa Rican attitude toward the Bryan-Chamorro
Treaty, this did not succeed as has been shown above.

It

might also be speculated that this was part of a "divide and
conquer" mentality on the part of the United States in its
relations with Central America.

According to at least one

author, this simply would not have been necessary if the United States had sought to "conquer" Central America,since it had

49Ibid., II:303-312.
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50
• .
the strength to do so wi"th out d'1v1s1on.
It would be entirely misleading to say that Costa Rica
took on any great significance in the eyes of the United States
because of its resistance to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty or, as
indicated, by the United States's favoritism for its cause
in the Panamanian boWldary dispute.
tra?'Y might be said to be true.

In fact, quite the con-

When another matter of great

importance in inter-American affairs, the recognition of the
revolutionary government in Mexico, came up for discussion,
Costa Rica was relegated to the status of a non-participant
and was notified after the fact of the decision made by the
United States, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and
Guatemala in the matter. 5 1 For the Costa Ricans, however, the
question was not of any great importance, since it had already
made its own policy and was quietly pursuing it.

Throughout

this period of revolution in Mexico, Costa Rica had maintained
consular posts in the major Mexican cities and continued to do
so with or without the concurrence of other American states. 52
The independence of action shown by Costa Rica in the
foregoing, which characterized its international

behavio~

in

the period before 1919, was indicative of the strong national50Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 208.
51

Secretary of State to the Minister of Costa Rica at
Washington, 19 October 1915, 812.00/16614a, Papers Relating to
Foreign Relations, ~. p. 771.
52 Memorias, 1914-1915, p. 123.
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istic sentiments motivating Costa Rican policies during this
period.

Such independence would continue to mark later Cos-

ta Rican policies.
This introduction to Costa Rica's policies and attitudes poses more questions than it answers.

The paucity of

information about some of these issues makes them difficult
to study and even more difficult to fit into any conclusive
pattern.

However, in the following chapters an attempt will

be made to resolve the major question of Costa Rican self image as it was manifested in national policies and international
relations during the 1919-1939 period.

CMP~R

II

THE TINOCO REGIME
Before considering Costa Rican internationalism during
the period under study (1919-1939), it is important to note
the internal political events and issues which would effect
international policies and attitudes.

The most significant

political development to the 1919-1939 period was the coup
d'etat led by Federico Tinoco in January, 1917.

This coup

touched all the important issues which were part of Costa Rican internationalism and established patterns which characterize the following twenty years.
As was indicated previously, political conditions in
Costa Rica during the nineteenth century, and in the early
twentieth, were unusually stable for a Central .American republic.1

This fact, while a matter of considerable national

pride, is related by some sources to the strict control of
the processes of government by a dominant element within
Costa Rican society, 2 which included its manipulation of an
1Among other sources see Busey, Notes on Costa Rican
Democracy, p. 44 Howland, American Relations, p. 220.
2u.s. Charg' Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the
23
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elaborate electoral system characterized by nwnerous checks
and balances. 3 An assessment of th~ role of an oligarchy in
Costa Rican politics is extremely difficult to make due to the
ill-defined nature of that group.

The difficulty arises from

the fact that the "oligarchy" was not a static group, nor was
membership in it determined by a select list of family names
or occupations.

Yet, most observers of Costa Rican society

are in agreement that such an oligarchy did exist.

Land own-

ership represented the essential ingredient for measuring
the political power of members of the oligarchy. 4 Much of
the land held in large lots by Costa Ricans was devoted to
coffee growing. 5 Eventually, the introduction of bananas as
a money crop changed the power base in Costa Rican politics,
but this would not occur until after World War I.

However,

land and the profits it produced were the sole basis for power
prior to that time.

Before the First World War and the emer-

gence of bananas as an important cash crop, the large landholders did not control the loyalty of people as a consequence of their landowning.

Approximately one half of the

Secretary of State, No. 64 1 27 May 1913, 818.00/42 1 Records
of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs
of Costa Rica, 1910-1929 1 National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy 669. Referred to hereinafter as MC669.
3Charles F. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics,
The Allyn and Bacon Series in Latin American Politics (Hoston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971) 1 p. 43.
4 Ibid., p. 18.
5 Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, p. 22.
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land was divided up into numerous small landholdings operated
by the owner

~nd

his family.

The other half of the land was

tied up in large plantation-size holnings.

6

Labor for the

plantations was generally drawn from the ranks of the small
landholders who worked for wages on them. 7

But since better

than two thirds of the small landholders supported themselves
solely on the income of-their own land, 8 the large landowners
could not get any economic strangle hold on their loyalties.
The greatest strength of the landowning aristocracy
early in the twentieth century lay in the relative political
apathy of the small independent landowners.

The large land-

owners could well afford political activities and used their
wealth to dominate the government of the nation.

This too

would change in the course of the early twenthieth century,
but not until after the educational reforms enacted at the
turn of the century aroused and equipped a rising middle
class. 9

But the change of power would be surprisingly free

of any vehe•ent class antagonism, primarily because of the
positive results of land ownership by the politically dominated classes.

Perhaps an additional reason for the lack of

hostility between the oligarchy and the lower classes can be
6 nenton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics, p. 16.

7Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, p. 63.
8 Ibid., p. 64.
9 Ibi.d ., pp. 50 -51.
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found in the fact that at no time could the oligarchs be
characterized as nonproductive or parasitic members of society which at least one author regards as a primary cause
for major social upheavals. 10
Despite changes which would mark Costa Rican society
and the character of the elements which dominated national

politics, early in the twentieth century the oligarchy still
controlled the political life of the nation.

As will be dis-

cussed, the strength of this oligarchy would elect Alfredo Gonz~lez

Flores as President in 1914 and then unseat him in 1917.
This oligarchy of wealthy aristocrats also had among

their number the majority of past Presidents as well as governmental officials of all levels.

This led to a situation in

which electoral campaigns in Costa Rica were personalist rather
than ideological in character.

There were actually no politi-

cal parties as that term is usually understood until after the
changes in society which were noted above. 11 All groupings
which might be construed as political parties were in reality
personalist organizations which advocated the candidacy of a
specified

individual~

A further result of the dominance of Costa Rican political affairs by the oligarchy was the fact that, until 1913,
10ibid., p. 4R.
11 u.s. Charg~ Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of Secretary of State, No. 64 9 27 May 1913 9 818.00/
42, MC 669.
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presidential elections were conducted by an electoral system
in the Congress, whose members were also not directly elected
by

the populace.

Thus presidential elections were removed

from the electorate by the oligarchy.
Election reform laws, which brought about the first
popular election of the Costa Rican President were put into
effect for the 1913 elections. 12 The candidates were, as usual, members of the oligarchy. 13 The campaign, as usual, waD
a battle of personalities rather than of issues. 14

However,

the results of the voting were inconclusive, with none of the
candidates receiving a clear majority. 15 This, according to
one reading of the reformed election laws, left the selection
of the president in the hands of the Congress so that, despite
the changes of the law, the election was not a direct one as
had been planned.
Again, the campaigning was quite bitter and directed
at the personalities of the candidates.

However, exercising

its somewhat uncertain prerogative to elect whomever it chose,
12Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, p. 4.
1 3u.s. Charg(; Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 64 1 27 May 1913, 818.00/42, MC 669.
1 4u.s. Charg6 Marshall Langhorne at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, 5 June 1913, 818.00/143, MC 669.
15 u.s. Charg~ Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 18 1 9 May 1914 1 818.00/45, MC 669.
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the Congress selected Alfredo Gonz~lez Flores as President. 16
In addition, a completely new slate of three candidates for
the three Desi5nados, or Vice Presidents, was chosen. 17 Usually these were the select assistants of the president or the
runners-up in the presidential voting.

In this instance, on

what appeared to be a whim of the Congress, tha Designados
were

no~

chosen from the list of the previous candidates.

The Congress was not governed by any specific legal ruling
on this part of the issue.

It should be remembered that since

there were no real political parties or ideological differences
to speak of among the candidates, a situation placing the runners-up in the Designado position would not necessarily present any grave problems.
There had been considerable politicking throughout
the Congressional deliberations, with Gonzalez Flores's candidacy advocated by a group led by the prominent Tinoco family.1 8
As

a reward for this assistance, Federico Tinoco was chosen as

the Minister of War in Gonzalez Flores's cabinet.

In addition,

he received a vague promise of similar assistance from Gonzalez Flores in a future presidential election. 19
Federico Tinoco and his family were members of the
1 6 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization, p. 26.

19 Ibid.
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oligarchy described above.

They were not outstanding in

wealth or reputation among their peers as evidenced by the
lack of specific information about them.

But they were capa-

ble, at the time of the 1914 election, of putting together a
coalition in the Congress to achieve the election of Gonzalez
Flores.

Since the Tinoco family had the political influence

to accomplish this, it is somewhat puzzling that they did not
seek to elect one of their own family.

However, this probably

can be answered by the politics of the day in that the time
was not yet right for a Tinoco candidacy.
The unusual means by which Gonzalez Flores was elected
would be extremely important to subsequent events.

According

to at least one Costa Rican historian, the election was received with considerable indignation by the populace at large
due to its affront to the dignity of the constitution. 20 The
Congressional choice of an individual who was not one of the
original candidates would become a matter of some dispute as
well.

Whether the Congress had the right to overlook the three

candidates who had undergone the popular vote would be increasingly questionable as the President's popularity waned,
and the issue provided a point at which his enemies could
strike.

However, the role of the Tinoco family in the polit-

ical maneuvers which brought about the election of Gonzalez
20 Le6n Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica (2
Tomes, San Jose: Imprenta Falco Hermanos & Co., n.d.), II:
104.
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Flores would be overlooked or simply forgotten. 21
The personal involvement of the Tinocos in the election was important, especially in the re·wards they were promised or thought they had been promised.

In any event, it is

important to remember that this election, despite its alleged
popular beginnings, was like those which had preceded it in
that it was an internal affair of the oligarchy rather than

a universal reflection of Costa Rican public opinion.
Gonz~lez

Flores as President proposed several reform

programs. the most important of which were economic changes
.
22
.
. 1 crises.
to meet recent f 1nanc1a

In attempting to estab-

lish relative fiscal stability for the nation, he proposed
tax increases and some new taxes. 23

The main thrust of this

tax program would have been felt by the oligarchy• who bitterly resented any imposition of taxes upon their wealth. 24
In some ways it is extremely difficult to comprehend Gonz(lez
Flores's motivations for a program with such predictable reactions.

However, it can only be said in his defense, for
21 Ibid.
22 special Report on the Political and Financial Situ-

ation of Costa Rica from Vice Consul Albert B. Pullen at Port
Limon to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1917 1 F. W.
818.00/-- MC669.

23u.s. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, No. 124• 2 May 1918, 818.00/--.
MC 669; u.s. Charg~ E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary
of State• 31 January 1917 1 818.00/67, MC 669.
24

Ibid.
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lack of any contrary evidence, that this may have been the
only viable avenue open to him for additional tax revenues.
The diRcontent was heightened further by the bitterness felt
at this reward for the assistance in securing Gonzalez Flores's election, plus the fact that he attempted to stifle
criticism of his measures by allegedly hindering the "freedom of the press" and of the vote of the populace in the
Congressional elections of 1915. 25 Although it is difficult
to determine whether the ambition of Tinoco himself or the
instigation of the oligarchs brought about succeeding events,
the issue is not really a crucial one. 26
Further, there were negotiations in progress between
Gonzalez Flores and foreign investors who were interested in
receiving oil exploration concessions from the Costa Rican
government.

Gonz~lez

Flores exercised his influence in favor

of one group of foreign businessmen, which stirred some serious animosity on the part of those who were left out, not
to mention the Costa Ricans who were associated with these
groups.

One such group had forged rather strong ties with

the Tinoco clan and hoped to benefit from the close association of the family with the government.

When their proposal

was passed over, the Greulich-Valentine or Sinclair-Greulich
25 Leon Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:
104.
26 u.s. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos'
to the Secreta:C'y of State, No. 124, 2 May 191S, F.W. 818.00/
--, MC 669.
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group (the two names are interchangeable> 27 conducted some
rather indiscreet business with the Tinocos, which would have
a serious bearing on the future course of events surrounding
Tinoco.

More will be said about this below.
The momentum against Gonz!lez Flores continued through-

0 ut

his term.

However, since reelection was not permissable

bY the Constitution, his return to the presidency was not of
great concern until late in 1916 when rumors began to circu1ate that he either intended to seek reelection or at least
control a successor of his choice. who clearly would not be
Federico Tinoco.

The issue was complicated by an alleged an-

nouncement from a prominent member of the oligarchy, Manuel
Castro Quesada, that he would lead the reelection campaign

for Gonzalez Flores. 28

The only source for this news of Gon-

z!lez Flores's intentions and Castro Quesada's role in the
matter is Tinoco himself. 29

A possible explanation for the

assumption that Gonzalez Flores sought his own continuation
27 nr. Greulich was a United States investor who re-

presented not only his own interests but also those of the
Sinclair Oil Company. The Valentines, Lincoln G. and Washington s., were "agents at lax'ge" functioning for various interests throughout Latin America, in this instance for the
G~eulich-Sinclair concern.
28 w. H. Field (Montealegre & Bonilla, Import & Ex-

pert), to J. H. Stabler, Department of State, 31 January
1917 9 818.00/78• MC 669.
29 President Federico Tinoco to u.s. Minister E. J.
H~le at San Jes~, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in u.s. ~~nister
E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary of State• No. 111, a
~rch 1917• 818.00/111, MC 669.
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in power was that he was attempting to name his successor to
the presidency.

Since such a practice might be construed as

a violation of free election laws, he may be culpable in part
for the wrongs attributed to him in this matter.

However,

even pro-Tinoco sources do not directly maintain that Gonzalez Flores intended to bypass constitutional elections for
his chosen successor. 30 Later events would not confirm or
deny the allegations, but the fear among the oligarchy that
Gonzalez Flores would seek a second term or would use his
power as an incumbent to forward a chosen successor who would
continue his policies was strong.

While they could obviously

have prevented such abuses, the oligarchs would resent any
interruption of the status quo and the potential loss of profit to their various business enterprises which such actions
might represent.
On January 27, 1917, Federico Tinoco, with the assistance of his brother Joaquin and others, very peacefully
seized the telegraph and radio facilities and, by late afternoon, he had been installed in the presidential palace, taking
power on the basis of Gonzalez Flores's unconstitutional intent to remain in office. 31 Gonzalez Flores, in the company
30 carlos Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica (Decima
Edicion, San Jose: Imprenta Trejos, 1960), p. 269.
31 "Proclama del General Don Federico Tinoco al Pueblo
de Costa Rica," from La Gazeta, 28 enero 1917 in La ca{da del
Gobierno Constitucional en Costa Rica, El Golpe de Estado de
~7 de Enero de 1917 (New York: DeLaisne & Carranza~ 1919), p.
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of some of the members of his Cabinet and a few Congressmen,
fled to the

Am~rican

legation where he was granted asylum

pending the instruction of the State Department, which were
delayed because of Tinoco's control of all outgoing conununications. 32
Depending on the account which can be believed, the
revolution of January,1917 was either a bloody, cutthroat
manifestation of Tinoco's power hunger, 33 or it approached
comic opera proportions. 34 Since the accounts reflect the
partisanship of the witnesses, it is likely that neither extreme is accurate. There were, however, few, if any, casual ties reported 35 as a result of the coup; therefore, it can
be assumed that the bloodthirsty description is considerably
exaggerated.

Further evidence is that Gonzalez Flores and

his group were allowed to leave the country unmolested. 36
9, r. W. 818.00/--, MC 669. This source will be cited hereinafter as La Ca!da del Gobierno Constituoional.

32 George W. Baker, Jr., "Woodrow Wilson's Use of the
Hon-Recognition Policy in Costa Rica," The Americas, Vol. 22
(July, 1965), p. 8. This work is an extract from Baker's
major work on Wilson's foreign policy.
33 Ex-president Don Alfredo Gonzalez Flores and Excharg~ to the U.S. Rafael Oreamuno to ::?resident Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918 9 818.00/509 1 MC 669.

34 John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San
Jos~, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in u.s. Minister E. J. Hale
at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917,
818.00/116, MC 669.
35 u.s. Minister E.
tary of State, No. 113, 15
36 Ibid.

34

Tinoco's support for this coup came from several
sources.

Among these he claimed a wide popular following,

with substantial support among the important people of Costa
Rica and the approval of the majority of the Congress as the
"savior of the country. 1137 It is difficult to uphold his
claim to popular support.

The views expressed in the nation-

.
38 b ut since
.
a 1 press were f avora bl e to Tinoco,
t h ere were
strict codes of censorship enforced by him, admitted by all
sides of the question, press opinion is of little significance
in answering this question.

However, there was obviously no

broad popular movement to bring about his downfall, and when
he was finally supplanted, it was again by the powerful oligarchy which had brought him to power.

In the interim, how-

ever, the country seemed to be united behind him and a "condition of complete harmony" existed. 39
There is another side to the possible sources of support for Tinoco 1 s coup other than those motivated by his
stated claim to solving an unconstitutional situation. 40
37 Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, ::?• 259.
38

Proceso De La Restauracion 0 La Intervenci6n Americana En Costa Rica (San Josfi: Imprenta Librer!a Y Encuadernaci5n Alsina, 1922), p. 21.
39 John M. Keith to u.s. Minister E, J. Hale at San
Jos~, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in u.s. Minister E. J. Hale
at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917,
818.00/116, MC 669.
40
President Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J.
Hale at San Jose, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister
E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3
March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
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Gonz~lez

supporte~G

Flores and many of his

would claim and

insist they could prove that Tinoco had been paid to rebel
against legally constituted authority by United States financial interests.

This claim

t~at

Tinoco was a puppet of Amer-

ican capitalism referred to information which linked him to
Lincoln G. Valentine, the representative of the Greulich oil
intcresto.

For the benefit of the United States State De-

partment, a pamphlet of unknown authorship was published by
the Gonz!lez Flores's lobby in Washington, which presented
genuine documents proving that Valentine had planned to buy
the favor of the Tinocos by granting them large portions of
the capital stock of the oil corporation which would be formed
to work the concession granted by the Costa Rican government. 41

According to this pamphlet, Valentine had undertaken

this plan when

Gonz~lez

Flores chose another concessionaire

over the Greulich proposal. 42

Tinoco then allegedly used the

"constitutional" argument merely to deceive the people. 43
This pamphlet was also presented to the United States Senate
Foreign Relations Committee as it took up the matter of recognition of the Tinoco government. 44

For the sake of its

41 La Ca{da del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 14.
42 sworn Statement of Lincoln G. Valentine, Enclosure

#2 in U.S. Minister William J. Price in Panama to the Secretary of State, No. 1868, 27 March 1918, F. w. 818.00/--, MC
669.

43

,

La Caida del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 14.

44 Ibid., p. 49.
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credibility, it is unfortuna"te that there is no further information available concerning the origins of this pamphlet.
It was one of a group of unnumbered documents preceding the
regularly nurr..bered documents in Microcopy 669.
Here again, the facts of the matter are somewhat difficult to ascertain.

Valentine was by no means an idealistic

individual who would be limited by the constitutional means
available to him to get the concession if these proved impossible or would deprive him of profits.

In the manner of

lobbyists, he certainly was not above granting favors to influential individuals in the government who would further his
cause.

In the realm of Costa Rican politics, presents of

stock and direct financial support for those governmental officials who would further one's cause were not frowned upon.
In fact, such gifts and gratuities were considered part of
the operating expenses of most major corporations.

Thus, it

is entirely likely that Valentine had paid the Tinocos to
support his claim and would be willing to pay handsomely for
the new Tinoco government to annul the concession granted to
others by Gonz!lez Flores and grant it instead to the Greulich interests.

It should be remembered that the evidence

supporting the case against Tinoco and Valentine was a part
of Gonzalez Flores's attempt to bring about United States intervention in Costa Rica and it is thus difficult to deterllll.ne the truth in the matter. 45 However, it was concluded by
45 Proceso de Restauracion, p. 15.
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John Fos"ter Dulles, actinz as a special investigator for the
State Department, that there had been absolutely no foreign
involvement in the instigation of the coup and that the entire issue was one of domes-tic politics. 46
In any case, after the substantial investments in
time, effort, and money made by ?alentine, the Greulich interests did not receive the concession which Tinoco granted
to a British concern, nominally headed by a United States
. .
Amory. 47
citizen,

Valentine himself received less than cour-

teous treatment by the Tinoco government, which at one point
jailed him. 48

It is simply not realistic to say that Tinoco

would treat the source of his funds for revolution and continuation in power in this fashion.

There may be some truth

to the allegations that Valentine had influenced Tinoco and
others who were dissatisfied with

Gonz~lez

Flores in planning

the coup, but that is what Tinoco himself claimed publicly. 49
The importance of this whole issue to this study is
46 John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 May
1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.
47 u.

s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC
669.
48

Lincoln G. Valentine to W. H. Field, 1 February 1919 1
Enclosure in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC 669.
49p resident
.
.
T.inoco to U.S. Minister
. .
E• J •
Federico
Hale at San Jose, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister
E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3
March 1917 11 818.00/111, MC 669.
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that the State Department and Woodrow Wilson chose to believe
Gonzalez Florea'a claims about Tinoco'• sources of support.
There were conflicting reports aa to the popularity of Tinoco' s regime, but due to the policies adopted by the Wilson
administration 1 they chose to accept only those reports which
supported the view that a president who rose to power without
benefit of an election muat be unpopular.

The

acceptance of

Gonzalez Florea in 'the United States legation and his subsequent welcome to Washington would further make it extl"emely
difficult for Tinoco or his adherent• to get a just hearing
in Washington for their government.

Even though Lincoln G.

Valentine would come forward and sign an affadavit for the
American Consul in San Joa' swearing that he had not paid
Tinoco to engineer the coup, this story waa believed until the
last day of the Tinoao regime. 50 In addition 1 once Valentine
had been ruled out aa the source of funds for the coup, Minor

c.

Keith was proposed as a possible donor due to his support
of the Tinoco regime. 51 There was even consideration in the
United States of treason charges against Keith for hia activities which were viewed aa inimical to the interests of the
United Statea. 52

SO Ibid.
51Memorandum of John Foster Dullea to Hon. Charles
Warren, Department of Juatice 1 2- August 1917, 818.00/23-a,
MC 669.
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The coup d'etat had other important ramifications for
Costa Rican international affairs.

First and foremost was
John M. Keith, 53 the

the damage done to the constitution.

nephew of Minor C. Keith and a long time resident of Costa
Rica, who, though a United States citizen, had married into a
prominent Costa Rican family, believed Tinoco had no alternative but to rewrite the constitution.

According to Keith,

the coup d'etat completely discredited the constitution as if
it were a "humpty dumpty" which could not be put together
again. 54 Keith argued, however, that this was not due to any
lack of democratic spirit on the part of the Costa Ricans or
Tinoco, but rather reflected the fact that the Latin American
mind did not associate the spirit of a democracy with the manmade instrument of a constitution.

Like all other man-made

devices, constitutions occasionally died and had to be replaced by newer and younger instruments. 55
loss of a

aone~itution

Therefore, the

could not be viewed as the loss of a

democracy, but merely as a change or improvement on the accessories of democracy, and in this case, since the revolt
53 John Keith had extensive business ties in Costa Ri-

ca. He did not, as had his uncle, sell the major part of his
holdings to the United Fruit Company. Keith expressed a knowledgeable sympathy for the Costa Ricans and Tinoco.
54 John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San
Jos,, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #2 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale
at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917,
818.00/116 9 MC 669.
55 Ibid.
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had come in response to a corrupt government, the revolt
could be. viewed as the first step in reform. 56

However, this

view was not shared by the United States government in the
policies which it adopted toward Tinoco, as will be discussed
in the next chapter.
Relevant to the internal affairs of Costa Rioa, however, is the fact that the gradual severing of economic ties
with the United States resulting from nonrecognition contributed to the general economic instability of the Tinoco government and, as United States Minister E. J. Hale had predicted, its eventual political demise. 57

Politically, the

tacit support of the United States for Gonzllez Flores's contentions concerning Tinoao's motives did Tinoco grave damage.
In effect, the United States harbored Costa Rican dissidents,

-

encouraged them in their resistance to the de facto government and thus gave heart to those dissidents who were in Costa Rica, preventing Tinoco from ever establishing real politica l stab 1·1·ity. 58
In spite of these handicaps, Tinoco managed to hold
his presidency together for over two years.

During that

time, according to the account one consults, there was either
56 Ibid.
57 u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 18 August 1917, 818.00/134, MC 669.

105.

58 Le6n FernAndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:

41

democratic rule based on a truly constitutional presidency
(Tinoco had held elections within four months of attaining

pow~r) 59 or there was severe oppression supported by phony,
engineered elections led by a tyrant, as Gonzalez Flores contended. 60

In this instance, it is not too difficult to de-

termine the truth.

There was certainly some lack of politi-

cal freedom under the Tinoco regime.

But when it would not

have been necessary to do so, he held elections to legalize
his position.

In addition, Tinoco arranged for a new con-

stitution to be written.

For the reasons noted above by John

M. Keith, this was an absolute necessity for his duration in
power and for the continued health of the democratic system
in Costa Rica.

However, these same facts viewed by a new

United States Consul in San Jos,, Benjamin F. Chase, led to
far different conclusions.

According to the individuals who

held that post during the Tinoco presidency (Primarily Benjamin F. Chase and Stewart Johnson), there were constant
purges of opposition leadership, the jails were full of political prisoners and free men were afraid to walk the streets.
As to the first contention, it was only natural that Tinoco remove those opposed to his presidency from all positions in the
government.

Second, the political prisoners received an early

59u.s. Minister E.J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 2 April 1917, 818.00/123 1 MC 669.
60u.s. Charg' ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos6
to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1917 1 818.00/164, MC 669.
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amnesty, with Gonz!lez Flores and all of his main officers
allowed to leave Costa Rica in peaoe within a matter of weeks
after theaoup. 61 As to the third contention, even the State
Department was a little leery of Chase's evaluation, since he
had requested gun boats off the Costa Rican coast to protect
American lives and' property.

It was noted in a State Depart-

ment memorandum that Chase was being a little "hysterical"
about the state of affairs in Costa Rica. 62
Once again it is important to emphasize that while
Tinoco was no altruist, it is the opinion of this author that
he did the best job possible as president under some extremely
difficult circumstances.

If there was political bribery and

graft, this was as much a part of Gonzalez Flores's presidency
as it was of Tinoco's.

If there were concessions to the in-

terests of foreign capitalists on Tinoco's part, this was also
a part of Gonz,lez Flores's strategy to achieve the most advantageous financial arrangements for the nation.

It is impor-

tant to remember on this issue that, although the charge that
Tinoco was bought by Valentine was ma, de• the concession which
was at stake was finally granted to another individual.

Fi-

nally, if there was a repression of opposition spokesmen and
leaders under the Tinoco regime, this, too, was a part of the
long-established political tradition in Costa Rica.

Had Tinoco,

61Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 9.
62
Acting Secretary of State Polk to the American Mission in Paris, 15 May 1919, 818.00/613 1 MC 669.
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as Minister of War, spoken out against Gonzalez Flores's political policies and presidency, he would have been replaced in office at the very least.
When in the summer of 1919 Tinoco'& regime fell, there
was no great victory to be celebrated for the forces of right
and democracy.

The physical defeat of the Tinoco regime was

accomplished by revolutionary forces harbored in Nicaragua with
the encouragement or at least the tacit approval of the United
States. 63 The leadership of these forces was comprised of the
members of the oligarchy who were as disenchanted with Tinoco
in 1919 as they had been with Gonzalez Flores in 1917.

Finally

involved in that defeat was the strangulation of the international side of the Costa Rican national image.

It is a sign of the

importance of that international side that the deprivation of
normal relationships with the rest of the world conununity of
nations, would, within a matter of two years, bring about the
fall of an inunensely popular regime which had had as its starting point the restoration of constitutional rule and the support of the powerful oligarchy.

However, the question of Cos-

ta Rican internationalism during the Tinoco period and in the
years immediately following them will be discussed in the next
chapter.

63non Alfredo Gcnz!lez Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to
President Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC
669.

CHAPTER III
THE TINOCO REGIME AND RECOGNITION
(JANUARY, 1917-MAY, 1918)
In the matter of the recognition of the Tinoco aoup
d'etat by the United States and by the rest of the world,
there were a number of legal questions to be resolved.
First, it was necessary to consider the standing in international law of Tinoco's government.

Traditionally, recog-

----

nition was granted to de facto governments by the majority
of nations due to the impartiality of such a position.
adopt a policy of

2!

To

jure recognition implied partisanship, 1

since it involved interpretation of the law of another state.

----

Conditions could be added to the de facto recognition, such
as

the United States's addition of the ability of an incumbent

regime to pay the nation's debts before being judged~ facto. 2
This, of course, presumed that the incumbent regime was not
really out of line with the political philosophy of those
nations from whom recognition was sought.

However, with a

morally righteous statesman like Woodrow Wilson in control of
1Neumann, Recognition, p.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
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s.
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the mechanisms of international relations, there was a shift
in the emphasis from

~

fscto to

~

jure recognition, and the

adcition of the concept of constitutionalism to the conside:r-ation of~ jure status. 3 This implied that the new government, in order to achieve the status of a recognized state,
must be in compliance with the body of law of the nation in
question, as interpreted by other nations.

In effect, there

was to be a constitutionally valid line of succession from
one government to the next, much like a royal blood line in
its application.
Thus, in the case of Tinoco's coup, the problem was
already clouded by the question of Tinoco's legitimacy within
the context of Costa Rican law.

If, as Tinoco himself main-

tained, Gonzalez Flores had preempted the constitution in
seeking reelection, 4 then he was not legitimately entitled
to a continuation in power.

However, this assumption did not

extend legitimacy to Tinoco or to any other usurper, unless
it could be proven that he had acted within the provisions of
the constitution.
simply to defeat

The proper legal remedy would have been
Gonz~lez

Flores in his bid for reelection.

However, this too was a complicated issue.

As the incumbent

3Ibid., P• 13.
4"Prcclama del General don Federico Tinoco al Pueblo
de Costa Rica," from La Gazeta 1 28 enero 1917 in La Ca!da del
Gobierno Constitucional, p. 9; Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San Joe,, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in
U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jes~ to the Secretary of State,
No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
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president, Gonzalez Flores controlled the very closed Costa
Rican electoral system.

In addition, one of the marks of his

regime had been the electoral frauds perpetrated on the people
of Costa Rica. 5 So, it might be argued from Tinoco's viewpoint that since Gonzalez Flores had effectively cut off all
legal remedies, revolution was justifiable.
This left Tinoco no other avenue but revolt in the
context of the Jeffersonian nineteenth century liberal philosophy which he apparently espoused.

6

The next stage in the

legal complex then became whether Tinoco was the appropriate
leader of any such revolution.

Obviously, Woodrow Wilson,

who referred to Tinoco as " ••• that impossible person," did
not regard him as such. 7

Moreover, Wilson would not allow

that there was even a need for revolution in Costa Rica, adhering to the Tobar Doctrine of the 1907 Central American
treaties and his own 1913 declaration, which repudiated all
changes of government by revolutionary means. 8

It would be

his view that there was absolutely no excuse for revolution as
a means of remedying the political or legal problems of the

5James L. Busey, "Presidents of Costa Rica," The Ameri.£!!.• Vol. 18 (July, 1961), p. 65.
6 Federico Tinoco to u.s. Minister E. J. Hale
Jos~. 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister
Hale at San Jost to the Secretary of State, No. 111,
1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.
7woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 9
1919, 818.00/82~, MC 669.
8Neumann, Recognition, p. 13.

at San
E. J.
3 March
August
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Costa Rican nation.

All appeals by the "advocates of democracy" in Costa Rica to the contrary, 9 Wilson would not modify
bis stand that Tinoco had seized power without legal right to
do so. 10

An understanding of the nature of the revolution and
its ramifications upon the constitutional structure of Costa
Rican government would have been most useful to Wilson in his
decisions on the Tinoco I'egime.

The conunents of John M. Keith,

referred to in the previous chapter, would have provided much
of the information required to make an intelligent and just
decision.

Unfortunately, Keith's insights were not shared by

the policy makers in the United States, although they had received a copy of his letter to United States Minister Hale in
Costa Rica as a part of Hale's regular dispatohes. 11
In many respects, Tinoco was most unlucky in that it
was Woodrow Wilson to whom he had to look for acceptance.

To

Wilson, as to any righteous and moralistic United States democrat, there could be no excuse for the destruction of a constitution nor of a constitutionally elected government.
9woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 3 April 1918 1 in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson,
Life & Letters (8 Vols., New York: Gresnwood Press PUbfishers, 1968), 8:70.
10
charg& ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, 26 April 1918, 818.00/111, MC 669.

11John M. Keith to u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San
7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in u.s. Minister E. J. Hale
at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 Maroh 1917 1
818.00/116, MC 669.
Joa~,
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The United States Minister in Costa Rica during the
coup, E. J. Hale, disagreed with the home government.

Basic-

ally in agreement with his friend, John M. Keith, Hale indicated in his reports to the Secretary of State that while the
revolutionary natU!'e of Tinooo's rise to power was deplorable,
he felt that for practical reasons and out of deference to the
right of the nation to self determination, the government should
be reoognized. 12 Hale was not alone in his conclusion. John
Foster Dulles, a Special Agent for the Secretary of State, recommended recognition of the Tinoco regime because he observed
that there could be no guarantees that any successor government would be any improvement over Tinoco. 13 Further, Dulles
noted that Tinoco was inclined to ref use financial aid which
had been offered by the German conununity in Costa Rica in order
that he remain clearly pro-Ally in the war effort. 14 The
possibility that Tinoco might turn to the pro-German group in
Costa Rica was also raised by the conunanding officer of the
United States military forces in the Panama Canal zone. 15
General Plummer also warned that this would threaten the de12u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669.
13 summary of the Confidential Report on Costa Rica by

John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917,
818.00/200, MC 659.
1 4 rbid.

15 Report of Brigadier General Plummer, Conunanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 2~ May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of
War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166 1 MC 669.
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fense of the Canal zone. 16

His concern extended further to

the possible restoration of Gonz!lez Flores, whom he reported
was decidedly pro-German. 17 In spite of the fact that Hale

had such support for his views, he was quietly replaced in
April, 1917.

There is no correspondence which directly in-

dicated the reasons for his removal, but his successors at the
United States Legation in San Jos'

~ere

far less sympathetic

to the Costa Ricans, Tinoco, and John M. Keith's advice than
Hale had been.
The problem which confronted the Wilson administration
can be further clarified in view of the fact that Tinoco, after

the fact, decided that Gonz!lez Flores had not been constitutionally elected, even though Tinoco was himself a part of the
government.

The constitutionality of Gonz&lez Flores's elec-

tion was supported by some of the legal advisors called in by
the State Department to assess the matter, 18 but it was not
this issue that concerned Wilson.

He simply refused to recog-

nize the government of Federico Tinoco and the changed constitution which it enacted because of their revolutionary origins.
Furthe:rmore, Wilson either directly or by omission allowed the
United States to appear to support any and all insurgent groups
against Tinoco.

Although he would later deny that this had

16 rbid.
17 Ibid.

18 Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 4.
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been the case, it is likely that without the encouragement
that the United States would not intervene, many of the insurgents would never have initiated their movements.

Nica-

ragua, in partj.cular, was careless in letting it be known
that various Costa Rican insurgent groups were forming within
its boundaries and that no action would be taken against them
beyond meaningless warnings.19
So extreme was the dislike and discontent of the United States with the Tinoco regime that at one point it entertained the idea of funding Gonzalez Flores to lead an expeditionary force from the United States against Tinoco, with the
assurance of special agents of the State Department that this
would turn the tide in an irreversible fashion against Tinoco. 20
It can be strongly argued that only the involvement of the United States in the World War at that time prevented the implementation of this plan, but it was fortunate for the future relations between the two countries that it did not do so.
The issue of United States recognition was important
to Tinoco.

The lack of an accredited relationship with the

19 senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of
State Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542 1 MC 669; Acting Secretary of State Polk to Senator George H. Moses, 28 January 1919,
818.00/542 1 MC 6691 U.S. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1,
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political
Relations Between Costa Rica and Other States, 1910-1929, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy 671. Referred
to hereinafter as MC 671.
20 Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of
State, 27 August 1917, 818.00/315 1 MC 669.
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United States was an economic death knell for the Tinoco regime, coming as it did hard on the heels of the German submarine blockade of Europe, an<l the subsequent shift of Coste. Rican trade to the United States. 21

There was the continual

fear that the United States might choose to extend the nonrecognition so that United States citizens would be forbidden
to trade with Costa Rica, which would be a rapid and painful
death for the nation as well.

In fact, one of E. J. Hale's

replacements, Stewart Johnson, suggested that the "requisition" for the war effort of United States ships used for the
exportation of Costa Rican crops would inunediately topple the
most stable government.22
In addition, there was the fact that the nonrecognition policy severely restricted the involvement of United
States citizens in Costa Rican economic affairs in general.
As has been mentioned, there was consideration given to prosecution of Minor

c.

Keith for his involvement with Tinoco,

which was precisely the kind of pressure the Tinoco regime
feared might be exerted.

For the purpose of clarity, the

issue of United States and nonrecognition and its impact on
Costa Rican internationalism will be discussed at a later
point in this study.
21 Baker

1

"Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12.

22 u.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~
to the Secretary of State, No. 154 1 11 Aug~st 1917 9 818.00/

210, MC 669.
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The pressures exerted by Alfredo

Gonz~lez

Floz•es and

his party in Washington, D.C. upon President Wilson to effectuate a nonrecognition policy were not so significant as they
would have liked to believe.

They would claim that it was

only on the basis of their appeal to Wilson for justice that
he decided not to extend recognition to Tinoco under any circumstances.23However, this was not quite the case.

For Wilson,

as for all idealists, there was simply no gray area in the decision not to recognize Tinoco.

The fact that he was a revolu-

tionary leader, no matter what the cause he espoused, was
enough to deny him the legal status he sought in the world
community of nations.

Tinoco, and a variety of the supporters

of his coup, would claim that such rigidity condemned the p6ople of Costa Rica, as well as those of the rest of the world,
to endure tyrannies, unjust rulers, and all violations of their
natural rights at the hands of anyone who could manipulate an
election in his own favor as Gonzalez Flores had done. 24
The issue of Tinoco's recognition by the United States
was not a simple matter.

There were arguments on both sides

of the issue which complicated the policy decisions developed
by Wilson's subordinates and which were quite separate from

23Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, Manifesto a Mis Compatriotas

(Sa.'1. Jos~:

Imprenta Minerva, 1919), pp. 4-5.

24 Federico Tinoco to u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San
Jos~, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J.
Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March
1917, 818.00/111, MC 669.

53

Wilson's personal moral decision.

First, there was the in-

volvement of foreign investors and interests in the instigation and support of the Tinoco regime.

The role of Lincoln

G. Valentine and the Greulich oil interests, which was discussed in the previous chapter, would be reopened and reexamined repeatedly throughout the two years of Tinoco's tenure
at the insistence of Gonzalez Flores and his adherents in
Washington. 25

In the view of these individuals, the interests

of American capital in Costa Rica, which had been thwarted
by Gonzalez Flores's plans for the nation's economic stability and independence, would bring about the Tinoco coup and
control its course. 26

As has been demonstrated, however, the

individuals involved in this particular concession later,
quite vehemently, denied these charges. 27

The facts of the

case are extremely difficult to ascertain, but it is evident
that the favored position which Valentine sought with the
Tinoco regime and the favored position which Gonzalez Flores
claimed Valentine had received is simply not borne out by the
facts or the treatment Valentine subsequently received at the
hands of Tinoco. 28
25 Alfredo Gonz!lez Flores, El Petroleo y la Pol!tica
en Costa Rica (San Jos~: Imprenta Trejos Afios, 1920) 1 passim.
26 La Ca!da del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 52.
27
Lincoln G. Valentine to W. H. Field, 1 February
1919, Enclosure in u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josa
to the Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919 1 818.00/571 1

MC 669.
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While it may well be true that the search

fo~

petro-

leum off the Coast of Costa Rica was of great interest to entrepreneurs of several nationalities during this period, it
is unlikely that the economy of Costa Rica would have changed
overnight from an agriculturally dominated one to one of an
Then, too, the big money normally as-

industrial character.

sociated with oil and its discovery would not have been in
evidence at the early stages of exploration.

In 1922 9 there

was a controversy over the failure of various concessionaires
to pay the government appropriate fees for their grants.

29

They claimed in their own defense that they had found no oil
and therefore could not share the profits of such oil with
•

•

the Costa Rican nation.

3G

So it is unlikely that during the

Tinoco presidency any substantial amounts were actually paid
out to Costa Ricans.

Soma fees may have been granted to ob-

tain concessions and shares of future profits promised, but
without some production to pay the bills, there was likely
to be little more than promises. 31
29 secretary of State to the u.s. Minister in Costa Rica (Davis), 13 June 1922, 818.6363/120, United States, Department of State, Pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the

United States 1
22 Was 1ngton 1
fice, 19§8) 9 IsiOOl)-1001.

overnment

rint ng

aoibid.
31 rn the evidence presented by Gonz!lez Flores in the
case against the Greulich oonoern• reference was made to providing Tinoco with capital stock in the oil corporation being
formed. Obviously 9 there would be no income from these shares
until oil was being produced. La Ca!da del Gobierno Constitucional 1 p. 52.
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Another factor that complicated the recognition of
Tinoco in the eyes of Wilson's subordinates was the involvement of Minor

c.

Keith with the Tinoco regime.

At first, it

was thought that Keith had interests of a purely business nature, separate from official affairs of state. 32 Subsequently, Keith was accused of supporting the Tinoco coup for his
own politioal purposes, 33 or of supporting it for the concessions which he might receive, 34 which would seem to put him
in the same category as Valentine.
somewhat difficult to ascertain.

Here, too, the facts are
An investigation was under-

taken by the United States Department of Justice at the insistence of the Department of State concerning the scope of
Keith's involvement with Tinoco in the interests of pursuing
a criminal case against him for his activities to the detriment of the United States. 35 It was found that Keith had
backed various bond issues, in return for which he had received a variety of concessions, including cattle grazing
32 u.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1917, 818.00/193, MC 669.
33
u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, 4 December 1918, e18.00/520, MC 669.
34 swnmary of the evidence adduced in the Supreme Court,
Special Term, Part III, Before Mr. Justice Greenbaum In the
Case of Lardizabal vs. Valentine, 19 January 1918, and Statemen~s made by Witnesses to Counsel and Department cf Justice
Concerning the Revolution Which Occurred in Costa Rica, 27
January 1917, 818.00/385, MC 669.
35 Ibid.
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lan d s an d a Paci"f'1c

coast

.
s h'1pp1ng
monopo 1 y. 36

In fact, it

should be noted that these concessions were not made to Keith
outright but had to undergo Congressional approval.

In some
instances, such approval was quite difficult to achieve. 37

The only arrangement between Keith and Tinoco which could not
be construed as a "good business" deal for Keith was his guarantee of a shipping service from Costa Rica's Pacific Coast
with no guaranteed profit.

38

But from Keith's point of view,

this investment may have paid off in other, far more profitable ventures.

What might be an accurate description of the

Keith interest in the political stability of Costa Rica.
Thus he felt it important to 9Upport a de facto government
which demonstrated a measure of stability in order to maintain
"business as usual" as much as possible. 39 However, to observers at the State Department, who looked for a culprit in
4o
'
•
11'
.
th e T1noco
a ff air,
inor C• Kei'th was an exce 11en t c h oice.
36 u.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, No. 143, 20 July 1917, 818.00/73,
MC 669.
37 specific reference is to a cattle concession sought
by Keith and presented by Tinoco for Congressional approval
which took a great deal of effort on Tinoco's part to reach
approval. U.S. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, 11 October 1917, 818.00/73 9 MC $.69.
38Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of
State, 15 January 1919, 818.otl/307, MC ~69; U.S. Charg& ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State,
No. 154, 11 August 1917, 818.00/210, MC 669.
39
Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. s.
40 woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 21 July
1919, 818.00/306, MC 6sg.
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Surprisingly enough, although his nephew John M. Keith was
also financially tied to the regime, and was quite outspoken
in his support of it, he was not found culpable in the same
degree as was his uncle. 41
There were other issues involved in the arguments on
the recognition of the Tinoco regime for the Wilson administration.

As was noted previously, some strategists felt that

the defense of the Panama Canal Zone was extremely vital if
the United States were to become involved in ths European
war. 42

A failure to recognize Tinoco might throw the govern-

ment to the German side in the conflict, especially in view
of the rather large and active German comm.unity in San
which had repeatedly offered Tinoco funding. 43

Jos~

There were

those who argued that Tinoco ought to be recognized,since he
was anti German whereas Gonzalez Flores had been decidedly
pro German. 44

This was demonstrated by the fact that one of

41 John M. Keith also subscribed extensively to the Ti-

noco bond issues. U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~
to the Secretary of State, Telegr~m, 19 May 1918, 818.00/434,
MC 669.

42 Report of Brigadier General Plununer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary
of War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1317, 818.00/166, MC
669.

~ 3 Summary of John Foster Dulles's Confidential Re~ort
on Costa Rica to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/
200 9 MC 669.
44u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 89, 15 November 1914, 818.00G58/02, MC b69i
Special Agent· John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1
May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.
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Gonz~lez

Flores's closest advisors was Juan Kumpel, a Ger-

man. 45
It was also reported that Tinoco had reopened a ser-

ies of prewar negotiations with German interests for the purchase of coal lands in Costa Rica.

46

The worry over such an

entanglement was serious but not serious enough to prompt
President Wilson to act, even though there were also reports
that the German government had offered to recognize Tinoco.
There was no raaction, probably because Tinoco refused the
47
German Offer.
It seems puzzling that Tinoco would have refused the
German offers of aid and recognition, given his eagerness to
achieve recognition and legitimacy.

However, in his refusal

of German offers, Tinoco probably acted for practical reasons.
For the most beneficial results of recognition, the resumption of high levels of trade with Europe, so long as the United States withheld recognition, was necessary.

Costa Rica

would therefore have to wait until the conclusion of the war
45 Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12;
U.S. Minister William J. Price to the Secretary of State, 14
March 1917, 818.00/115, MC 669; U.S. Charge at Panama to the
Secretary of State, No. 1298, 14 March 1917, 818.00/118, MC
669.

46
u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the Secretary of State, 3 May 1918, 818.00/2, MC 669.
~ 1 U.S. Charge, in
. Venezuela to t h e s ecretary o f s ta~e,
No. 1019, 12 October 1917, 818.00/249, MC 669; Summary of Mr.

Dulles's Confidential Report on Costa Rica to the Secretary of
State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669.
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before such a program would be effective.
t~

Furthe~,

since Cos-

Rica itself had no merchant marine fleet, it was dependent

upon other nations, in this instance primarily on United States's
shipping, to deliver its products to markets.

While nonrecogni-

tion by the United States continued, it would not be a practical
policy for Tinoco or any other Costa Rican

pr~sident

to antag-

onize Woodrow Wilson and the United States any further by alignment in any way with Germany, even the acceptance of recognition.
Therefore, it can be assumed that Tinoco acted out of practical
good sense with regard to his German policy.
Another part of the concern engendered by the war was
the proximity of Costa Rica to the Panama Canal Zone and the
threat to the defense of the Canal if Costa Rica took an antiAmerican stance in the war. 48 How great a threat Costa Rica
alone could have posed to the Canal is questionable.

However,

the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States policy
in the Caribbean cannot be overestimated. 49 It is important
to remember that at this time Costa Rica had no standing army
as such and relied only on its militia units and local police
forces so that outside troop or naval assistance would have been
necessary for any direct threat to the Canal.

By 1918, however,

4 8Report of Brigadier General Plununer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of
War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669.
49 Howland, American Relation~, p. 311.
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with the lessened potential for direct German

s~pport,

it was

unlikely that Costa Rica posed any serious threat beyond that
of a nuisance.

It is difficult to examine this question clear-

ly, since at no time did Tinoco take an anti-Ally stand in the
war.

Had he done so, it might have prompted an entirely .dif-

ferent approach from the United States.
In the issue of Tinoco's recognition, the war and the
safety of the Western Hemisphere received much mention from individuals who were not primarily motivated in that direction
because they knew of its importance to President Wilson.

None-

theless, there were other arguments advanced to Wilson and his
subordinates for the recognition of Tinoco.

Not the least

among these were the concerns of American businessmen who had
interests in Costa Rica or who were intending to beoome involved there through recently granted Tinoco concessions. 50
Letters arrived at the State Department throughout the Tinoco
tenure from a wide variety of businessmen imploring the United States government to recognize Tinoco because delay of recognition would cost American citizens hard earned profits, not
to mention the taxes which the government would miss as a consequence. 51

-·----------50woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 April 1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:70; U.S. Consul
Benjamin F. Chase-at San Jos~ to the Secretar·y of State, 14De.cember 1918, 818.00/520, MC 669; Monge Alfaro, Historia de
Costa Rica, p. 254.
51 William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January
1917, 818.00/63, MC 669; W. H. Field to Woodrow Wilson, Enclo-
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The response of the Wilson

administratio~

to these in-

quiries and requests was, of course, an unqualified "No!"

Wil-

son indicated in fact that he felt loyal American businessmen
would cease all business affairs in Costa Rica so long as Tinoco remained in power. 52

Failing that, he entertained some

direct action against these businessmen who did not follow his
advice, 53 as in the case of Minor C. Keith.

While Keith had

achieved some measure of notoriety for his activities in

Cos-

ta Rica because of the size of his investments and the stature
of his prestige there, he was not unique in his involvement.

At the same time that attempts were made to exert pressure on
the Wilson administration, the same individuals were also advising and encouraging Tinoco with regard to his course toward
Wilson. 54

There was even one report that Keith was responsible

for advising Tinoco to declare war on Germany as a sure avenue
to the recognition of the United States. 55

While his motives

sure in Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 April
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:70.
52 William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January
1917, 818.00/63, MC 669.
53woodrow Wilson to Senator Joseph E. Ransdall, 5 March

1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:13; Woodrow Wilson to
Secretary of State Lansing, 21 July 1917, 818.00/306, MC 669.

54 William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January

1917, 818.00/63, MC 669.

55 u.s. Consul ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~
to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1917~ 818.00/306, MC 669.
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raay not have been altruistic, Keith, like Tinoco, probably
sought ·the most advantageous position possible for Costa Rica.

This could only be realistically interpret€d as a pro-

Ally stance and at the optimum, a cobelligerency with the United States.

However, none of these arguments was taken to

heart by Wilson, although at various times he did reflect
some irritation that reaterialistic interests of businessmen
would interfere with principle. 5 6

He also refused to allow

the profits of American businessmen to involve him in an "intrigue" in Costa Rica which would have brought about Tinoco's
replacement. 57 Therefore, it might be said that while Wilson's
moral stand on the issue of recognition was not open to suggestion from the standpoint

of pecuinary gain, neither was it

open to the suggestion of fomenting further revolution to right
an alleged wrong.

However, as will be demonstrated below, Wil-

son would not take any negative position toward the revolution
which was eventually begun against Tinoco from Nicaragua despite
its violation of provisions of the Tobar Doctrine and the 1907
Washington Treaties.
The husinessmen who had no luck with Woodrow Wilson or
his subordinates in the State Department next turned to the
Congress.

Senator Lodge asked the White House about the delays

56 woodrow Wilson to Senator Joseph E. Ransdall, 5 March
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Lett~, 8:13.
ril

57woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 Apibid., 8:70.

19~8,
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in recognition of the de facto regime on behalf of several
important business interests included among his constituency.SS
There were hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the issue of recognition, prompted by the presence of
Gonz!lez Flores and his cohorts in Washington. 5 9

However, con-

trary to their wishes in the matter, Senator George H. Moses,
sponsor of a subsequent resolution for immediate recognition
of the Tinoco regime, was not impressed by their lobbying efforts or evidence.60
Tinoco did not go unrepresented in the matter.

Early

in his administration he had employed the services of the prominent law firm of Douglas, 0 1 Bear and Douglas, who numbered
among their attorneys the former Secretary of State under Wilson, William Jennings Bryan.61

Bryan communicated directly

with President Wilson on the matter of Tinoco's recognition,
only to be rebuffed.62

Wilson asked Bryan to remain uninvolved

58Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 17.
59 Don Alfredo Gonz~lez Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to
Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669.
60 senate Resolution 362, Con~essional Record, 65th
Congress, 3rd Session, p. 23, cited Ii Baker,"Wilson 1 s NonRecognition Policy," p. 13.
61Paxton Hibben, The Peerless Leader William Jennin s
Bryan (New York: Russell & Russe 1, 1967 , p. 376.
62Reference to the letter is made in Woodrow Wilson to
William Jennings Bryan, 23 July 1918, Baker, Wilson's Life &
Letters, 8:291.
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in the Tinoco affair but failed in that effort. 63

Bryan was

paid handsomely for his involvement as a prestigious lobbyist for Tinoco in Washington, 64 and it is probably as a result
of his efforts; along with a few of the other pressures brought
to bear, that the Moses Resolution reached the Senate floor at
all.

Unfortunately for Tinoco, the Congressional delibera-

tions and lobbying took a gX'eat deal of time, and as Gonz!lez
Flores and Benjamin F. Chase had predicted, time was his undoing. 65

Before the matter came to a final vote, Tinoco had

been overthrown.

However, this did not occur before Presi-

dent Wilson had to answer some rather penetrating questions
posed by the Senators concerning his activity or lack thereof
in regard to Central American affairs relating to Costa Rica. 66
For example, by the time the hearings got under way,
the United States was overlooking the revolutionary movements
sponsored in and launched from Nicaragua against !inooo. 67
63 woodrow Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, 19 July
1918, ibid., 8:286.
64Hibben, William Jennings Bryan, pp. 361, 376.

65Manuel Castro Quesada to the Secretary of State, 28
February 1917, F. W. 818.00/--, MC 669; Don Alfredo Gonz!lez
Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to Woodrow Wilson, 12 November
1918, 818.00/509, MC 669; U.S. Charg' Benjamin F. Chase at San
JosG to the Secretary of State, No. 573, 818.00/658, MC 669.
66 Earl B. Gaddis, Secretary of the Senate Foreign Re-

lations Conunittee to F. K. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 16
December 1918, 818.00/522, MC 689.
67 President Woodrow Wilson to the American Legation in

San Jos6, 29 December 1917, 818.00/287 1/2, MC 669. This dispatch comments on the diplomatic difficulties which Wilson
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Although Gonz(lez Flores was worried about the warnings sent
out by the State Department to Nicaragua, 68 and such activity
was expressly forbidden by the Washington treaties of 1907,
the intent of the United States in the matter was obvious.
These same treaties were those by which Wilson refused to recognize Tinoco•s government.

But an issue of even greater con-

cern to the Senate was the failure of the United States to extend recognition to Tinoco once Costa Rica had declared war
on Germany in May, 1918, so the question of aid to revolutionaries was put in the background. 69

For the sake of clarity,

the declaration of war and its ramifications will be considered in a succeeding chapter.
The pressures brought to bear on the Wilson administration to recognize Tinoco were minimal compared to the pressures brought to bear on Tinoco to achieve that recognition.
First and foremost were the economic problems encountered by
his regime as a consequence of the nonrecognition policy. 70
foresaw if the movements were encouraged or even given tacit
approval by the United States.
68 Don Alfredo Gonz(lez Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to

Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669.
6 9Earl B. Gaddis, Secretary of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to F. K. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 16
December 1918, 818.00/522, MC 669; Woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 5 August 1919, 818.00/807, MC 669; Ricardo
Fern(ndez Guardia, Cartilla Hist6rica de Costa Rica (Sexta
Edici6n, San Jos': Librer!a e fmprenta Escolares, 1933), p.
126.
70u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Joa' to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1918, 818.00/134, MC 669.
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While there was never any embargo or quarantine of Costa Rica,
there were apparently a number of businessmen who held back
investments from Costa Rica until such time as the relations
between that nation and the United States were regularized. 71
Tinoco became so desparate on the issue of recognition that
at one point he offered to cede the Cocos Islands to the United States and to provide teZ'?'itory for a United States military installation in Costa Rica in return for recognition. 72
The United States was not at this time,

no~

would it be in the

future, interested in such a proposition, although the islands
would be assessed closely for their potential strategic value.
The necessity of achieving United States recognition
was all the more important for Tinoco, since several nations
declared that they intended to follow the lead of the United
States regarding recognition of Costa Rica.7 3 Although this
tendency would be modified as Tinoco maintained himself in
power for a time, the initial damage done to Costa Rican stature was severe.

European nations, favorably impressed by the

71woodrow Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, 23 July
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life g Letters, 8:291.
72 special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary
of State, 16 April, 1918, 818.00/142a, MC 669.
73rnternal Memorandum, Department of State, Stabler
to the Secretary of State, 25 June 1917, 818.00/171, MC 669-France; Internal Memorandum, Department of State, 19 April
1918, 818.00/404, MC 669--Sweden. Both notes refer to unofficial visits of members of the respective nations' legations in Washington to the State Department to sound out United States attitudes and to indicate the policy plans of
their nation.
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declaration of war on the part of Costa Rica, would soon seem
to realize that Tinoco had maintained himself in power successfully for an ample period of time to be considered a de facto
government.

The reactions of the European powers will be dis-

cussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
Within the Latin American community, the response was
not unanimous.

Within the limited sphere of Central America

where United States influence can be said to have been the
strongest in the early twentieth century, there was almost unanimous disregard for Wilson's warnings.

Even though Robert

Lansing, Secretary of State, acting on Wilson's instructions,
warned that the Central American nations would be viewed in a
distinctly unfriendly light if they recognized Tinoco, 74 all
of the Central and South American states except Nicaragua and
Panama eventually did so. 75
These states hesitated for a time in their recognition to insure that Tinoco would be able to sustain himself
in power and that the United States would not take any direct
action against him.

Although Wilson considered a suggested
invasion against Tinoco, 7 6 he did not authorize it, choosing

74circular letter to all American Missions in Central
America (except Costa Rica) from the Secretary of State, 21
September 1917, 818.00/231b, MC 669.
75 Neumann, Recognition, p. 18.
76u. s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, 18 June 1919, 818.00/703, MC 669.
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instead the middle course of nonrecognition. 77

The invasion

was suggested to Wilson by the Special Agent of the State Department, John Foster Dulles.

Dulles's plan was based on the

belief that popular discontent with the Tinoco government in
Costa Rica would prompt a revolutionary movement against it
if a spark were ignited. 78 Therefore, Dulles suggested that
the United States government discreetly arm and supply Gonz!lez Flores and a band of his supporters and provide them with
transportation to Costa Rioa.79

Once they had landed on Costa

Rican shores, the populace would rise in support of their
movement and Tinoco would be overthrown. 80 This strategy,
which sounds very much like the United States activity surrounding the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion into Cuba in 1961,
was never tested and never got beyond the stage of an internal
memorandum.

Nonetheless, it does demonstrate the strength of

sentiment against the prolongation of Tinoco's presidency.
However, the choice of nonrecognition by the United
States allowed the small nations of Central America to do what
they pleased with respect to Tinoco, whereas an invasion would
not have.

In fact, aid was received by him at various times

77Baker, "Wilson's Non~Recognition Policy," p. 4.
7 8Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of
State, 27 August 1917, 818.00/315, MC 669.

79

Ibid.

BOibid.
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from the Cabrera administration in Guatemala. 81

Part of the

explanation for the rebellion of the Central American states
against the stated wishes of the United States may be found
in the fact that there was speculation by some of the Central
American leadership that the United States refused recognition to prevent any further discussion of a Central American
.
82
union.
Responding to this favorable climate in Central America, Tinoco sent special missions to the other Central American republics seeking aid and comfort from them and their advice on how to achieve United States recognition. 83 He also
attempted to enlist their aid in convincing Wilson of the justice of his position. 84 However, Tinoco did not rely solely
on the agency of other governments to press his case.

In ad-

dition to his missions to Latin America, he also funded agents
81u.s. Charg' ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, No. 206, 19 December 1917, 818.00/
298, MC 669; Memorandum from Mr. Robbins, Latin American Division, Department of State, to the Secretary of State, 7 March
1917, 818.00/108, MC 669; American Legation in Guatemala to the
Secretary of State, 17 June 1919, 818.00/697, MC 669.
82 Minister in Honduras, Dennis, to the Secretary of
State, 28 May 1925, 813.00/1241, Reference Note 818.00/1118,
MC 669.
8 3u.s. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jose
to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1917, 818.00/242, MC
669; American Legation in Honduras to the Secretary of State,
12 June 1919, 818.00/681, MC 669.
84Legation of El Salvador in Washington to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1919, 818.00/739, MC 669; American Legation in Salvador to the Secretary of State, 4 February 1917,
818.00/70, MC 669.
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to travel to the United States to procure arms and produce
propaganda for him. 85 As has already been mentioned in this
context, Tinoco acquired the services of William Jennings
Bryan to lobby on his behalf with President Wilson.
The remainder of Latin America, those nations in continental South America, were also of some assistance to Tinoco.

Several times the Chilean ministers in San Jos' or in

Washington acted as an emissary between Tinoco and the United
States. 86 There was also a plan to gather together the representatives of the various South American states in San Josi
for a conference to propose a course of action to the United
States. 87

Unfortunately for Tinoco, the results of this con-

ference had little effect on the policy of the Wilson administration.

However, it was reported that Tinoco had received

aid from various Latin American representatives in Costa Rica
in organizing an alleged anti-American campaign in response to
8 5u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, Telegram, 21 April 1917, 818.00/137, MC 669;

U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Joe' to the Secretary of
State, No. 619, 11 July 1919, 818.00/791, MC 669.

SSH. P. Ketcher, Office of the Counselor, to the Secretary of State, 23 June 1919, 818.00/715, MC 669; U.S. Consul
Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 19
June 1918, 818.00/709, MC 669.
87 u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, No. 617, 9 July 1919 1 818.00/783, MC 669;

U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of
State, 4 October 1918, 818.00/491, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin Jefferson at Managua to the Secretary of State, No. 697,
23 June 1919, 818.00/760, MC 669; Navy Department to the Secretary of State, Conference on the u.s.s. Castine, 20 June 1919,
818.00/705, MC 669.

71

the continuation of nonrecognition. 88
It is impossible to determine whether this campaign
was genuinely anti-American or whether it was simply a device
employed by Tinoco to antagonize the United States into some
reaction which somehow could be turned to advantage due to the
lack of any but general references to it. 89

In the last months

of his regime, perhaps out of desparation or perhaps out of
anger, Tinoco allowed the campaign and cooperated with it,
showing at least that the Latin American nations with whom the
campaign was shared accepted the sovereignty of the Costa Rican
nation. 90
In the end, there remained only one group whose favorable inclination toward Tinoco went unanswered.

These were

the individuals who were motivated by humanitarian concerns
with regard to the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica.

Their con-

cerns can be classes as "humanitarian" in that they were concerned with the impact of nonrecognition upon the well-being
of the Costa Rican people in general.

For example, United

States Minister E. J. Hale expressed the worry that nonrecognition would lead to economic hardship for the nation and starvation for the less well to do Costa Ricans. 91 The small land-

88u.s.

Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 619, 11 July 1919, 818.00/791, MC 669.
ssrbid.
90Ibid.
91u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary
of State, 18 April 1917, 818.00/134, MC 669.
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owners, in particular, who were dependent on the income produced by their cash crops would be hardest hit.

In addition,

Hale was concerned about the effects of political instability,
which might lead to civil war and, in his view, unnecessary
loss of life. 92 Also among this group was Hale's close
friend, John M. Keith, who viewed Tinoco as the lesser of two
evils and felt that the failure of the United States to recognize Tinoco could only bring hardship to the Costa Rican nation
and people. 93 Both Hale and Keith felt that the continued nonrecognition invited counter-revolution. 94

Even these concerns

met a negative response from Wilson, who responded to Hale's
.
b y removing
•
. f rom his
. post in
. san J ose.
~ 95
suggestions
him
Although he had been supported in his position by the
report of Special Agent John Foster Dulles working for the
Secretary of State, 96 Hale had failed to couch his recommendations in appropriate language or to show appropriate disdain for a revolutionary government.

Further, his opinion was

suspect for his association with one of the Keiths, albeit a
92 Ibid.
Jos~,

93 John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San

7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale
at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917,
818.00/116, MC 669.
9

~Ibid.; Emilio Artega, San Joa~, Costa Rica, to the
Secretary of State, 25 February 1918, 818.00/351, MC 669.
95 Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 13.
96 John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1

May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.
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less-than-notorious Keith.
It is the opinion of the author that of all the advice and suggestions which Wilson received, that of E. J. Hale
and John M. Keith was by far the most reasonable and intelligent.

It was not founded in any way on personal concern but

rather was a reflection of a long thought-out process of understanding for the intricacies of the Costa Rican system and
people.

That Wilson chose to rebuff their advice was sad from

the standpoint of his own position and that of the United
States in subsequent years, but for Tinoco it was disastrous.
It may be that the intertwining of the recognition issue with
some of the issues surrounding the United States' entry into
World War I kept some of the pro-recognition arguments from
Wilson's serious consideration.

However, Costa Rica's decla-

ration of war against Germany should have resolved any confusion which may have arisen.

The following chapter will dis-

cuss the declaration of war and its aftermath.

CHAPTER IV
COSTA RICA AND WORLD WAR I
The regime of Federico Tinoco in Costa Rica declared
was on Imperial Germany in May, 1918.1

Tinoco had been re-

ported to be of pro-Allied sympathies even before he assumed
power in January, 1917.2

As indicated in the previous chap-

ter, his predecessor, Alfredo

Gonz~lez

Flores, on the other

hand, was alleged to be pro-German or at least under the influence of various Germans in Costa Rica. 3 It is difficult
to determine just how serious the pro-German influence in
Costa Rica was before the declaration of war.

However, it

may be assumed that it was approximately the same as other
nations in Central America, which were also the recipients
of various German offers of investment and funding early in
the twentieth century. 4 There is really little likelihood
1Ricardo Fern!ndez Guardia, Cartilla Hiat5rica, p. 126.
2special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of
State, 1 May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669.
3American Legation in Panama to the Secretary of
State, No. 1298, 14 March 1917, 818.00/118, MC 669.
4u·.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos&
to the Secretary of State, No. 323, 20 August 1918, 818.00/
474, MC 669.

74

75

that Costa Rica could have declared a formal position other
than the one it eventually chose, but it is possible that it
might have maintained the somewhat hostile neutrality which
characterized the positions of Mexico and Argentina during the
war.

While neither of these nations was overtly hostile to the

Allied interests, they were found to be less than responsive
to certain war efforts instigated by the United States.
For the time being, however, Federico Tinoco had to
pursue a policy which took into account his non-recognized status in the world community of nations.

Despite any inclinations

he might have, there were strong sentiments among other nations,
especially the United States, that this status prevented him
from the sovereign act of a declaration of war. 5

This brings

the discussion to a consideration of Tinoco's motives for the
declaration of war.
As far as Woodrow Wilson and the anti-Tinoco forces
were concerned, the declaration of war against Germany was simply a ploy on Tinoco's part to achieve recognition from the
United States. 6 In views held by these individuals, there
was no sincerity or principle involved in the decision to declare war but rather a matter of political expediency for a
5Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Woodrow Wilson,
9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669.
6Memorandum from Mr. Stabler, Department of State, Division of Latin American Affairs, to the Secretary of State, 26
May 1917, 818.00/316, MC 669.
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very hard-pressed government. 7

To complicate the picture, it

was reported that Minor C. Keith, who supposedly advised Tinoco to declare war, 8 was far more interested in courting the
good will of Britain and France than in achieving the formal
recognition of the United States. 9

Keith may have believed

that recognition would follow from the acceptance of European
powers of Costa Rican cobelligerency in the war.

In addition,

it may also be that Keith felt it important to court the good
will of these nations in an attempt to restore some of the
trade which had gone on between Costa Rica and Europe prior
to the outbreak of the war.

However, without the protection

of a sizeable navy, Costa Rica could hope for little improvement in its European trade until the war ended or until it
could count on the protection of the United States Navy.

So

it might be said that there were economic as well as political
motives for the declaration of war.
Some measures of consideration must also be given to
the possibility that Tinoco and the Costa Rican Congress acted
out of sincerity in their declaration.

The possibility of this,

however, diminishes in view of Tinoco's serious problems and
his need to seek a solution.

But it would be a gross insult

7Ibid.

Bu.s. Charg' ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' to
the Secretary of State, 19 July 1917, 818.00/306, MC 669.
9rbid.
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to Costa Rican national pride to say that it might be less
convinced of the rightness of its action than was Brazil or
any of the European belligerents, or even the United States.
The preoccupation of Costa Rica with its domestic problems and
political entanglements, not to mention the threat of invasions
from neighboring territory which sought to depose Tinoco, make
it extremely difficult to perceive if there was any real groundswell of public opinion in favor of the declaration of war.
But it is important to note that Tinoco could have solved some
of his internal problems by accepting the aid proffered by the
German community in Costa Rica as was discussed in the previous
chapter.

Thus, while Tinoco's declaration of war was probably

founded in the expected international benefits he would receive, primarily in the form of recognition at least by the
European powers, there was also probably a measure of conviction that the cause of the Allies was a just one.
It is also necessary to take into consideration the
various other influences which brought Tinoco to the stage of
a formal declaration of war rather than maintaining neutrality
as was the pattern among most of the Latin American states. 10
Since foreign investors played such a key role in the Costa
1 0Neutrality was maintained by Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Relations
with Germany were severed, thus achieving a de facto neutrality
by Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay. Warren H. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of
Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. XII,
NO: 6, 1929), p. 16.
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Rican economy, their influence on Tinoco must be taken into
account.

The benefits of the regularization of Costa Rica's

international status to the businessmen would have been immeasurable, if only the harassment of the State Department of
the United States were removed as a factor in their daily operations.

Further, there may have been an increase of invest-

ments from foreign sources which were severely restricted by
the injunctions of Woodrow Wilson, not to mention the impact
of the war itself upon commerce.
Assessment of the impact of such regularization is not
easy.

Had the status of Costa Rica changed to that of a dip-

lomatically recognized state, there were no guarantees that
investors in war time industries elsewhere in the world would
shift any of their capital to Costa Rica.

This may in itself

be a partial explanation for the declaration of war.

If the

Costa Rican economy could reflect a war time "boom," investors
might have been found.

But here again there were no guarantees

and no real proof.
Tinoco also had to deal with the pressures exerted by
the other Latin American states.

Other Central American nationa also declared war on Germany, 11 but in the Costa Rican
view, this, as well as other Latin American declarations of
war, would be due to the domination of the United States. 12

11Besides Costa Rica, war was declared by Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Kelchner, Latin America and
the League, p. 16.
12 Ibid., p. 37.
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Costa Rica had never felt any real co!!l1Tlunity of interest between itself and the Central American neighbors, pridefully
disdaining all but perfunctory relationships on the basis of
its own superiority.

Thus, it would have been nearly impos-

sible for Costa Rica to accept the possibility that Central
America could share its motivations.
For the nations of South America, which mostly adhered to the path of neutrality, there were the additional
motivations that the trade with Europe would eventually be
resumed after the war had ended.

A declaration of war might

alienate a potantial future customer for their raw materials.
Then too, there were sizeable and influential German
communities throughout Latin America, 13 which would tolerate
a neutral national position but might have become active opponents of any government which declared war against their
homeland.

These views would be passed on to Tinoco by the

representatives of states such as Chile, which sought to aid
Tinoco.

There is not sufficient documentation available on

the size of the German community in Costa Rica to allow an
13ror example, in early discussions of the Paris Peace
Conference, Wilson attempted to have Brazil given extra representation to prevent further "Germanization" in Brazil. United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919
~ 13 Vols. , \1fashington, D. C. :
Government Printing Office -;-19421947), III:533-534. (Referred to hereinafter as Paris Peace Conference); American Legation in Venezuela to the Secretary of
State, No. 1019, 12 October 1917, 818.00/249, MC 669.
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accurate assessment of their direct influence on Tinoco.

How-

over, the commentary of United States representatives in Costa
Rica would indicate that this group was sufficiently large or
influential enough to occasion some concern on their part. 14
From the foregoing, the question is raised as to how
Tinoco could completely disregard the impact of his declaration of war upon the German community in Costa Rica, or for
that matter, upon the future of trade relations with Germany.
As has been stated repeatedly before this, the most influential
people in Costa Rica were the businessmen who had sizeable investments there.

Leading these were Minor Keith and his ne-

phew, John M. Keith.

Primarily, the investors were United

States citizens who may or may not have adopted Costa Rica as
a "home away from home" as the Keiths had done.

The natural

inclination of such individuals would be to maintain some degree of affinity with the United States at least to the extent of not declaring war upon that country.

Therefore, they

would counsel neutrality at the least, and a declaration of
war against Germany as an optimum.

Given these factors, it

might be argued that Tinoco's declaration of war reflected an
attempt on his part to reward the United States based inter14The reports of John Foster Dulles and General Plummer concerning the potential influence of this community upon
Tinoco are the primary sources for this conclusion. Summary
of John Foster Dulles's Confidential Report on Costa Rica to
the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669; Report
of Brigadier General Plummer, Commanding General, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of War to the
Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669.
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ests which had remained loyal to him.

An additional aspect of this kind of policy motivated
by public relations concerns was that Tinoco may have felt

that the declaration of war would stir up United States publi c
opinion in his favor to the extent of overridine Wilson's decision not to recognize him.

In fact, it was primarily on the

issue of his declaration of war that the United States Senate
queried Wilson most strongly. 15

They asked how the United

States could continue to deny diplomatic recognition to any
nation which had, at considerable risk to its own well being,
declared war against an enemy of the United States.1 6

Of

course, the risk taken by Costa Rica by declaration of war so
late in the contest was minimal, with more real advantages for
the nation than disadvantages.

So, to a certain extent, if

this was a part of Tinoco's plan, it worked.

Unfortunately

for Tinoco, the results of this effort came too late for his
benefit.

By the time hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee were concluded, delayed to a certain extent by Wilson's intransigence and the lobbying efforts of

Gonz~lez

Flo-

res and his adherents, Tinoco had fallen from power and the
question of recognition was purely academic.
Once the declaration of war was made in May, 1918,
there was nothing for Tinoco to do but to await the judgment

1 5senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of
State, F. K. Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669.
16 Ibid.
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of the world community of nations.

Shortly thereafter, arrange-

ments were made with Spain to see to the protection of Costa
Rican lives and property in Germany and Belgium. 17

Notifica-

tion of the declaration of war was sent to the representatives
of the Allied Powers located in Paris.
One disheartening response came when K. Matsui, representative of Japan, merely notified his home government and
then responded to that effect to Manuel de Peralta, the Costa
Rican diplomat in Paris.

There was no indication in Matsui's

letter of the forthcoming recognition of the Tinoco government by Japan.18

On the other hand, far more positive res-

ponses were received.

Great Britain's representative, S. Der-

by, indicated not only his own pleasure at the news that another nation had joined the ranks of the defenders of democracy, 19 but also indicated in another communique that Costa
Rica was welcomed on an official level by the British goVErnment. 20

This response reflects some of the quandry in which

Great Britain found itself with regard to Tinoco.

At first,

the British government simply adhered to the policy of the
17El Marques de Amposta to Don Manuel de Peralta, 3 de
Junio de 1918, Documents Distributed to the Public, Paris
Peace Conference, 1919, Authentic Delegation Propaganda MSS,
Hoover War Library, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Photoduplicated copies. Referred to hereinafter as Delegation
Propaganda.
18 K. Matsui to Manuel de Peralta, le 31 mai 1918, ibid.
1 9 s. Derby to Manuel de Peralta, le 29 mai 1918, ibid.

ibid.

20 s. Derby to Manuel de Peralta, le ler Juin 1918,
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United States with regard to recognition.21

Later, as Tinoco

began open manifestations of his sympathy with the Allied
cause and showed signs of being willing to engage openly in
hostilities, it seemed as if the British government would modify its own position.

But by the time the Costa Rican declara-

tion of war was made known, the British apparently postponed
recognition until they could find a way to do so without antagonizing President Wilson.

The French, too, had begun to modify

their viewpoint, although they were also bound by a desire not
to offend Wilson.

For example, in February, 1918 the French

Minister in Washington, D.C., M. Laboulaye, called at the
State Department to ask whether the United States would have
any objections to the French government sending two military
instructors to Costa Rica as requested by the Tinoco government. 22

It is unclear whether the United States objected.

When Costa Rica declared war, France also sent a note of gratitude to Manuel de Peralta. 23
Even the United States Minister in Paris, W. G. Sharp,
was forced to respond in the proper courteous diplomatic f ashion to the announcement.

His note, while couched in basical-

ly the same language as the others received by Manuel de Pe21Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12.
22 Memorandum from Mr. Stabler at the Division of Latin
American Affairs to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1918,
818.00/--, MC 669.
23M. Pichon to Manuel de Peralta, 21 mai 1918, Delegation Propaganda.
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ralta on behalf of Costa Rica, was somewhat lengthier than the
average and spoke of the "noble determination of the valiant
Republic" (Costa Rica) which had disregarded the disinterestedness of some nations and had placed itself squarely on the side
of the fo1•ces of law versus those of oppression.

Sharp went

on to say that this declaration would lead to a closer sympathy among all of the sister republics of the Americas. 24
While this sentiment expressed to the Costa Rican government of
Federico Tinoco might seem to be out of line with the overall
policy of the Wilson administration, it does reflect the moral fairmindedness which was also characteristic of Wilson's
policies.

It is interesting to note the cordial manner in

which the declaration of war was received in Paris as opposed
to the blatant way in whi·oh it was ignored in Washington.

If

Tinoco had taken heart from Sharp's reference to the possibility of closer relations among the American republics, he
was to be sadly disappointed by the reaction of the United
States government on an official level.

There were little if

any grounds for a great deal of optimism on the part of Costa
Rica if only the degree of its participation in the war effort

is taken into consideration.

The nation did little more than

offeI' its harbors to Allied vessels, but at no time were Costa

ibid.

24w. G. Sha~p to Manuel de Peralta, le 13 mai 1918,
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Rican troops employed.25
There was some question whether Wilson was even aware
that Tinoco had issued the declaration of war. However his diary indicated that he had been aware of the declaration from
the first but simply chose not to react to it. 26 Later, in
reference to the Paris Peace Conference, he would return to
his intransigent opinion of the Tinoco regime and its legitimacy. 27

For the time being, however, Tinoco had only Sharp's

letter with which to console himself.
Of course there were Other responses to the declaration of war, most of which were markedly similar in their
language and in the pro f orma manner in which they expressed
the pleasure of their governments at the Costa Rican action.
They were meaningless in that they did not convey a recognition on a formal level of Tinoco's government.

The same

forces which had prevented recognition from being granted
previously still seemed to be in control of the situation in
the spring of 1918.

Thus, the letters from Great Britain,

25"Plan for the Preliminary Convention Between the
Allied Ministers," 5 January 1919, Paris Peace Conference, I:
386. This allocated representation to the conference on the
basis of direct involvement in the war and relegated Costa Rica to the same level as neutral non-participants.
2 6Baker, Wi~so~~~ Life S Letters, 8:163.

27 "Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M.
Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919," in attendance: Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau,
Sonmino (Italy), Matsui (Japan), et al. Paris Peace Confer~_nce, III: 534.
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France, Serbia, Italy, and Belgium, among others, were of absolutely no value to Tinoco.

The United States Minister 1n Hon-

duras, Charles B. Curtis, warned that these letters might be
used by the Tinoco government to present a case for recognition.
Hhile the letters themselves may have been valid, Curtis felt
that the United States should make it clear to all interested
parties that the letters did not constitute formal diplomatic
recognition.

The Charge d'Affaires in Costa Rica agreed that

Tinoco might consider the letters as an indication that his
government had been recognizect. 28

Further, the letters would

be useless to Tinoco's successors 1n their attempts to be admitted to the Paris Peace Conference as befitted their role
as a belligerent.
As indicated above, there were communications from
other governments.

Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, El

Marques de Amposta, communicated with Peralta from Madrid that
the government of Spain would be pleased to take on the protection of Costa

Rican lives and property in Germany and Bel-

gium pending the resumption of diplomatic relations at the
end of the war.

Further, Spain expressed an interest that

those Germans who resided in Costa Rica be treated fairly so

28u.s.

Minister Charles B. Curtis at Tegucigalpa to
the Secretary of State, No. 805, 30 August 1918, 818.00/483,
MC 669; U.S. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, No. 362, 8 October 1918, 818.00/495,
MC 669.
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long as they continued to observe Costa Rican law. 29

Since

Spain had recognized Tinoco's goverrunent, 30 the question of
the acceptance of its declaration of war had no weight in deciding that the government was legitimate.
Another important letter was the one received from the
Brazilian representative, Olyntho de Magalhaes.

He, too, pointed

out the pleasure of his government at receiving the declaration
of war and the notice that Costa Rica had joined those disinterested nations in the pursuit of justice and the preservation
of civilization.

An interesting facet of the Brazilian mes-

sage, however, is the closing statement of the Minister with
regard to the obligatory nature of the note. 31 It would seem
that the Brazilian Minister, representing the only active belligerent among the Latin American nations, apologized for the
necessity of communicating his pleasure at Costa Rica's action
in a form letter.

Although this was not directly stated, there

is a great deal of flattery reflected concerning Costa Rica's
action.

The question of Brazilian leadership among the Latin

American nations in subsequent events relating to the League
of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference will be discussed in
subsequent chapters.

However, it could be that the Brazilian

29 El Marqu's de Amposta to Manuel de Peralta, 3 de
Junio de 1918, Delegation Propaganda.
30u.s. Minister at San Jos' to the Secretary of State,
23 August 1917, 818.00/211, MC 669.

3101yntho de Magalhaes to Manuel de Peralta, Delegation
Propaganda.
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government felt that in this case "imitation was the sincerest fol'Dl of flattery,'' and that it now saw a special kinship
with Costa Rica for its action.

How this response might have

been anticipated by Tinoco, and how much he may have counted
upon Brazilian support for his regime with the United States,
since Brazil had already recognized him is questionable.

How-

ever, it is an aspect of the declaration of war which should
not be overlooked.
For whatever reasons, Tinoco declared war on Germany
and Costa Rica aligned itself officially with the Allied powers.

The rewards received by the Costa Rican

nation~were

min-

imal in terms of increased international prestige or recognition.

As has already been mentioned, there was a movement in

the United States to reconsider the policy of the Wilson administration toward Costa Rica.

But before this movement really

got off the ground, Tinoco was overthrown.

The revolutionary

movements which brought about his political demise, launched
from Nicaragua, were another bone of contention with the interested Senators, 32 but here, too, their interest was too late
to be of any benefit to Tinoco.
In addition, although the declaration of war brought
a great deal of sympathy from the involved European powers,
that sympathy did nothing to improve Tinoco's condition.
32senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of
State, F. K. Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669.
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Neither the British, the French nor any of the other belligerents could afford to alienate Woodrow Wilson in any way that
would jeopardize the assistance they were receiving from the
United States in the war effort.

So while they might have been

inclined to extend recognition to Tinoco and even to resume
their pre-war levels of trade with Costa Rica, both were impossible.

Recognition would have incurred the wrath of the

United States.

Moreover, resumption of trade was impossible

while their resources were tied up in the war.
A possible remedy for this situation was seen in the
peace negotiations that followed the war.

For the Tinoco re-

gime, these efforts were simply too late.

But Wilson's atti-

tude toward the Tinoco regime extended to its immediate successor, that of Juan Bautista Quir6s.

Quir6s had been appoin-

ted by Tinoco to assume the provisional presidency as he was
fleeing the country in July, 1919.33

As the United States had

warned, Quir6s was also refused recognition because he had been
appointed by an unconstitutional president and therefore was
himslf illegitimate. 34 Not even Quir6s's obvious desire to
33u.s. Minister in San Jos~ to the Secretary of State
23 May 1919, 818.00/437, MC 669; American Legation in San Jos~
to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1919, 818.00/829, MC 669.
34

secretary of State to U.S. Minister in San Jos,, No.
11, 19 August 1919, 818.00/829, MC 669; Memorandum, Division of
Latin American Affairs (Stabler) to the Secretary of State, 6
February 1917, 818.00/105 1/2, MC 669; Secretary of State to
the U.S. Minister in San Jos~, 30 August 1919, 818.00/866a, MC
669.
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placate the Wilson administration by holding elections as soon
as possible and by offering to step down in favor of whichever
individual the United States designated satisfied Wilson.35
It was felt that Quir6s acted out of fear for the approach of
the revolutionary troops from Nicaragua.

These troops were

the ones about which the United States had issued the warnings
but which Nicaragua had continued to harbor.
It would be difficult to say that the activities of the
Wilson administration with regard to the recognition of a Costa Rican government and the attitudes toward the recognition
of a Costa Rican declaration of war constituted anything less
than a direct interference in the internal affairs of the Costa Rican nation.

Because of the instrusion of World War I,

what might have been solely a Western Hemispheric affair was
catapulted onto the stage of worldwide affairs.

Obviously, Cos-

ta Rica had suffered a gross insult at the hands of the United
States.

How this would continue and develop through the Paris

Peace Conference and the early years of the League of Nations
will be discussed in the next chapter.

35u.s. Minister in San Jos' to the Secretary of State,

22 August 1919, 818.00/845, MC 669.

CHAPTER V
COSTA RICA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The conclusion of World War I occurred before the
United States and Costa Rica resolved the problems of the recognition of the Tinoco government.

Thus, because of pres-

sures exerted by the United States on the European Allied powers, Costa Rica never achieved the status of a recognized belligerent in the war effort. 1 This fact assumed greater significance as plans were made for the Paris Peace Conference.
Preliminary planning, conducted by various committees and
which reflected several years' thought on the part of all of
the nations in question, recognized the importance of including
the nations which had not participated in the war, in particular the Latin American states, in the deliberations. 2 One
suggestion of the planning committees indicated that the Latin
American states were to be included only because of the in1James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller to Woodrow
Wilson, 30 December 1918, Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty, Appendix on Signatories, Exclusions from Belligerents, Paris
Peace Conf.185/151, Paris Peace Conference, !:305; Robert
Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669.
2Memorandum by D. H. Miller to Woodrow Wilson on Revised French Proposal of 21 November 1918, Paris Peace Confer!.!!Q.!, !:355.
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terest of the United States in having them in attendance and
because whether they deserved inclusion or not, the Latin American states themselves would expect to be counted in on the deliberations. 3 At one point, it was even suggested that the
United States could represent Latin America to "avoid crowding" at the peace deliberations. 4 That the Latin American
states expected to be included is undeniable, especially in
connection with those Latin American states which had declared
war on Germany.

Surprisingly enough, however, Costa

Rica was

not included in this category because of the insistence of
Woodl'Ow Wilson that it not be.5
Wilson tried to control the planning stages of the
Paris Peace Conference by striking a bargain with the major
powers on the status of Costa Rica in exchange for their desires on organizational matters. 6 He insisted that the question of the inclusion of Costa Rica in the deliberations was
a moot one, since that state did not have the official status
3Ibid.
4French Foreign Office's Scheme of Procedure, Part III,
Representation of the Powers and of the States, 15 November
1918, ibid., !:348.
5

Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Woodrow Wilson, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669.
6secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's
Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, in attendance: Lloyd
George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonmino (Italy),
Matsui (Japan), et al., Paris Peace Conference, III:534.
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of a

recognized nation as far as the United States was con-

cerned. 7

Therefore, if Costa Rica were included in the con-

ference, the United States would object most strenuously.

The

implication which can be drawn from Wilson's comments was that
he would have separated the United States from the proceedings
of the Conference rather than be forced into an ipso facto recognition of Costa Rica, as his advisors warned him he would
be.a

The European powers, primarily the Great Powers who were

involved in these early
mands. 9

d~liberations,

acceded to Wilson's de-

This point was not a particularly difficult one for

Wilson to achieve 7 since Lloyd George, who represented Great
Britain, was adamantly opposed to any status for the Latin
American belligerents which would equate them with the small
powers of

Eu~ope

which had incurred the devastation of the war

upon their homelands and had sacrificed so many lives, while
the Latin American states had done virtually nothing. 10 Wilson further strengthened his argument by declaring that the
question of Costa Rican participation and recognition was not
7Ibid.
8Ibid.; Memorandum by D. H. Miller to Woodrow Wilson
on Revised French Proposal of 21 November 1918, ibid., !:355.
David Hunt Miller advised Wilson that admission of Costa Rica
to the Conference would constitute recognition.
9secretary 1 s Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's
Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, in attendance: Lloyd
George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonmino (Italy),
Matsui (Japan), et al., ibid., III:534.
1 0ibid., III:534-535.
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one which belonged before a world group, since the problems
entailed in the question of the constitutionality of its government were purely American ones.

That is to say, they were

of concern only in the Western Hemisphere.11

Wilson explained

that Costa Rica had only declared war on Germany as a ploy to
achieve the recognition of the United States.

Since United

States nonrecognition was based on a policy designed to discourage revolution in the Americas, he asked to be upheld in
not recognizing Costa Rica's belligerency so that the solidarity of American policies could be maintained. 12
The status which Woodrow Wilson and the other leaders
discussed was not a matter of great significance.

For pur-

poses of representation at the Paris Peace Conference, several
categories of nations were devised, including the major belligerents, small European belligerents, nonparticipating belligerents, neutrals, and so on. 13 There were also distinctions
made as to the special interests some nations, such as those
being newly formed, might have in the peace deliherations. 1 ~
In one of the preliminary plans for the conference, Costa Rica
was included among those nations which had not participated
11Ibid.
12rhid.
13Memorandum by D. H. Miller to Woodrow Wilson on the
Revised French Proposal of 21 November 1918, ibid., !:355.
14 Ibid.
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directly in the war effort and which had no special interests
in the war settlements.15

In effect, this included Costa Ri-

ca among the neutrals and the nations being formed which received only one plenipotentiary each. 16 However, not even
that single representative was granted Costa Rica as Woodrow
Wilson was able to convince the leadership of the major European delegations to accede to his demands with regard to
Costa Rican recognition.17
Wilson's claims that the issue of Costa Rican recognition was not one over which the world group had any authority reflected not only his continued intransigence with regard to the Costa Rican situation in particular, but it also
reflected a response on his part to the critics of his world
peace plans in the United States.

Since part of those plans

for the peace conference included the formation of a world
peace organization, there was concern by some United

States

Senators that such an organization would jeopardize the Monroe Doctrine. 18 This issue is more accurately placed in the
15Plan for the Preliminary Conventions Between the
Allied Ministers, 5 January 1919, Paris Peace Conference, I:
393.
16Ibid., I:386.
17 secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, ibid., III:
534-535.

18 nenna Frank Fleming, The United States and the
League of Nations (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), p. 54.
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questions surrounding the formation of the League of Nations
and will be discussed in greater length in that context.

How-

ever, for the time being, it should be noted that Wilson had
to begin early in his discussion in Paris to demonstrate that
nothing to which he agreed in Paris would in any way endanger
the status or prerogatives of the United States in the Americas.
As was mentioned previously, Costa Rica did not accept the decisions of the preliminary conferences in Paris.
Manuel de Peralta, the Costa Rican diplomat in Paris, circulated copies of the letters which he had received regarding
the declaration of war to all of the delegates at the Peace
Conference. 19 In addition, there was an open letter to all of
the delegates which emphasized the Costa Rican position in the
war and indicated the justice of Costa Rica's participation in
the conference.20

But these efforts were to no avail.

Since Costa Rica had not been admitted to the Peace
Conference, a state of war still existed between it and Germany.

This was finally solved by an enactment of the Costa

Rican legislature which was answered by a decree of the German government proclaiming an end to the state of war.21

At

19see the individual letters referred to in the previous chapter to Manuel de Peralta from El Marqu's de Amposta,
K. Matsui, s. Derby, w. G. Sharp, et al.
20 open letter to "Messieurs les Plenipotentiares," le
febrier 1919, and a statement to the Peace Conference at large
dated 28 February 1919, Delegation Propaganda.
21The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Asso-
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the same time, the status of Germans residing in Costa Rica
was clarified with a law allowing them to seek naturalization
under Costa Rican law, which they had not been able to do during the hostilities because of the closed diplomatic channels.22
However, the United States Consul in Costa Rica reported that
there had been no confiscations of German properties during the
war.

Nor had there been any adherence to the "Enemy Trading

List" published by the United States to prevent the infiltration of German firms into the Americas.2 3 This proved that no
serious efforts had been made to participate in the war effort.
While the failure of the Tinoco government to achieve
representation at Paris was attributable to the same problems
which led to nonrecognition by the United States, it was the
expectation of the Costa Rican government after the overthrow
of the Tinoco regime that it would be included in the deliberations of the Conference.

However, since the Conference was

essentially over before relations between the United States and
ciated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919,
Paris Peace Conference, X:735-736.
22Pan American Union, Bulletin L (January, 1920), p.
102.
23 secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in Switzerland (Stovall), No. 2776, 23 September 1918, "Reports on Central American legations--Information on treatment of Germans,"
763.72114A/185c, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918,
Supplement 2, The World War (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1933), p. 89.
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Costa Rica were regularized, this was not possible.

There was

little if any concern on the part of other Latin American
states for the status of Costa Rica at the conference, since
it seemed that each nations was most concerned with its own
status there and the promotion of its own ideas.2 4 The support which the Tinoco regime had received from Latin America
ended with his fall from power.

As was mentioned in the pre-

vious chapter, his immediate successor, the provisional president, Juan Bautista Quir5s, never received United States recognition and was soon replaced by Francisco Aguilar Barquero,
who had been one of the Designados in the

Gonz~lez

Flores ad-

ministration. 25

Barquero called elections which resulted in
the election of Julio Acosta late in 1919. 26
Julio Acosta had been part of the insurgent group which
caused Tinoco's fall from power, and much of his support in the

election derived from his opposition to the Tinoco regime.27
24 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 21-40.

25u.s.

Minister at San Jos' to the Secretary of State,

2 September 1919, 818.00/870, MC 669; U.S. Minister Benjamin

F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 687, 9
September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669.

26Le6n Fern~ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:
108; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josi to the Secretary
of State, 8 December 1919, 818.00/944, MC 669.
27 u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jes~ to the Secretary of State, No. 714, 21 October 1919, 818.00/928, MC 669;
U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the Secretary of
State, No. 685, 4 September 1919, 818.00/899, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State,
No. 826, 12 August 1920, 818.00/1000, MC 669.
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In effect, according to Benjamin F. Chase, the United States
Consul at San

Jos~,

the majority of the voters viewed Acosta's
election as a final repudiation of Tinoco. 28 But there was
another aspect of the election to be considered.

The anti-

American press campaign which began in the last days of the
Tinoco regime flourished during Acosta's election campaign,
heightened by the failure of the nation to be admitted to the
Paris Peace Conference as a result of Woodrow Wilson's efforts.29
Further, it was maintained in at least one publication that
Quir6s had been replaced by Barquera on "radiographic" orders
from United

States Secretary of State Robert Lansing as well

as through the influence of a group of Wall Street capitalists. 3 0
The election of Acosta, the failure of Costa Rica to
obtain representation at the Paris Peace Conference, and the
failure of any Latin American state to come to the nation's
aid gave the distinct impression to the Costa Rican public
that the only sovereignty which remained to the nation was
that allowed by the United States, 31 which finally extended
28u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, No. 714, 21 October 1919, 818.00/928, MC
669.
29u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00/927, MC 669.
30 La Verdad {San Jos~), 7 September 1919, cited in U.S.
Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Joa~ to the Secretary of State,
No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669.
31
Ibid.
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recognition to Acosta's government late in 1920. 32

This bit-

terness would not come to full bloom during the Acosta presidency, despite the fact that some of the delay in extending
recognition to Acosta was due to Wilson's illness following
the peace aonf erence and his campaign for the support of the
League of Nations. 33
Wilson's campaign for the support of the League of Nations in the United States was quite difficult due to substantial differences of opinion as to what the League would mean
to the United States.

Wilson had a great deal of support for

his view that it should be a universal alliance for the preservation of peace as opposed to a supranational power, with a
military arm, which would enforce the preeminence of certain
powers. 34 Further, Wilson saw the League as a logical, worldwide extension of the United States 1 s effort, by means of the
Monroe Doctrine, to prevent the spread of reactionary ideologies.as
However, there was significant opposition to the League
32secretary of State to the U.S. Consul at San Jos,,
Telegram #16, 2 August 1920, 818.00/991a, MC 669.
33 u.s. Consul in Costa Rica to Joseph R. Tumulty, Secretary to President Wilson, 26 November 1919, 818.00/949a, MC
669. This letter stresses that, although Wilson was ill, immediate recognition was important.
34Arthur s. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, A Look at
His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1957), p. 119.
35 Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 181.
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in the United States, the leadership of which found several
strong arguments with which to lead their campaign.

One such

argument was that the League of Nations would subvert the
Monroe Doctrine and the position of leadership of the United
States in the Western Hemisphere, not to mention the necessity for revision of the Constitution. 36 The rationale for
this opposition lay in the fact that any of the other members
of such a worldwide organization would be able to challenge
the position of the United States granted by the Monroe Doctrine. 37

Within the context of a peace organization in which

all sovereign states were equal members, any of the Latin
American nations, not to mention any nation hostile to the
United States, could challenge a unilateral doctrine embracing the entire hemisphere as the Monroe Doctrine did.

A po-

tential threat to that doctrine existed in that Mexico could
lead such a challenge to United States policy as revenge for
the treatment it had received during its revolution, 38 especially since Mexico had been granted membership in the
League of Nations on the basis of United States recommendation. 39
36rleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 54.
37 Ibid., p. 151.
38

Ibid., p. 123.

39 James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller to Woodrow
Wilson, 30 December 1918, Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty, Appendix on Signatories, Exclusions from Belligerents, Paris
Peace Conf. 185.1/151, Paris Peace Conference, !:315.
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No consideration was given to the possibility that Costa Rica
had equal grounds for challenge based on its problems due to
the unilateral decision of the United States not to recognize
the Tinoco regime and thereby to exclude Costa
Paris Peace Conference.

Rica from the

The leaders of the opposition to the

League in the United States used the term "Monroe Doctrine"
freely in their arguments, mustering support for their position among masses of people who probably were not even aware
of what the doctrine meant. 40 If the arguments of this opposition group were carried to a logical conclusion, it would
follow that no Latin American nation should belong to the
League of Nations because of the exclusive hegemony reserved
to the United States in the Western Hemisphere on the grounds
that each nation posed a threat to a unilateral policy of the
United States. 41
Wilson received some support for his problems from
Great Britain in answering this criticism which was understandable in view of the role of that nation in the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, as well as its interest in protecting similar arrangements of its own. 42 The British suggested that the League Covenant include a recognition of the
special nature of the arrangements that existed in the Western
40r1eming, The U.S. and the League, p. 76.
41Ibid., p. 214.
42 Ibid., p.

ass.
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Hemisphere by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine. 43

It was even

suggested that the Monroe Doctrine be mentioned by name.

By

the same token, there was French opposition to including the
Monroe Doctrine specifically on the rationale that official
recognition of the doctrine might limit future United States
involvement in Europe, which could jeopardize French safety.44
Another problem arose over whether the Covenant should
define the Monroe Doctrine specifically.

If it were defined,

then any United States application of the doctrine would be
subject to scrutiny as to how it fit the description laid out
in the Covenant. 45 If it were not defined, there was still the
problem that the doctrine could be challenged by any member of
the League. 46 In the end, the problem was resolved by including a mention of the Monroe Doctrine as a "regional arrange1.J 7
ment" in Article 21 of the League Covenant.
This satisfied
the fears of the United States's opposition to the League on
the basis of potential jeopardy to the doctrine but at the
4 3Ibid.
44 Ibid.
4 5Ibid., pp. 214, 309.
46 Ibid.

47woodrow Wilson's Statement to the Members of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 1919, Ray
Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers
of Woodrow Wilson, 6 Vols., War and Peace, Presidential Messages, Add~esses and Public Paper~ (1917-1924) {Vols. 5 & 6,
New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1927), 5:577.
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same time left it sufficiently vague enough to satisfy those
who feared that the enforcement of its provisions would be
taken out of the hands of the United States.
Surprisingly enough, there was little response to
this inclusion on the part of the Latin American states which
stood to lose the most by it.

At least for the time being,

all of these states were willing to allow the mention of the
Monroe Doctrine to stand. 48 For the most part, in the early
days of the League, Latin America was aligned with the small
neutral nations of Europe in seeking a guarantee of their territorial integrity and sovereignty from the organization, supporting disarmament and cooperating on the issue of Germany's
admission to the League. 4 9 In fact, it was precisely this guarantee that Wilson used in his arguments against the jeopardy
to the Monroe Doctrine.

He claimed that any organization which

guaranteed the integrity of nations could not in any way interfere with an internal affair such as the Monroe Doctrine. 5 0
In this, Wilson had been advised by former president William
H. Taft that the political approval of the League Covenant
48 Salvadorean Minister of Foreign Affairs (Paredes) to
the Secretary of State, No. 752, 14 December 1919, 710.11/433,
United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920 (3 Vols., Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19~ !:224-225.
49r. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations
(2 Vols., New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), I:271.
SOFleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 86.
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would be more certain if the Monroe Doctrine were recognized
in the Covenant. 51
Another aspect of Latin American participation in the
early days of the League of Nations was the attempt to bring
about the consolidation of a Latin American bloc in the League.
More than any other group, the Latin American nations acted
in concert in the League of Nations by rotating their representation on the Council, by decisions made in conferences
among their delegates and by providing some leadership for
52
member states in policy decisions.
However, few if any of
the policy decisions in the early life of the League of Nations concerned Latin America directly.5 3

One of the earli-

est questions was the admission of those Latin American states
which had not been granted original membership in the organization.

Costa Rica was finally admitted to membership in the

League in December, 1920.5 4

There was no solution to the

problems which had surrounded its exclusion from earlier
meetings, but by that time the United States had formally
recognized its government.

Joining the League of Nations

changed very little of Costa Rica's relations with the res1rbict., PP· 183-184.
52 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 11; Wal-

ters, League of Nations, I:335.
53 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 140.
5

~Le6n Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, I:
108; Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (February, 1923), p.
206.
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mainder of the world, since it had little part in the Latin
American coalition, being preoccupied with its internal problems and the restoration of its relationship with the United
States.
When the invitation to join the League was finally extended to Costa Rica, the Acosta Administration immediately accepted in time to send a delegate to the First Session.

Man-

uel de Peralta was assigned to attend the sessions in Geneva
as well as to continue to hold his post as ambassador to
France.SS

However, the readiness of the Costa Rican govern-

ment to join the League was not unanimously popular in Costa
Rica.

Much of the unpopularity was related to the sentiments

expressed toward the Presidency of Julio Acosta himself.

Acos-

ta took office in May, 1920 and was noted for his efforts to
restore the economic and political stability which had been
seriously damaged during the Tinoco interlude.S 6

Depending

upon the time and place, one finds Acosta referred to as either
vary popular or very unpopular. 57 As far as the two United

p. 206.

SSPan American Union, Bulletin LVII (February, 1923),

56 u.s. Chargg Roy T. Davis at San Josg to the Secretary of State, No. 123, 23 March 1923, 818.00/106~, MC 669;
Leon Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:108.
5 7For references that Acosta was popular see: U.S.
Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josg to the Secretary of State,
30 September 1919, 818.00/909, MC 669; his unpopularity was
referred to in: U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josg to
the Secretary of State, No. 709, 1~ October 1919, 818.00"927,
MC 669.
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States Chal"g's in San Jos6 during this time were concerned,
Acosta's identification with the overthrow and replacement
of the Tinoco regime made him a well-liked leader.

58

How-

ever, both Benjamin F. Chase a.nd Walter C. Thurston noted
that Acosta had serious problems due to his over-identification with the United States. 59 While it may well be tX'tle, as
Chase in particular observed, that the Costa Rican nation was
grateful to be rid of the problems of the Tinoco yeal"s, 60 there
was also strong sentiment in reaction to the sacrifices of national prestige which had occu?'I'ed because of United
policy toward the nation. 61

States

Unfortunately for Acosta, he was

directly associated with, or identified as, one of those individuals responsible for the policy which had been adopted toward
the United States a.nd Woodrow Wilson to the detriment of national
58 u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos,·to the
Secretary of State, No. 685, 4 September 1919, 818.00/899, MC
669.
59There was also specific mention that Tinoco's fall

had been caused by U.S. nonrecognition. U.S. Charg& Clarence
B. Hewes at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 289, 13
July 1923, 818.00/1076, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase
at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920,
818.00/1005, MC 669.
60u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos,·'to the
Secretary of State, No. 816, 12 August 1920, 818.00/1000, MC
669.
61 u.s. ChargG Clarence B. Hewes at San Jos& to the Secretary of State, No. 282, 29 June 1923, 818.00/1073, MC 669;

U.S. Charg' Clarence B. Hewes at Sa.n Jos' to the Secretary of
State, No. 264, 25 May 1923, 818.00/1068, MC 669; U.S. Charg~
Walter C. Thurston at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No.
14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669.
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pride. 62

An excellent example of this was the resignation of

Juan Bautista Quir6s from the provisional presidency to which
Tinoco had appointed him before fleeing the country.

In the

view of many Costa Ricans, Quir6s could have held elections
just as legally and just as effectively as did Francisco Aguilar
Barquero, whom the United States had seen as an acceptable
provisional president. 63
Then, too, there was the delay in the United States extension of recognition to Julio Acosta once he had been constitutionally elected. 64 There was a time lapse of nearly nine
months from the election and four months from the inauguration
before full diplomatic recognition of Costa Rica was extended
by the United States.SS

Although the delay was due in part to

Woodrow Wilson's illness at the time, this was no consolation
to Costa Ricans.

Further, the delay could be seen as proof

that Acosta was no United States puppet as some maintained, but
Acosta himself did nothing to help his own cause in the issue,
choosing instead to issue statements about the "close ties and
62Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 279.
63u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos'' to the
Secretary of State, No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC
669; Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 279.
64u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00/927, MC 669.
65u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 8 December 1919, 818.00/944, MC 669.
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friendship" between Costa Rica and the United States. 66

From

the foregoing, one can speculate that the advocates of national pride in international relations would view a refusal
to join the League of Nations on Acosta's part as a far more
desirable policy to promote Costa Rican status in the world
community of nations.

Nonetheless, Acosta accepted the mem-

bership.
Apart from specific issues within Costa Rica which
argued against membership in the League of Nations, there
were broader issues which encompassed much of Latin America
and which, in general, revolved around the uselessness of
the League in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

For ex-

ample, the issues which preoccupied the League of Nations as
a whole in the early years of its existence were primarily
ones of organization and structure of the activities of the
League.

What became apparent was that each of the member

nations, including the Latin American states, had its own
view of the purposes of the organization and i• some instances,
was intransigent in seeing its own views brought to fruition. 67

Unfortunately for the Latin American states and the

smaller states of Europe, the design of the League gave the
66 Extract from Address of President Julio Acosta to
the Congress, 1 May 1920, cited in U.S. Consul Benjamin F.
Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 779, 14 May
1920, 818.00/983, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations,
~' I:884.
67
Walters, League of Nations, !:93-94.
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greatest emphasis to the so-called Great Powers.

This spread

of authority within the League, which is reflected in the
United Nations by the Security Council, would be a bone of
contention for the smaller nations. 68
For the most part, they met this problem by seeking
the seating of the small states on the League Council with
permanent status similar to that of the Great Powers. 69

Bra-

zil was in the forefront of those states which felt that it
had the right to be so situatect. 70 The Latin American nations
seemed to agree that at least one of their members should sit
on the Council 1 but the problem of choice soon resolved itself
into a struggle for the leadership of the Latin American contingent. 71
Initially, the Latin American states were included
with a group of European states which shared a temporary seat
on the Council which rotated among them a11. 72 This meant
that at some times, there was no Latin American representation on the permanent governing body of the LeaJue.

All of

Latin America had agreed upon the necessity of a permanent
seat for one of its members, but Brazil managed to arrange
68 Ibid., I:35.
69
Ibid.
League, p. 65.

1

!:126-127; Kelchner, Latin America and the

70 walters, League of Nations, I:126-127.
71 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 21, 67.
72
Ibid., pp. 66-67.
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matters so that it would acquire that position for itself
when the seat was eventually granted. 73 When the Council
was reorganized in

1~25-1926,

Brazil was not satisfied with

the arrangements and tendered i·ts resignation from the League. 74

The rules of procedure did not make the decision a

final one for two full years, but Brazil withdrew at the time
of its notification.
When Brazil resigned, the question of leadership among
the Latin American states was again open to discussion.

A

logical successor in terms of contemporary La.tin American
politics might have been Mexico or Argentina.

Since Mexico

had not yet joined the League and would not do so until
1931, 75 this left Argentina, which had not had representation at the League since its legation walked out during the
First Session over the question of German repreeentation. 76
Chile stepped in and took advantage of the absence of Mexico
.
and Ar gent ina
an d rep 1 ace d Brazi'l • 77 Un l'k
1 e Brazi'l , h owever,
Chile was not convinced of the relevance of LeaJue membership
to American affairs and was quite outspoken in that belief. 78
73 Ibid., p. 90.

7 4 Ibid., pp. 71, 90.
75 Fl

'

e~ng,

Th e U••
S an d t h e Le ague, p.

~17,
11

1
n ••

76 walters, The League of Nations, I:24.
77 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 90 •
. 78
Ibid., PP• 89-90.
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As a consequence, the Chilean delegates were not in a position of sufficient authority to prevent the diminution of
Latin American representation at Geneva or the withdrawal of
other Latin American states from the League.

In fact, for

the same arguments which Chile presented as to the unimportance
of the League to the Americas, more and more Latin American
states bP.gan to

dive~t

their energies from the League to the

Pan American Union and the Inter-American conferences. 79
In an attempt to answer some of the Latin American
grievances about the irrelevance of the League to American
problems, a Latin American Liaison Office was formed which
was to provide a two-way channel for information from and
. Am .
.
80 As it developed, this
about t h e La tin
erican nations.
office became a training school for diplomats of the Latin
American states, since it provided internships for promising
young Latin Americans as well as some public informaiton ser81
vices about the League in the home states of Latin America.
However, in general, it must be admittec that Latin
America was less than a wholehearted participant in the League
of Nations.

In its early years, several Latin Americans

served in positions of responsibility in the League, such as
President of the League Assembly, president of some of the
79Ibid., pp. 89-90.
SOibid., p. 147.
81Ibid., p. 162.
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League divisions, and chairmen of some of the League Commit~
82
tees.
The International Labor Office was also a dubious
success insofar as Latin America was concerned.

It is inter-

esting to note that of all the Latin American nations, Costa
Rica was the only one never to send a delegate to the International Labor meetings.
America

~elegated

83

For the most part, however, Latin

the affairs of the League to a secondary

position in its concerns, as few League measures ever received ratification from the Latin American states. 84

Further,

arguing that the League did not deal with American questions,
the Latin American states unanimously opposed attempts to
85
raise budgets or quotas for the financing of the League.
Add to these problems the fact that few of the European nations recognized the advantages possible with full Latin American participation, 86 and Latin American dissatisfaction becomes understandable.
Among the Latin American states, Chile soon became a
leader in the discontent with League membership. 87

After Bra-

zil resigned over the issue of its permanent seating on the
82 Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (November, 1923),

p. 451.
83 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 196-197.
84Ibid., p. 163.
BSibid., p. 171.
86 walters, The League of Nations, I:392.

87Ibid., !:341.
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League Council, Chile assumed the position of prominence which
it had held. 88

Chilean delegates were quite explicit in their

explanation that the Pan American Union handled American questions quite effectively and was therefore more important to
the Latin American states than was the League. 89 This position
served to put the Pan American Union and the League into competition, a situation which neither organization anticipated
or welcomed.

Nevertheless, the logic of the Chilean arguments

was not lost on the Latin American membership.

The strongest

part of their argument was that the United States did not belong to the League 9 0 and that it insisted on the separation of
American questions from League conoerns. 91 If it was admitted
that the United States held a dominant position in the Americas,
or at least aspired to one, then it only made sense that any
discussions involving American problems had to be conducted
where the United States could be involved in arbitration and
r.egotiation.

More on the development of the inter-American sys-

tem during this period will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
However, it should be noted that it was precisely the success
of the Latin American states in their dealings with the United
States through the Inter-American Conference system during the
88Ibid.
89 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 89-91.
90

walte~s, The League of Nations, !:350-351.

91 Kelchner, Latin Amer.;pa_and the League, p. 89.
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1920's and early 193D's which led to the growing disenchantment of those states with the League of Nations.
Costa Rica was no exception to these general patterns.
Represented at the League by Manuel de Peralta, who had celebrated his fiftieth anniversary in the diplomatic service of
the Costa Rican nation in 1923, Costa Rica took no position
of prominence in the early years of the League of Nations. 92
It was, as mentioned, the only nation never to send a delegate
to the International Labor meetings.

The main preoccupation

of Costa Rica during the early 1920's was with domestic affairs and the restoration of smooth-running constitutional
government.

For the most part, the relationships maintained

with European nations were on matters of trade.

However,

there was the intrusion of the problems occasioned by the
nullification of the legislation of the Tinoco regime. 93

The

most serious problems, after a somewhat difficult passage of
the laws of nullification, arose from the cancellation of the
Amory oil concession.

Great Britain objected

s~renuously

to

this cancellation of a concession granted to its nationals,
demanding indemnification if the concession was not upheld.94
92Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (February, 1922),
p. 206.
93 Le6n Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:
108.
94u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 16 July 1920, 818.6363Am6/42, Papers Relating
to Foreign Relatio~s, 1920, !:836-839.
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The United

States took a neutral stand in tha matter after

having ascertained that the nullification acts did not affect
any American holdings. 95 The negotiations on the Amory concession continued for a number of yaars, with the matter finally settled in favor of the cancellation in the Costa Rican
courts. 96
The Amory concession, along with the activities of the
nation with regard to the League of Nations, would do much to
discredit President Julio
States.97

Acosta as a puppet of the United

The anti-American sentiment, which had been manu-

factured at the end of the Tinoco regime, was heightened by
policies which seemed to favor United States investors over
English businessmen, 98 although the picture was quite different
from the United States's viewpoint.99

Evidence to support the

view that Acosta was controlled by the United States was found
95

u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 4 September 1920, 818.602/12, ibid., I:838.
96 Pan American Union, Bulletin LVIII (February, 1924),
p. 196.
97 u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669;
U.S. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jos& to the Secretary of
State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669.
98 u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669.
99u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 97, 1 June 1921, 818.60/--, MC 669.
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in his public statements as well as in various other policies
undertaken by his administration.100

A revival of the Panama-

nian boundary dispute in 1921 with armed action by both parties,
which led to favoritism for Costa Rican interests by the United States, was also detrimental to Acosta in this sense.

Pana-

ma insisted that the issue be taken before the League of Nations~ while

Costa

Rica insisted that the arbitration of the
United States was effective in solving the problem. 101 In essence, this prevented League interference since the League
could only arbitrate upon the invitation of the disputants.
Panama argued that the exclusion of the boundary dispute on the
basis of Article 21 (the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine)
did nothing but secure the power of the United States in the
Americas.102

More will be mentioned concerning this dispute

in the discussion of American affairs.

As far as public opin-

ion and the press were concerned, United States favoritism for
Costa Rica in the matter probably stemmed from Acosta's concessions to the United States. 103
100Pan American Union, Bulletin LI (December, 1920),
p. 634; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 779, 14 May 1920, 818.00/983, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, ~' I:884.
101 Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 120;
Controversia Entre Panaml y Costa Rica, II:160.

102 controversia Entre Panam! y Costa Rica, II:239.
103 te5n Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:
109.

'
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In addition to these problems, there was the matter
of the affordability of League membership.

Costa

That is to say,

Rica felt that the quota fees which it paid to the

League of Nations were simply not worth the return in services or prestige which it received. 104 However, in the
final analysis, there were other factors which affected Costa Rica's decision, as well as the decisions of other Latin
American states, to dissociate themselves from the League of
Nations.

In Costa Rica, the matter of resignation from the

League for what were ostensibly financial reasons came under
discussion as early as 1921. 105 It was maintained that in a
time of economic crisis such as then existed, the membership
fees for the League were an expense that could not be justified and therefore, they should be eliminated. 106 But since
Costa Rica's share of the League budget came to only $24,000
per year,107 this argument can be seen as somewhat superficial.
For whatever reasons, Julio Acosta chose not to consider resignation from the League during his term of office.
Perhaps he hoped, as did many other Latin American leaders and

104u.s.

c.

Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669;
Memorias, 1924, p. vii.
105
u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669.
iOSibid.
107 Ibid.

Charg~ Walter
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those of the small nations of Europe, that the League would
be able to protect their interests against the hegemony of
the Great Powers; in the Latin American case the hegemony of
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.10 8

But by the

mid-1920's this hope would be seen as futile and other avenues would be sought by which to seek the same solution.

Thus,

a major campaign issue for the 1924 Costa Rican presidential
elections was the anti-American sentiment of some Costa Ricans
and the associated desire to resign from the League of Nations.109
Since Acosta was not eligible for reelection under the

term~

of the Costa Rican constitution, the issue of his relationship
with the United States and Woodrow Wilson did not have a direct
bearing on the campaign.

However, the plans of the candidates

for the presidency with regard to the national policies toward
the United States and the League of Nations was quite important.110
It should be noted that United States representatives
like Walter

c.

Thurston, who served for about three years as

the United States Charge in San

Jos~,

reported to the State

Department that much of the anti-American sentiment which surf aced during the election campaign was attributable to Mexican

108Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 13.
109 u.s. Charg~ Clarence B. Hewes at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 280, 22 June 1923, 818.00/1077, MC
669; U.S. Charg~ Clarence B. Hewes at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 264, 25 May 1923, 818.00/1068, MC 669.
110 Ibid.
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propaganda efforts in Costa Rica. 1 1 1

In addition, he noted

the adverse effect on United States-Costa Rican relations resulting from the development of closer ties between Spain and
d uring
'
. d • 112 I n h is assessment, Thurston
•
Costa R1ca
t h'is perio
0

completely overlooked the impact of events in recent years on
Costa Rican attitudes and failed to see that Mexico and Costa
Rica shared problems in achieving recognition from the Wilson
administration which had probably developed a special kinship
between them.

Perhaps he can be excused for this oversight in

light of general State Department attitudes on the same subject.
There was at least one State Department missive which
expressed considerable consternation over Costa Rican hostility toward Nicaragua in the early 1920 1 s. 113 If one discounts
all potential national rivalries between these two states,
not to mention the actions of Nicaragua in the Bryan-Chamorro
T~eaty,

there still remains the fact that Nicaragua harbored

111u.s. Charg6 Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 310, 17 August 1923, 818.00/1078, MC 669;
U.S. Charg~ Walter C. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Secretary
of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669; U.S.
Charg~ Walter C. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Secretary of
State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
112 u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC
671; U.S. Charge Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669.
113u.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC
671.
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the insurgent forces which eventually overthrew the Tinoco regime, which many Costa Ricans viewed as a constitutional government.

Yet it is precisely this Nicaraguan policy which the

State Department cited as good and sufficient reason for the
existence of cordial relations between the two nations.114
The rationale for this would be, of course, that Tinoco was a
tyrant who had to be replaced at any cost.11 5

Therefore, Cos-

ta Rica should be grateful to Nicaragua for its assistance in
the elimination of Tinoco.

It can be seen that whatever mis-

conceptions Thurston or his colleagues may have had with regard to Costa Rican attitudes, they came by them quite honestly.
Before turning to the outcome of the 1924 elections,
it is also important to consider the overall status of Costa
Rica's foreign affairs, since this would have significant impact on the eventual decision of the president elected in that
contest with regard to the League of Nations.
that the League was essential to the

If it was true

relationsh~.p

between Cos-

ta Rica and the world conun.unity of nations, then perhaps
there would have been grounds for opposing the resignation.
However, it is apparent that Costa Rica conducted a broad
range of foreign policy quite separate from its membership
in either the Pan American Union or the League of Nations.
1 14 rbid.
115 Ibid.
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In the realm of inter-American affairs, which will
be discussed at greater length in succeeding chapters, Costa
Rica pursued quite independent policies in the early 1920's.
For example, during 1921 and 1922, it was associated with
another Central American Union project. 116 Further, the negotiations with Panama over the disputed boundary continued
for Costa Rica refused League mediation and rejected the attempts of the United States to interfere in the armed dispute
117
The period was also characterized by a quite
which arose.
amicable relationship with Mexico. 118 While these developments will be discussed at greater length below, on the whole
it could be said that Costa Rica certainly had no need of the
League of Nations in its dealings with other American states.
Within this same period as well, Costa Rica would express some
criticism of the Pan American Union and the preeminence of the
United States in its affairs.

The criticism was directed a•

gainst the Pan American Union following the failure of that
body to adopt some Costa Rican suggestions for organizational
116Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 213.
117
u.s. Charg' Walter C. Thurston at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669;
Secretary of State to U.S. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San
Jose, 718.00/325a, United States, Department of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921
(2 Vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,""1936),
!!:181.
113 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC
669.
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changes, so it might be argued that there were more hurt
feelings than good reasons involvect.1 19
In the realm of European affairs, the most important
single problem which arose, other than that of League membership, was the settlement of claims which arose due to the
nullification of the acts of the Tinoco regime.

Most sig-

nificant among these was the Amory oil concession, which involved Great Britain and which had been associated with a
loan negotiated with the Royal Bank of Canada. 120 As was
discussed previously, the Amory concession matter was finally
resolved in the Costa Rican courts, with the help of mediation by Chief Justice White and former President Taft of the
United States.

It was Taft's conclusion that the Tinoco re-

.
h ad b een in
.
. .
gime
fact a legitimate
government. 121

Although

Great Britain approached the United States for assistance in
settling the matter, it was decided by the State Department
that the matter was not subject to official intervention,
since it could be handled under Costa Rican law. 122 This decision was an important one for Costa Rica, since it allowed
a resolution of national problems on purely national grounds,
119 u.s. Charge Clarence B. Hewes at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 251, 4 May 1923, 818.00/1065, MC 669.
120
,
,
U.S. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
1 21Neumann, Recognition, p. 18.

122 Ibid.
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with the aid of voluntary mediation by individuals whom it
had chosen.

However, Great Britain criticized the United

States for taking a position favorable to its own interests
rather than one which reflected the justice of the situa-.
tion. 123

This did not in any way affect Costa Rican-British

relations and so the independence of Costa Rica's policy was
preserved.
Therefore, it can be seen that Costa Rica had no need
for the League of Nations to conduct its foreign affairs.
This will become even more apparent as these issues are discussed at greater length in succeeding chapters.

However, it

can be seen that while there may have been emotionalism or
anti-Americanism attached to the resignation from the League,
the decision was probably one made on logical, well-reasoned
principles, including of course, the financial issue.
Thus, in December, 1925 Costa Rica's delegate at Geneva presented written notice of resignation to the Secretary
~eneral

of the League to become effective January 1, 1927,

citing financial considerations as the reason for its decision to withdraw. 124

It was reported by the Minister of For-

eign Affairs that the decision to resign had been made after
the League published and publicized a list of "debtors," which
123 u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 823, 6 August 1920, 818.00/000, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1:.21..Q., I:835.
124 M
.
192'' p. v11.
..
_emorias,
----:!.'
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included Costa Rica.

He asserted in his ann11al message to

the Congress that such an action gave serious offense and
insult to the Costa Rican people. 125

Further, the report

specified that the $18,700 owed to the League (or 74,671 colones) could have been used far more profitahly for aqueducts,
roads, or schools. 126 The matter remained in abeyance for
the two calendar years required by the League Covenant for
effective resignation. 127

Just prior to that date, however,

a letter was sent by the League Secretariat asking that Costa
Rica reconsider its decision to withdraw. 128 It should be
noted that one historian of the League explains that this
letter was sent to Costa Rica not because of any real concern
over the Costa Rican resignation, but simply because similar
letters had been sent to Brazil and Spain on the occasion of
their resignations and it was considered necessary to extend
the same courtesy to Costa Rica to avoid insult. 129
In reality, the Costa Rican response to this letter
~·ms

not a shocking one, al though its implications might be

construed as such.

In its response,. Costa Rica indicated

125 Ibid.
126 Ihid., P• viii.
127 Ibid., p. VII.
128 rrancisco J. Urrutia, El Presidente en ejercicio del
Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones a Su Excelencia el Sefior
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, San Jose, Costa Rica, 14 de
marzo de 1928, Hemorias, 1928, p. 63.
129 walters, The League of Nations, I:38.

-
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that in order for it to make any reevaluation of its decision to resign, it would have to have the League's definition
of the term "Monroe Doctrine" as it appeared in Article 21 of
the League Covenant. 130 This request was surprising for a
number of reasons.

First, there had been no indication in

the original letter of resignation that there was any objection to the contents of Article 21. 131 This would not have
been a surprise in itself, since Article 21 had been a problem from the start. 132 Second, it had probably never occurred to the preparers of the League Covenant at the time that
Article 21 was included that they would be put in the position of defining a United States policy such as the Monroe
Doctrine without having the United States able to speak for
i' t

ee lf • 133

The third occasion of surprise was the source of

these problems:

Costa Rica.

Costa Rica had never been an

outstanding member of the League of Nations, nor had it even
indicated any tendency to act outside of the pattern for Latin
130 League of Nations, Official Journal, IX:432, cited
in Kelchner, Latin America and the Lea~ue, p. 132; Rafael Castro Quesada, Secretario de Re!aciones ~xteriores to Sefior Don
Francisco J. Urrutia, Presidente del Consejo de la Sociedad
de las Nacioner:;, 18 de julio de 1928, Memorias, 1928, pp. 6567.

-

131

Manuel M. de Peralta to Senor Lie. don Rafael Arguello de Vars, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica de Costa Rica, 14 de enero de 1925, Memorias, 1924, pp.
154-155.

-

1 3 2walters, The League of Nations, I:38.
133 Fleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 214.
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America.

Unless the unusual ci!:'cu.r,1stances surrounding its

adJI1ission to the League were considered, there was, in fact,
no reason to suspect that Costa Eica was bold enough to perpetrate any such shocking or independent actions.
The League Secr·etariat, as well as the General Ass embly when the matter was brought before it, was at a loss as
to how to proceed. 134 At first, an atter,1pt was made to acquire a definition of the Honroe Doctrine from the United
States. 135 For all of the reasons which had been used in opposition to the League of Nations on the grounds of its potential for interference in inter-American affairs, plus the
fact that the United States did not belong to the League, the
136
Th en, ano th er p 1 an was d'iscusse d
Unl.' ted States refusect.
whereby the League Covenant would be modified to exclude Article 21. 137 Here, Great Britain objected for the same reasons for which it had supported the inclusion of the Article
in the first place, namely the protection of its own "regional understandings." 138 Finally, it was decideC::. to inform
Costa Rica that it was not in the power of the League to de134 walters, The Lea,gue of Nations, I:390.

135 rbid., I:391.
136

Ibid.

137Ibi<l.
138 rbid.; Fleming, The

u.s.

and the League, p. 185.
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fine the Monroe Doctrine, since it was a "regional understanding" with which, as Article 21 made clear, the League would
not interfere since it represented a previous binding agreement among member states rather than anything for which the
League was responsible. 139

On that note, Costa Rican res ig-

nation became effective.
Where did this unusual request come from?

It could

be speculated, quite convincingly, that the requested definition of the Monroe Doctrine was meant as a way of bothering
the United States or tugging at Uncle

Sa~'s

beard, by intima-

ting a misapplication of the Monroe Doctrine. 140

Or, it

might be that Costa Rica truly sought a definition of a policy which it believed interfered with the effectiveness of the
League in American affairs. 141

However, since it had been the

obvious intent of Costa Rica to resign from the League of Nat ions for some time before this request was made, it became
evident that the question was posed in an attempt to force a
definition of a policy which simply could not bn furnished by
the League.

Therefore, Costa Rica accomplished the embarass-

139 Pr6cope, Presidente en ejerc1c10 del Consejo de la

Sociedad de las Naciones to el Sefior Secretario de Estado de
Costa Rica, San Jos~, 1 Septiembre de 1928, Memorias, 1928,
pp. 67-68.
---140

,

,

U.S. Charge Clarence B. Hew~s at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 251, 4 May 1923, 818.00/1065, MC 669.
141 Rafael Castro Quesada, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores to Senor don Francisco J. Urrutia, Presidente del
Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones, 18 de julio de 1928,
Memorias, ~. pp. 65-67.
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ment of the United States and of the League of Nations in
one blow, preserving once az,ain its jndependence of action in
world affairs, unless, of course, Costa Rica was "put up to
it" by Mexico or Chile, two outspoken critics of United States
influence in the Wester n Hemisphere as suggested by the Uni1

ted States CharGe Roy T. Davis. 142
cussed in succeedinL chapters.

This issue will be dis-

However, since there is no

evidence to support this possibility, it must be assumed that
Costa Fica acted completely on its own and would continue to
do so.
The decision to withdraw frOrn. the League of Nations had
143
been made by Julio Acosta's successor, Ricardo Jimenez.
By
the time this decision was reached, there was little if any
United States encouragement or pressure for remaining in the
League.

In addition, the resignation served the purpose of

establishing Costa Rican independence from United States influence insofar as Costa P-i.can public opinion was concerned.
The preoccupation of the United States with its own internal
affairs, plus isolationist sentiment there, prevented any reaction to Costa Rica's Monroe Doctrine question which might
have presented problems for Costa Rica.

However, the same

142 u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1924, 818.00/1108, MC 669.
143 Manuel M. de Peralta to Senor Lie. don Rafael Arguello de Vars, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica de Costa Rica, 14 de enero de 1925, Hemorias, ~, pp.
154-155.
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purpose was served whether the United States objected or not.
Costa Rican independence in its international affairs was
established and its path was clear for full participation in
the Pan American Union.

CHAPTER VI
COSTA RICA AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY
OF NATIONS:
As

THE

1920~S

has been established, the couJ:"Se of international

events from 1900 to 1920 led to a situation in which Costa
Rica, along with other Latin American states, essentially
pUJ:"Sued a foreign policy limited to solely American or Western Hemispheric concerns.

It weuld hardly be realistic to

assert that 1920 marked a demarcation line for Costa Rica,
after which diplomatic relations with the nations outside the
Americas ceased to have any importance.

However, as will be

discussed in this and the succeeding chapter, the period following 1920 was, for Costa Rica, a time in which American or
regional affairs took on primary importance in international
relations.

The main goals of Costa Rica's foreign policy was

to improve Costa Rica's status in the Americas.
If it were the intention of Costa Rican policy makers
to concentrate on hemispheric affairs, then logically a start
would have been to be made in improving the nation's bilateral relations in the Americas.

It is difficult to ascertain

how this would be done on the basis of available evidence.
All that can be accurately demonstrated is the actual course
131

133
of Costa Rican policy as reported officially by representatives of the United States and more importantly by the Costa Rican Ministers of Foreign Affairs in their annual reports
when these are available.
In terms of the Costa Rican policy makers themselves,
the election of Julio Acosta as President was reviewed in
preceding chapters.
1924.

His term of office extended from 1920 to

The 1924 election was marked by the same initial prob-

lems as had marked the 1914 election of Alfredo Gonzfilez
Flores.

None of the candidates for office received the re-

quired constitutional majority, putting the election into the
hands of the Congress. 1 The Congressional deliberations ended in the election of Lie. Ricardo

Ji~nez,

whose campaign

proposals were not substantially different from those of his
opponents. 2 The only potential problems arising from Jim,nez's
Congressional election lay in the refusal of the Congress to
seat a group of opposition delegates. 3
Jim&nez was followed in office in 1928 by Cleto Gonztlez V!quez, whose policies were so similar to Jim,nez's as
1 Ricardo Fernlndez Guardia, Cartilla Hist6rica, p. 130.
2Le6n FernMidez Guardia, Histopia de Costa Rica, II:
114-115.

3u.s. Minister Roy T. Davis at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 1 May 1914, 818.00/1108, MC 669.
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not to be considered a real ohange. 4

Both could be charac-

terized as pro-democratic moderates with an interest in gradaul social changes and an overall improvement of Costa Rica' a economy and public works. 5

When Jim6nez was returned to

the presidency in 19S2 for another four year term, it confirmed the fact that the nation was pleased by the stability
and gradual progress for which the two leaders were known. 6
With such internal conditions of stability and progress, it
should have been relatively easy for Costa Rica to prusue a
foreign policy determined by national interests rather than
the kind of policy which characterized the years immediately
following the overthrow of the Tinoco regime, when the approval of the United States was the primary goal.
The situation among the Latin American states in the
early 1920's was still characterized by the domination of
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

With Brazilian withdrawal

from the League of Nations, Brazil and Argentina alone were
in contention for leadership in the Americas, while Chilean
efforts were directed to leadership of the Latin American contingent which remained in the League of Nations. 7

At the

4Le6n Fern&ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:
114-115.
5Ricardo Fern&ndez Guardia, Cartilla Hist6rica, p. 130.
6 Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, P• 2S.

7Norman A. Bailey, Latin America in
(New York: Walker and Company, 1967 • pp.
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same time, Brazil's close association with the policies of
Woodrow Wilson in the early days of the League diminished
the effectiveness of its resignation as evidence of its independence.

This left AJ:lgentina in an extremely favorable

position with regard to leadership among the Latin American
states in American affairs.

It is interesting to note that

in 1921 9 Costa Rica maintained friendly relations with Argentina in spite of the isolationist tendencies of AJ:lgentine
President Irigoyen. 8 During the same time period, relations
with Chile were decidedly cool. 9 However, in all fairness
it should be reported that this unfriendliness was due to an
alleged insult to President Acosta by the Chilean Minister
at a state dinner, which had long lingering oonsequenaes. 10
Relations with the other major South American states
were, for the most part, strictly pro forma.

At various times

and for various reasons, animosity to these nations surfaced
in the Costa Rican press.

However, these occasions were pri-

marily relegated to cases like that of Peru.

In that instance,

there was a strong suspicion that Peru had given material and
moral assistance to Panama in its boundary dispute with Costa

Bu.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 1~ October 1921, 718.00/1 1 MC
671.
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Rica. 11
As the 1920 1 s pl"Og%'essed, so too·did the nature of

Costa Rica's relations with the South American states.

Some

-

of that pl"Ogress could be attributed to the growth of Hispanismo in Costa Rica, which emphasized the racial links
eY..isting C!IJJM:>ng all Latin American people and including Spain. 12
Hispanismo13 also made Costa Rica particularly susceptible to
the "propaganda" efforts of other nations and to attempts at
Latin American unity and the diminution of United States influence there. 14 There were exchange scholarships arranged so
that Costa Rican students could attend the national sahools
in South American nations such as Chile, which overlooked
the earlier coolness between the two nations. 15 The long
range goal was the establishment of a Pan American Institute
for the education of promising young Latin Americans fl"Om all
11 Ibid.
12

Diario de Costa Rica (San Josg), 6 October 1927,
cited in u.s. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San Joa' to the Secretary of State, No. 1052G, 7 October 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 Septem.ber-7 October 1927 1 818.00/1179, MC 669.
13 For a complete discussion of the phenomenon of
Hispanismo see: Frederick B. Pike, Hispgnismo, 1898-1936
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971}.
14 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San JosA to the Secre-

tary of State, 24 December 1926 1 MC 669.
1 5u.s. Charg& Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 1364 1 30 October 1928, 818.4725/1 1 MC 669.
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nations. 16

The earlier difficulties which had clouded Cos-

ta Rican-Peruvian relations were apparently resolved during
the 1920 1 s as evidenced by the lengthy tribute given Peru in
the address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Costa
Rican Congress with regard to Costa Rica's contribution to
the centennial celebration of the Battle of Ayacuoho. 17 In
general• on the level of bilateral relations with South America in the 1920 's, Costa Rica was seeking an inc?'eased harmony
and good wili.1 8 The?'e is no indication that the?'e was any
oonce?''ted effort to support the dominance of any one of these
nations in Latin AmeI'ican affairs.

Fol' the most paI't, Cos-

ta Rica seems to have joined in the overall Latin Ame?'ioan effort to withstand United States domination of the Americas,
as will be discussed below.
In the realm of bilateral ?'elations with Central American states, there was also some important p?'Ogress in the
cou?'se of the 1920's.

A major concern in this a?'ea which

has already been discussed at some length was the boundary
dispute between Panama and Costa Rica.

In 1921, the dispute

was still unsettled and was approaching the state of armed
16 u.s. Charg' Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 599, 1 February 1929, 818.4275/2• MC 669.
17 Memorias, 1924, P• vi.
18

Memorias,

.!ll.!•

P• xii.
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conflict between the two nations. 19

Since at that time both

nations were members of the League of Nations. it was suggested by the British government that they take the matter
to the League for arbitration.~ 0

In the view of Costa Rica,

the mediation of the United States was sufficient to handle
the dispute in keeping with any agreements requiring arbitration. 21

In fact, the Costa Rican Congress passed a resolu-

tion expressing the gratitude of the nation to the United
States and commending that nation for its position in the
matter as a reflection of a new and positive policy toward
Latin America. 22 However, Panama's view of United States mediation was not as positive.

Panama obviously felt that jus-

tice was on its side and that the United States should be
there as well.

As a consequence, the Panamanian government

sent letters and news stories in support of its position to
major United States news services and publications as well
as to the London Times. 23 This was to no avail as troops
from Panama and Costa Rica clashed in the disputed area.

The

19 Robert Lansing and Lester H. Woolsey to the Secretary of State, 3 March 1921, 718.1915/360, MC S71.
20 u.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Joa' to the
Secretary of State, 28 February 1921, 718.1915/299, MC 671.
21 controversia Entre PanamS. y Costa Rica, II:239.
22 u.s. Cha~g' Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, No. 59, 23 March 1921, 718.1915/382, MC
671.
23 eontroversia Entre Panam! y Costa Rica, !I:171.
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United States immediately sent word to the Panamanian government that such hostilities should cease at once, since war
would be an inadmissable threat to the defense of the Panama
24
Canal.
At the same time, a ~uch milder warning went to the
Costa Rican government, stressing the fact that force was not
justifiable in this instance and indicating that such action
caused the United States "gravest concern." 25
The refusal of Costa Rica to take the matter before the
League of Nations may have been reinforced or perhaps even
prompted by the attitude of the United States.

The United

States Secretary of State indicated to the Charge in San Joa& that it was the desire of the United States to have the

boundary dispute finally settled in accordance with the decisi-0n of Chief Justice White. 26 Thus, if this was communicated in any way to the Costa Rican government, it would be
supported in its attitude that mediation other than that already offered by the United States was unnecessary.

It be-

came clear to observers that the boundary conflict was not
one which would be settled easily or promptly.

As a conse-

24
The Secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in Panama (Price), 3 March 1921, 718.1915/293, United States, Department of State, Pa ers Relatin to the Fond · Relations of the
United States,
ngton, •• : Government
Printing Office";"""'i936),
25
The Secretary of State to the U.S. Charg& in Costa
Rica (Thurston), 5 March 1921, 718.1915/325a, Papers Relating
to Foreign Relations, l!!,1 1 Ia181.
26 Ibid., I:182.
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quence, it was viewed as inevitable that Costa Rican-Panamanian relations would remain unfriendly. 27 The possibility
that the United States involvement in the issue was prolonging the intransigence of either or both parrties was not assessed at this time, although it would be a consideration in
later years.

In the interim, Costa Rica, supported by the

United States, would be as conciliatory and amicable toward
Panama as was possible under the circumstances throughout the
1920's. 28

There was an additional aspect to the boundary question
which would fit into other major developments in Latin American relations during the 1920's.

The involvement of the Unit-

ed States in the controversy has been outlined briefly above.
However, there was a ramification of that involvement which
had considerable relations to the development of a Latin American movement in the 1920's and 1930's to lessen the importance
of the United States in Pan American affairs.

It was report-

ed that the representatives of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico
were supposedly spreading the word in Costa Rica that the United States, in spite of its apparent favoritism for Costa Rica's
27 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921t 718.00/1, MC 671.
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cause, could have solved the border dispute quite easily by
controlling Panama as it had the power to do and by ordering
the acceptance of the White award. 29 But such speculation
did little to bring about the settlement of the original dispute and probably led to even more difficulties in the achievement of a final resolution.
In the realm of Central American bilateral relations,
Costa Rica took on another cause cglebre in this period.

For

obvious reasons, the criteria for extending diplomatic recognition to new governments would be an extremely sensitive issue with Costa Rican politicians.
President Julio Acosta

(1920-192~)

AB was indicated earlier,

was repeatedly accused of

appeasement of the United States and part of the ammunition
for those accusations lay in his acceptance of the 1923 Washington treaty which reaffirmed the Tobar Doctrine of nonrecognition of revolutionary regimes. 30 A test case of the doctrine came in 1931 when General Hern&ndez Mart!nez seized the
presidency by revolutionary coup in El Salvador.

He denounced

the 1923 treaty and proceeded to establish a stable and wellaocepted government. 31 Costa Rica and El Salvador had had especially cordial relations, since they were l:zrought together
by their common grievances against the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty
29 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, 28 February 1921, 718.00/299, MC 671.
3°Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 228.
31 Neumann, Recognition, P• 24.
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between the United States and Nicaragua. 32

This cordiality,

combined with Costa Rican antagonism to the nonrecognition
Doctrine of the 1923 treaty, led to the declaration early in
1933 that, effective January 1, 1934, Costa Rica would join
El Salvador in renouncing their adherence to the Treaty. 33
Thus, Costa Rica and El Salvador stood together against the
policies of the other Central American states, as well as the
United States,which had also ratified the treaty.
There was considerable discussion as to how these nations should proceed.

A plan was devised by the United States

State Department whereby the three Central American states
could announce that although they had decided to recognize the
Mart!nez regime, they still viewed the treaty as binding
among themselves. 34 The United States would thus also be
free to I'9cognize the Mart!nez regime without impairing the

cordiality of its Central American relaitons while at the
same time not backing down on its treaty obligations. 35 Upon evidence that the Mart!nez regime was stable and popularly
32 u.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Joa~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
33 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 228.
34Acting Secretary of State Philips to the Secretary of
State, 3 January 1934, 816.01/344a, United States, Department
of State, Forei n Relations of the United States Di lomatio
P~~~s, ~
o s., as 1ngton, D•• : Government rinting
Of ice, 1951), V:216-217.
35 Ibid.
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supported, President Roosevelt agreed to the plan. 86

Presi-

dent Sacasa of Nicaragua drafted an agreement for the Central
American states embodying this plan and added the recommendation that Costa Rica's approval be sought befora the agreement was concluded as a matter of courtesy. 37 Costa Rica's
President

Jim~nez

and Foreign Minister Pacheco were notified

of the plan and expressed great pleasure that their lead was
being followed. 38 When recognition was extended to the Martinez government on January 26 1 1934, Foreign Minister Pacheco made a statement in which he claimed a vindication of
the Costa Rican policy. 39 While the Treaty was technically

in force between the United States, Nicaragua, Guatemala and
Honduras, the principle of nonrecognition embodied in the Tobar Doctrine was in reality finished in Central American affairs. 40

It may be that the success of the bilateral action

of Costa Rica and El Salvador should be correctly attributed
to the response of the United States to their challenge of the
36 Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, 8 January 1934, 816.0!/348 (notations of President on a photostatic copy indicate his approval, the copy
is numbered 816.01/350), Papers Relating to Foreign Relations,
1934, V:218-219 •
...............
37 u.s. Minister in Nicaragua (Lane) to the Secretary
of State, 11 January 1934, 816.01/355, ibid., V:224.
38 u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 15 January 1934, 816.01/363• ibid., V:230-231.
39 u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack _.t San Jos& to the Secretary of State, 26 January 1934• 816.01/410, ibid., Va256.
40 Neumann, Recognition, p. 24.
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1923 Treaty and specifically to the Tobar Doctrine.

However,

it took substantial courage and independence of thought and
action for these two states to stand up to the potential
threat of the "Colossus of the North."
Another nation which is also credited with challenging the United States during the 1920's and 1930 1 s was Mexico.
In view of this, it is inter-esting to look at Mexican-Costa
Rican relations during this period, cclored as they were by
the relationship of the United States to each nation.

As no-

ted previously, Costa Rica maintained diplomatic relations
with Mexico throughout its controversial revolutionary period.
In the early 1920 1 s there were some reports of the propaganda
efforts of Mexico in Costa Rica.
Costa Rica, Waltar

c.

One United States

Charg~

in

Thurston, noted that "as by virtually

every Latin American republic, Mexico is regarded by Costa
Rica as the 'advance fort or bulwark standing between Spanish
American culture and race and the imperialistic Colossus of
the North. '" 41

Thurston went on to observe that Mexico took

full advantage of the situation by maintaining amicable relationships whenever possible. 42
By the mid-1920•s Mexican propaganda efforts in Central
America had become more sophisticated.

In 1925,

th~

Mexican

ministers throughout Central America approached the govern41 u.s. Chargg Walter c. Thurston at San Josg to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
42 Ibid.
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ments to
loans. 43

~horn

they were accredited with offers of broad

There is little doubt that Mexican policy was ef-

fective in Costa Rica in view of the attack by La Prensa of
San Jose on the United States for its policies toward Mexican President Plutarco

El!as Calles. 44

However, this was not

to continue indefinitely or without interruption.

In the year

following the loan proposals, the potential for Mexican intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua aroee and there
was an almost immediate Costa Rican reaction to that threat. 45
Prior to the realization that Mexico posed a threat to Costa
Rica, the government had tolerated Mexican domination of the
San J ose, press. 46 But t h.is would subsequent1 y change.
This brief disenchantment with Mexico's motives was
ended within a short time as the unity of American states in
general was strengthened.

The Costa Rican: nation seemed to

accept its racial link with Spain and to find the American
43 u.s. Charg~

Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary
of State, 29 October 1925, 818.51/316, MC 669.
44 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary
of State, No. 616G, 3 July 1925, Report of General Conditions

Prevailing in Costa Rica, 20 June-3 July 1925, 818.00/1122,
MC 669.
45 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary
of State, No. 820G, 15 October 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 25 September-15 October 1926•
818.00/1152, MC 669.
46
Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policx
(New York: w. w. Norton g Company, 1§s7), p. 15.
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counterpart to Spain in Mexico, the "Aztec nation." 47

As

was the case earlier in the 1920's, Mexico followed up on
the fellow feeling by giving Costa Rica and other Central
American states presents of airplanes. 48

The waxing and

waning of Mexican influence in Costa Rica was without any
real pattern in the 1920's.

Later, as will be discussed

below, there would be some correlation between Costa RicanMexican relations and the course of Pan American affairs.
As opposed to Mexican relations, Costa Rica's relationship with Nicaragua never had any periods of positive
accomplishment.

Part of the problem related to the diffi-

culties between the two nations which arose because of the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.

When Nicaragua experiences internal

political problems early in the 1920's which brought about
the intervention of the United States, Costa Rica was found
to be in the position of allegedly supporting Nicaraguan revolutionaries.

The Costa Rican government. in fact. informed

the President of Nicaragua that a rebel band was in Costa Rica
4 7La Prensa (San Jos~), 22 September 1927 and El Diaric
de Costa Rica (~an Jos~), 6 October 1927, cited in U.S. Consul
it M. de Lambert at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State• No.
1052G, 7 October 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 September-7 October 1927, 818.00/1179 1

MC 669.

48

,
,
U.S. Charge R. M. de Lambert at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 1341, 3 October 1928, 818.248/1, MC 669;
U.S. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State,
No. 1615, 8 August 1929, 818.248/5, MC 669.

1~7

preparing to

CX'OSS

the border into Nicaragua.~ 9

Somehow

it is difficult to overlook the parallel between this situation and the one of previous years surrounding the rebel
bands originating in Nicaragua which were responsible for
the overthrow of the Tinoco government.

Perhaps this is

where the explanation for Costa Rican hostility lies.

How-

ever, the United States took the unusual position that precisely for that reason Costa Rica should feel gratitude to
the Nicaraguan nation and that relations between the two
states should therefore be cordia1. 50 But such an attitude
overlooked the animosity felt by those Costa Ricans who had
supported Tinoco, the lingering resentment surrounding the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, and the hostility occasioned by the
presence of United States Marines in Nicaragua.
The United States took some steps to remedy these latter problems.

Early in 1923, the United States and Costa Ri-

ca finally signed an agreement by which Costa Rica would be
consulted in the event of a decision to construct a Nicaraguan canal so that Costa Rica's interests could receive equitable consideration.51

Another event which had an extremely

49u.s. Minister Jefferson in Nicaragua to the Secre-'
tary of State, 22 August 1921, 715.1715/206 9 Papers Relating
to Foreign Relations. ~, II:554.
50 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
51Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (April, 1923), p.
404.
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positive effect on United States-Costa Rican relations regarding Nicar·aguan issues occurred in 1925.

At that time,

the United States withdrew its marines from Managua in spite
of the request of some members of the Nicaraguan government
that they be allo1>1ed to remain. 52 On the .other side of the
spectrum, this event did nothing to facilitate Costa. RicanNicaraguan amicability.

In fact, the United States was vin-

dicated in the Costa Rican press for its intervention in
Nicaragua on the grounds that individuals who would request
continu.ed military intervention were not worth)' of independent self-government. 53
Once again in 1927• Costa Rica came under suspjcion
for harboring within its borders rebel groups which were
54
opposed to the current Nicaraguan government.
It is entirely possible that this allegation. if true. reflected the popular opinion that any canal project undertaken by Nicaragua in
conjunction with the United States would be disastrous to
5 2u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 630G, 5 August 1925, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 19 July-30 July 1925, 818.
00/1124, MC 669.
53 u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 641G, 4 September 1925, Report on General
Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 16 August-4 September
1925, 818.00/1126, MC 669.
54 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt in Nicaragua to
the Secretary of State, No. 27, 31 January 1927, 817.00/1505,
United States~ Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927 (3 Vols., Washington,
D.C.: GOvernment Printing Office, 194"2'5"'; III:306.
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Costa R.ican sovereignty.

Therefore, aiding the disruption of

internal order in Nicaragua would delay the construction of
the canal and prevent the realization of the threat.

If such

a canal were constructed, it would be linked by numerous high-

ways and railways which would virtually cut Costa Rica into
several long, narrow pieces running north and south between
Panama and Nicaragua. 55 Feeling threatened by Nicaragua's
relationship with the United States, Costa Rican policy in
the 1930's would tend toward establishing close ties with
other Central American states, such as with El Salvador in
the matter of the denunciation of the 1923 Washington Treaty.
Further, an effort was made to improve relations with Guatemala whica had taken Costa Rica's part in the boundary dis.
56
pute with Panama.
The thread of United States relations with Costa Rica
runs through all of Costa Rica's bilateral reations with other Latin American states in the 1920's.

As was indicated

earlier, the United States was viewed with I!l.ixed emotions by
most Costa Ricans, depending upon the attitude held with regard to the nonrecognition of the Tinoco regime, its fall, and
55 La Nuev~ Prensa (San Jos~), 17 November 1927, cited
in U.S. Charg~ R. M. de Lambert at San Jos~ to the Secretary
of State, No. 1042G, 2 December 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 18 November-2 December 1927,
818.00/11e3, MC 669.
56 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurstcn at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921 1 718.00/1, MC 671.
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the original exclusion of Costa Rica from the League of Nations.

In general, at the beginning of the decade, Costa

Rica was wary of the united States and its motives in Central
American affairs.

This did not prevent the conduct of day-

to-day business, such as the conclusion of a treaty of extradition with the United States in 1922 57 or a treaty regulating the travel and business of salesmen between the two
countries. 58 Primarily due to the ability of both nations to
conduct "business as usual" in spite of potential problems.
it was possible in 1925 to characterize their relations as
"amicable. n 59

Adding to that amicability was the agreement

concluded in 1926 with the United Fruit Company providing for
a loan of $500,000 to the nation. 60
57 Negotiations and Text of a Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Costa Rica, 10 November 1922, Unit-

ed States, Department of State, Pa~ers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 19 2 (2 Vols., Washington, D.C.a
Government Printing Office, 1938r;-I':980-993; Pan American
Union Bulletin LIV (June, 1922), p. 625.
58
Repablica de Costa Rica, Colleci6n de Tratados [Que]
Contiene Solamente Los Tratados Vi entes en la Pecha del 31 e
diciembre de 1926 Ed1c1 n Ordenada por la Secretar a de Relaciones Exteriores, San Jose: Imprenta Librer1a y Encuadernaci6n Alsina, 1927), p. 333, 718.00/4, MC 671; Hemorias, 1924,
p. vi.
---59 u.5. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre··
tary of State, No. 604G, 5 June 1926, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 May-5 June 1925, 818.00/
1119, MC 669.

60 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Joa~ to the Secretary of State, No. 649G, 18 September 1925, Report on General
Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 5 September-18 September
1925, 818.00/1127, MC 669; u.s. Charge Roy T. Ddvis at San Jos'
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The improvement in United States-Costa
was also noted in the Costa Rican press.

Ric~n

relations

The dontlnation of

San Jose newspapers by Mexico was changed so that by late
1S25, one major daily news publication was owned by the Associated Press and others featured many despatches from United States papers. 61 Even stories of local origin reportedly
" eu1 og1ze
· d" Uni•t e d 0ct a t es 1·n'"'t1.tut1·ons
and i·deals. 62 Someu
how it is difficult to credit this change of press attitude
to a sincere change of opinion about the United States, but
the United States Chargg, Roy T. Davis, did so, explaining
that Mexican influence had waned and that there was a "higher
·
n63
.
c 1 ass o f JOurna
1 1sts.

However, it should be noted that the

threat of Mexican domination in Nicaraguan affairs may have
led to a swing of opinion favorable to the United States as a
viable means of preventing the extension of Mexican domination to Costa Rica.
So strong was this swing of opinion that in a Presito the Secretary of State, No. 655G, 2 October 1925, Report on
General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 19 September-2
October 1925, 818.00/1129, MC 669.
61 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Sec1'etary of Stat~, No. 695G, 25 December 1925, Report on General
Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 11 December-25 December
1925, 818.00/1134, MC 669.
62 Ibid.
63 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 744G, 16 April 1926~ Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 March-16 April 1926,
818.00/1139, MC 669.
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dential election campaign, the opponents of Ricardo

Jim~nez

found his alleged anti-Americanism to be ammunition to use
against him. 64

However, as time passed, Jim~nez's position

was accepted as a realistic one.

In leading the nation to

its withdrawal from the League of Nations, he was credited
with understanding that while the League could be a moral
force in protecting Costa Rican sovereignty, it could simply
not challenge the real power of the United States in American affairs. 65
To the detriment of the United States, the favorable
attitude of the Costa Rican press would suffer as a result of
United States intervention in Nicaragua during 1926 and 1927. 66
Once again, the Costa Rican press took up

th~

theme of United

States imperialism and the threat of United States military
power. 67

However, there was some modification of the view as

can be seen in the following extract from a prominent San Jos'
64u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1926, Report on General Conditions
Prevailing in Costa Rica, 26 December-8 January 1926, 818.00/
1129, MC 669.
65
El Diario de Costa Rica (San Jose), March, 1926, in
u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State,
No. 744G, 16 April 1926, Report on.General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 March-16 April 1926, 818.00/1149, MC 669.
66 Howland, American Relations, p. 228.
67 u.s. Charge ad interim Waldemar J. Ga.llman at San
Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 765G, 28 May 1926, Report
on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Ried, 14 May-28 May
1926, 818.00/1142 1 MC 669.
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daily newspaper:
The danger of Yank~e imperialism, as we have stated so
many times, is not caused by the activities of the Secretary of State at Washington, but by the maneuvers of the
arde.nt friends which the Yankee Government has in these
republics. Almost on every occasion intervention has
been solicited by Rome degenerate dependent upon the support of traitors who are always to be found. 68
The reaction of the United States representative in
Costa Rica was that Mexican influence was once again rearing
its head as evidenced by a belittlement of

Charl~s

Lindbergh's

accomplishment in comparison with a proposed flight by a Mexican aviator to Argentina. 69

•

Another factor which may have contributed to the wave
of anti-American sentiment in Costa Rica during 1927 was the
general public belief in the innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti.
There were widespread public demonstrations and the threat of
a general strike in support of their case. 70 However, the
68 RepP.rtorio de Americano (San Jos~), 19 November 1927,
Translation in U.S. Chargi R. M. de Lambert at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, No. 1092G, 2 December 1927, Report on
General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 18 November-2
December :J.927, 818.00/1183, l1C 669.
69 niario de Costa Rica (San Jos~), in U.S. Charg~ Roy
T. Davis at San Jos€ to the Secretary of State, No. 983G, 24
June 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevci.iling in Costa
Rica, 10 June-24 June 1927, 818.00/1169, MC 669.
70 u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 983G, 24 June 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 10 June-24 June 1927, 818.00/
1169, HC 669; U.S. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 1013G, 12 August 1927, Report on General
Conditions Pr3vailing in Costa Rica, 21 July-12 August 1927,
818.00/1174, MC 669.
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movement died down rather quickly and was even of some eventual benefit to the United States because of the reports that
the United S"tates Senate was determined to ignore foreign
demonstrations, which gave evidence that the United States
might be undergoing a turn toward isolationis:r.i 1 Hhich could
71
Conmean that its imperialistic designs might be waning.
tinued evidence of this was provided to some Costa Ricans
by the visit of President-elect Herbert Hoover to Costa Rica

in December, 1928,

~he

first such visit by a United States

President or Presideil't-elect.

Many Costa Ricans apparently

were ready to accept the messages of friendship and cooperation offered by Hoover and they looked foI'W'ard to amicable
relations with the United States during his Presidency. 72
It can be aeen from the foregoing that it is difficult
to isolate bilateral relations conducted by Costa Rica from
its multilateral relationships.

For example, as was indicated,

the on-again, off-again amicability with Mexico seemed to be
directly related to the status of United States-Costa Rican
relations.

In at least one instance, the Central American con-

cern with the potential threat of Mexican domination of Nica71u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 103DG, 2 September 1927, Re:?Ort on General
Conditiona Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 August-2 September
1927, 818.00/1177, MC 669.
72 u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State, 4 January 1929, Repo»t on General Conditions
Prevailing in Costa Rica, 17 November-31 December 1928,
818.00GC/7, MC 669.
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ragua led to improved United States-Costa Rican relations.
It would then seem to follow that Costa. Rica •>Jould be inclined to participate in multilateral groups such as the
Pan American Union or a Central American Union if one existed.

Thus, in 1921 when a proposal was forwarded for still

another attempt at Central Amerioan confederation, Costa Rica was willing to participate in it as it had

~een

to parti-

cipate in such efforts in previous years.
The attempted Central American Union of 1921 was supposedly part of the celebration of the first centennial of
independence. 73 A conference was convened, chaired by a
Costa Rican, Alvarado Quiros, in which the details of the
confederation would be worked out. 74 As had been the case
in previous efforts, it soon became apparent that the divisions among the five Central American states were far greater
than any of the unifying influences which had prompted the
conference. 75 A federal constitution was to be prepared by
which each nation maintained its autonomy in internal affairs,
provided actions of this type were not contrary to the broad
.

.

r,1 l es o f t h e consti tut1on.

76

But the constitution was not to

be drafted until the pact of union had been ratified and a
73 Le6n Fern~ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:109.
74 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 215.
75 Le6n Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:109.
76 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 213.
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.
1 cons ti. tnent assembly convened. 77
nationa

The fi'.1'.'st real

indication that there would be problems in meetint:: these preliminary steps came when

Pr~sident

Qui1,6s was not present for

tl1e official signing of the pact of union. 78

Although the

official cereraony was delayed four days to await his return
to the conference, 79 his absence, along with the reaction of
the Costa Rican pr·ess to the prcposed union, did not bode well
for its success, at least in Costa Rica. 8

°

Further, evidence

of the potential failure lay in the fact that Nicaraeua withdrew from the conference when it became obviol'.s that the other
participants intended to bring the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty under
discussion. 81

Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salva-

dor, nonetheless, signed the pact of union on January 16,
1921.

82

Once again, there is a suspicion that Costa Rica did
not take the success of the union too seriously.
Beeche, the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, D.

Octav:i.o

c.,

pre-

77rbid.
78 Ibid., p. 215.
79Ibid.
80 El Diario (San Jose), 14 January 1921, cited in
Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 215.

81 u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 4, 22 January 1921, 818.00/1021, MC 669.
82 u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the Secretary of State, 19 January 1921, 813.00/1047, Papers Relating

to Foreign Relations,

.!2.Z.!•

I:9.

157
sented a copy of the pact of union to the Secretary of

St~te,

remarking that it was "barely a project" and "has not yet
been approved by the Congresses in the respective countries." 83
Ratifications of the pact were achieved in fairly short order in the Congresses of Honduras, 84 El S.::i.lvador, 85 and
Guatemala. 86

Since these three ratifications rendered the
pact effective, 87 it was sent to the League of Nations for
registration. 88

The Costa Rican Congress, meanwhile, re-

jected a majority report which recommended ratification and
voted to postpone action on the union until its next session. 89
It soon became apparent that Costa Rica was not going
to ratify the pact.

Although the pact was "viewed very favor-

ably," there was talk of close relations with the federation
83The Costa Rican Minister in Washington (Octavio

Beeche) to the Secretary of State, 1 February 1921, 813.00/
1050, ibid., I:145.
u.s. Charg~ Spencer in Honduras to the Secretary of
State, No. 70, 15 February 1921, ibid., I:153.
84

85u.s. Minister Jay in El Salvador to the Secretary of
State, 23 February 1921, 813.00/1057, ibid.~ I:154.
86 Guatemalan Minister in Washington (Bianchi) to the
S~cretary of State, 8 April 1921, 813.00/1069, ibid., 1:154.
87Alberto Uclea, Honduran M~nister of Foreign Affairs,
to the Secri==tary of State, 15 June 1921, 813.00/1088, ibid.,
I:155.
88u.s. Charg~ Frank Arnold in El Salvador to the Secretary of State, 3 June 1921, 816.00/326, ibid., I:154-155.
89u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, 22 June 1921, 813.00/1079, ibid., 1:156.
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rather than membership in it. 90

Thus, this union, like

others which preceded it, failed because the five Central
American nations could not ratify a pact of confederation.
The major analyst of these attem.pts at confederation in Central America notes that while there are specific reasons
which can be attributed to each individual failure, one of
the three overall causes was the isolationist behavior of
Costa Rica when it came to making the final com:mittment to
union. 91

Thomas Karnes goes on to explain that the primary

consideration for Costa Rica was economics.

That is to say,

there simply were no profitable markets for its products in
Central America. 92

Further, on a less specific level, there

was the Costa Rican concern that its political stability and
high level of culture might be impaired thrcugh association
. h its
.
l ess stable, less c ul tura1 ly deve 1 oped neig
. hb ors. 93
wit
In the specific instance of the 1921 Confederation,
however, Costa Rica's stated motives were somewhat different
from the foregoing.

In keeping with the problems it per-

ceived because of United States domination in Nicaragua and
throughout Central America, Costa Rica claimed that a political
9'0u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.

91Karnes, Failure of Union, pp. 248-249.
92 Ibid.
93

Ibid., p. 249.
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confederation was impossible and only a spiritual union was
.. l e. 94
feas1D

This explanation, in the opinion 0f this author,

is perhaps far more to the overall point than any specific
arguments which might be cited.

Costa Rica was well aware,

with the Tinoco problem still fresh in nenory, of the in fluence that the United States wielded over the livGs of the
Central American republics.

Confederation, er any other

project designed to strengthen Central l\r:lerica, could succeed only with the approval of the United States, making the
accomplishment of union less important than it was designed
to be.

Therefore, Costa Rica chose in this instance to re-

tain its freedom of action, much as Nicaragua did, by refusing
to join the union.

While there had been no indications that

the United States disapproved this union, it should be clear
from the foregoing that Costa Rican self interest, both in
Central America and elsewhere in the world, could be best
served by other means.
One way in which Costa Rica obviously sought to serve
its best interests was its revival of the idea of an InterAmerican Court of Justice.

It should be remembered that Cos-

ta Rica had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Central
American Court until its demise was brought about the the rejection of its decision on the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty by the
United States and Nicaragua.
9 4 Ibid. , p. 21 7 •

The Costa Rican Congress passed
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a resolution to propose the institution cf an inter-American
body in conunemoration of the 100th anniversa'.l".'y (1826) of the
First Congress of American Nations and in honor of Simon
Bol!var. 95 At the same time, there was discussion of an
AMerican Lear;ue of Nations ·which could hcmdle strictly American problems most effectively because of the distinctive relationships which existed among nations of such similar origin. 96

As will be demonstrated, the latter iden. was one which

was quite popular with the smaller Latin American states during
the late 1920's and early 1930's.

However, in view of Costa

Rica's rejection of the Central American union in 1921, it is
interesting to note its advocacy of this cause.

It is entirely

feasible that the Costa Rican proposals, as well as others of
similar nature, resulted from the failure of the League of
Nations to accept any role in the mediation of the Tacna-Arica dispute. 97

However, in this matter as in others, the

League deferred to the United States and the inter-American
Conference system for a solution. 98
95 u.s. Charg~ ad interim Waldemar J. qallman at San
1Tose to the Secretary of State, No. 773G, 2 July 1926, Report
on General Conditions Prevailine in Costa Rica, 11 June-2 July
1926, 818.00/1144, MC 669.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.; J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and InterAmerican Securitv, 1889-1960 <AuRtin: University o~ Texas

Press, 1967), pp. 93-94.
98 Bailey, Latin America in World Politics, p. 149.
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This brings the discussion to a consideration of Costa Rican participation, or lack thereof, :i_n the inter-American Conferences of the 19 20 's.

in Santiago, Chile in 1923.
beer1

The first of these was held

This conference had initially

scheduled in 1914 but had been po st:poned due to the in-

terventior! of World Har I. 99

The program approved fo~ the

conference included nearly twenty i terns, iOO

E

even of which

could be categorized as political issues which the United
States was expected to oppose but which it had allowed in the
hopes of preventing their success. 101

These political is-

sues primarily revolved around a proposed reorganization of
the Pan American Union with a diminution of the control of
the United States as their goals. 10 2

Prior to this time,

representation at the Pan American Union or on the Governing
Board was restricted to the diplomatic representatives of
the individual countries accredited to the United States and
obviously to those nations who had regularized diplomatic re9 9James B. Scott, ed., The International Conferences
of American States, 1889-1928 (Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1931), p. 209.
100program of the

,
Fi. f th Con f erence as approve d b y tne

Governing Board of the Pan American Union, 6 December 19 22,

ibid., pp. 210-212.
101

Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 9 5.

102 :tbi.d.
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lations with the United States. 103

Further, the chairr..an-

ship of the Governing Board was held on a permanent basis
104
by the United States Secretariy of State.
It is obvious
from the foregoing that the role of the United States in
the Pan A..merican Union was a dor:iinant one, so that the ef-

forts of reorganization were directed to a real problem rather than to an illusion of dominance by the "Colossus of
the North."
There were, of course, other issues which the United
States could be expected to oppose, such as the idea of an
.
.
105
.
American League of Nations.
This proposal was presented
as a means of encouraging closer ties among the American nations, with legal strictures such as binding arbitration to
cement the nations more closely than did the Pan American
Union. 106 In the same vein, the program contained at least
two items designed to promote arbitration as a means of solving international disputes in the Americas 107 and proposed
the acceptance of a uniform codification of international law,
such .as the one to be produced by the Inter-American Congress
1 03Ibid.

104Ibi.d.
1 D5scott, Conferences of American States, 1889-19~,
p. 211.
106

t·~echam,

Inter-~merican

Security, p. 95.

107 scott, Conferences of American States, 1889-192_§.,
p. 211.
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of Jurists • 108

All of these issues

rc;•ere

linked to the dimi-

nution of United States influence, since they were prenised
on the equal sovereignty of all American states and would allow Lu.tin AmePican preeuinence by the simply fact that they
outnur:rl)ered the United States.
The American League of Nations proposal was introduced
by

President Brum of Uruguay at the Santiago Conference in

spite of warnings that the United States opposition to such a
program would prevent its pas sage, which, in fact,

occurre~.•

An interesting aspect of Brum' s proposal was thrJ.t he wished

109

to

see the Monroe Doctrine as the fundamental principle of the
American League, with each American state issuing a declaration of the Doctrine on its own behalt. 110

The United States

took particular issue with this aspect of B:r.um's proposal,
maintaining that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral policy
111
. h could no t t h ere f ore b e appropriate
.
db y any o th er nation.
.
wh ic

Vfoile the United States was able to carry out its opposition
to the American League with the majority of the Conference,
primarily due to the nationalistic jealousies which existed,
it was apparent that such control would not be long lived after
108 rbict., p. 210.
109 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 97.

110

Ibid.

1111b.i.a.
-
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the 1923 Conference.

112

Costa Idea, rep1"esented at ·the Conference by Alejandro
Alvarado Quiros who was the former chairman of the Centrc:.l
American Conference of 1921, 113 was counted among the delegations in opposition to the United States by virtue of its
position with regard to the issues outlines above.

In fact,

the resolution proposing the creation of a Permanent Court of
A~
•
J ustice
•
.nmerican
was made by t h e

costa Rican
•

de1 ezate. 114

The tribunal would, according to the Costa Rican proposal,
provide binding arbitration for all signatorids and arbitrate
any disputes of non-signatories for which a special agreement
could be reached designating the Court as arbiter. 115

How-

ever, this resolution was not adopted by the Santiago Conference.

It was sent, along with other proposals, such as

the codification of American law, to the Congress of

Jurists~

which was scheduled to meet at Rio de Janeiro in 1925.

116

Beyond the referral of the aforementioned matters to
112Ib.ia.,
·
pp. 99-100.
113 scott, Conference of American States, 1089-1928,

p. 219.
114 Proposed Treaty Presented by the Delegation of Costa Pica Re~arding the Creation of A ?ermaneut Court of Ameri-

can Justice, ibid., pp. 452-453.
115 Ibid.
.
<eso 1 ution
a d op t e d ~.vy t h e 1 4 t h
ference, 2 May 1923, ibid., p. 284.
116 1

session
.

of t he

con-
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the Rio Congress of Jurists, there was very little of real
progress to be noted from the proceedings of the Santiago
Conference.

As was indicated ea1•lier, Costa Rica would pick

up the theme of the American League of Nations in 1926 and
would continue advocacy of that idea, as well as its own
proposals, in subsequent inter-.Anerican conferences.
The next scheduled conference tock place in Havana
in 1928.

Many of the issues which remained unresolved after

the Santiago Conference were again put on the agenda, which
made the United States aware of the fact that the defeat of
controversial mai:ters which it opposed was by no means assure<l.117
In response to the Brum proposal made at Santiar;o
which had called for the establishment of an American League
of Nations based on a multinational Monroe Doctrine, the
delegation from the United States was instructed that the
United States did not desire a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine at this and, for that matter, at any inter-American Conference 1 despite g!'.'owing Latin American support for the American League idea.118

The project for the codification of

1171,Iecham > Inter-American Secu!"i ty, :p. 10 0.
118 secretary of State to the American Delegation, 5
January 1928, Supplementary T:atter•s :trot On the l'<~enda But Which
May Be Proposed for Consideration Under Article 24 of the Regulations, 710 ~ FO 0 2 /131a, United States, Department of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
192 8 ( 3 Vols., Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office•
1942) 9 It578.
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American international law resulted in the Bustamante Code,
which was presented to the Havana Conference for ratification.119

Several of the delegations expressed reservations

before signing the convention which recognized the name
Bustamante Code and indicated the tentative approval of
their nations.120

Costa Rica and Colombia joined in a res-

ervation indicating their willingness to accept the Code,
provided it never came into conflict with provisions of
their national constitutions. 121

By November, 1930, ten

Latin American states, including Costa Rica, had ratified
. . t•ing a
t h e Bustamante Co d e, 122 1nd1ca

w1·11·
ingness

to comp1 y

with projects designed to increase Latin American unity.
Overall, the Sixth International Conference of American States was a testing and re-testing of the ability of
the United States to exert its influence in controlling the
Latin American states within the conference system.

Costa

Rica once again participated in the conference, seemingly
on the side of th0se nations who sought to limit United
States influence,

~ut

it was not particularly outstandine

119 code of Private International Law, Scott Confer2
ences of funeri~an States, 1889-1928, pp. 327ff.
120

Ibid., p. 443.

121

Ibid., p. 372.

122 Ibid.,

p. 325.
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even in that area.
One outcome of the Havana Conference was an agreement
fo:r. a Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration to be held late in December, 1928. 123

In essence,

this conference was to dis cuss some of the matters on ai-,bitration which the United States had blocked at Havana.

The

outcome of the Conference was a General 'I'reaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed by twenty republics, and binding all
signatories to arbitration as a means of settlinrr all disputes.124

Costa Rica was one of the signatories but agreed

only with two reservations:

first, the provisions of the

treaty were not to affect any previously existine agreements
between Costa Rica and any other nations, whether both had
ratified the treaty or not; 125 second, the provisions of the
treaty did not affect any case which fell under the jurisdiction of the Costa Rican courts so long as both parties in
the case t'ecognized the jurisdiction of those courts. 126

Ten

other signatories of the Treaty adopted either one or both of
these reservations.:i.27

In spite of this, by December, 1930,

only six of the original signatories had ratified the treaty
123 Ibid., p. 458.
124
Ibid.
12srb·d
.1 •
126

,

p. 4 60 •

Ihid.

127 rbid., pp. 460-461.
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and of these six, four had followed Costa Rica's lead in reservations,'.i..28 although Costa Rica itself had not ratified.

The reasons for Costa Rica's failure to ratify the treaty, as
well as its reservations in signing, can be found in the
boundary dispute with Panama.

Six

n~nths

before the Confer-

ence was held, the Costa Fican Foreign Minister had indicated
to the United States Charge, Roy T. Davis, his government's
willingness to be bound by a treaty of arbitration provided
that there were e;uarantees that such a treaty would in no
way affect the current state of the boundary negotiations
wi. t

h p anama. 129

I t was t h e Costa Rican
.
-iconcern t1.1at
a gene-

ral tl'eaty of arbitration might allow Panama to reject all
previous negotiations and resubmit the boundary question for
mediation.

In view of the length and bitterness of the dis-

pute to that point, Costa Rica was simply unwilling to allow
this to occur, 130 viewing its own national interests as more
important than a general arbitration treaty for the Americas.
Although Costa Rican foreign policy during the 1920's
was complex, it was characterized by a dominant theme, namely
the pursuit of the best interests of the Costa Rican nation.
In the areo of g1•eat ir;tportance to other· Latin lm•erican states
128~1 •ct
.l

)J.

• '

129

pp. 458-460-461 •

U.S. Minister Roy T. Davis at San Jos~, temporarily
in WashingL:or1, D.C., to the Secretary of State, 3 July 1928,
710.1012Washington/82, ~pers Relating to Foreign Relations,

-

1928, 1:639-640.

iSOibid.
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during this period, the limitation of the influence of the
United States in Pan Ar:ierican affaiPs, Cos-ca

l~ica

to attempt ·to assw::1e a position of lea.JePship.

chose not

Accepting

the pragri1atic approach of Presideni: lcicardo J"imenez, Costa
F.iccL rcc:Lliz12d

t~1at

if it atteL11Jtec1 to i,.J10re tne very real

pmrnr of the United States in Latin .American affairs, it
would be courting disaster.

Thus, membE:l'ship in the League

of ?;ations was seen as a needless expense which bore absolutely no fruit for national policy.

Secondly, even if Cos-

ta Rica had taken it upon itself to attempt to lead other
Latin American nations, there .is little evidence to support
the contention that any would have followed.

Finally, there

was every indication at the close of the 1920's that the influence of the United States was to be limited in the future,
not only because of the unity of Latin Americans in opposition to it, but also due to a modification of United States
fe-reign policy which would come to be called the Good Neighbor
Policy.

Costa Rica thus had no reason to continue to oppose

the United States as it had in the majority of cases during
the 1920 1 s.

In addition, its independence of action with

regard to other Latin American states would be sustained by
the almost universally accepted non interference principles
which marked Pan Americanism.

COSTA RICA IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS
IN THE GOOD NEIGHBOR YEARS:

THE 1930 1 s

The most significant differences between the two decades under study was that in the early 1930 1 s, the overall
scope of Costa Rican foreign policy was greatly reduced.

In

the 1930 annual report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to
the Congress, it was noted that while the nation attempted to
maintain all amicable relationships, economic considerations
had forced a cutback in the number of missions open throughout the world and had prevented an active pursuit of policies
which sought to establish new, friendly relationships. 1 The
worldwide nature of this economic crisis seemingly made the
task of remaining Costa Rican diplomats all the more difficult, since economics were held responsible for a variety of
political disturbances with which they had to deal. 2

None-

theless, Costa Rican internationalism continued to express
the goals and desires of the nation, as they were interpreted
1Memorias, .............
1930, p. vii •
2 Ibid., P• v.
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by Costa Rican statesmen.

Therefore, as a background to a

discussion of Costa Rican internationalism in the 1930 1 s,
some consideration should be given to the internal affairs
of the nation.
As was indicated previously, the late 1920's were
marked by an exceptionally stable political scene in Costa
Rica.

In 1932 1 Ricardo

Ji~nez

sought election to his sec-

ond term as President to suooeed don Cleto Gonz'1.ez V!quez. 3
The election campaign was an extremely active one in which
Jim,nez was opposed by Manuel Castro Quesada. 4 Once again,
the failure of either of the candidates to achieve the required majority put the election in the hands of the Congress, which, by Gonz'1.ez V!quez's orders, was to follow prooedUJ'es established by a group of Jim'1lez supporters there. 5
The United States took much interest in the outcome of this
election,sinoe Castro Quesada, who had been associated with
the Tinoco regime, was notoriously opposed to United States
3 secretary of the Legation Werlich for the u.s. Minis-

ter at San Jos' to the Secretary of State No. 1251, 31 December 1932 1 Report on 1932, 818.00/1401 1 u;tlted States, Department of State, Records of the Department of State Regarding the
Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1930-1139 1 Manuscript Collection, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Documents from this
collection will be cited hereinafter, with appropriate decimal
file number for each specific document, as Internal Affairs,
1930-1939.
4

Ibid.
5Major A. R. Harris, G.s., M.A., Report No. 57 from
San JosA, 25 February 1932, National Elections: Present Political Situation, 818.00/1352 1 Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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involvement or economic penetration into Costa Rica, whereas
Ricardo Jim~ez seemingly had no such objections.&
Congressional deliberations resulted in

Ji~nez's

Castro Quesada announced himself in revolt. 7

When the
election,

It was specu-

lated that his motivation was not to seize power for himself,
but to force Gonz41ez V!quez to hold new elections in which
a neutral third party could be chosen. 8

Since President Gon-

z4lez V!quez refused to surrender to such extralegal means,
the disputants were at an impasse. 9
ter in San Jos'• Charles

c.

The United States Minis-

Eberhardt, became directly in-

volved in the conflict by carrying messages from the Castro
Quesada faction to the President and Ricardo Jim6nez 10 in an
attempt to assist breaking the impasae. 11

He was almost

6Memorandum by Walter c. Thurston, Divison of Latin
American Affairs, Department of State, to the Assistant Secretary of State, 12 September 1931, 818.00/1293, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
7 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, 27 February 1932, 818.00/1341 9 Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.

au.s. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San Joa& to
the Secretary of State, No. 12. 15 February 1932 1 818.00/1325,
United States, Department of State, ForeiSV Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Paiers, 1932 ts ois., Washington,
b.~.: ~overnment Printing o l!ce,-i14'e>, vzs12.
9u.s.

Sinister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos6 to
the Secretary of State, No. 14, 12 February 1932, 818.00/
1329 1 ibid., Va514.
iOibid.
11u.s. Minister Charles

c.

Eberhardt at San Jos' to
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immediately instructed to disengage himself from any mediation
efforts, since this would give tacit approval to the legitimacy of Castro Quesada's revolt which was clearly illegal. 12
Without Eberhardt's assistance, conferences were held among
the contending factions, during which it became obvious that
Castro Quesada'& insurrection had ended. 13 A pact was signed,
witnessed by Eberhardt in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, by which Castro Quesada was granted amnesty for
his revolt but by which his bid for power in Costa Rican politics failed. 14
Following this brief interlude of unrest, with its
relatively peaceful settlement, Costa Rican politics settled
back down to a preelection dormancy. 15 Much of this tranquility resulted from the personal authority which surroWlded
the Secretary of State, 16 February 1932, 818.00/1329, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
12 secretary of State to u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos4, 17 February 1932 1 818.00/1329, Internal
Affairs, 1930-1939.
13u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos6 to
the Secretary of State, 18 February 1932, 818.00/1335 1 Internal Affai'l'S, 1930-1939.
1 4u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos' to
the Secretary of State, 18 February 1932 1 818.00/1335 1 Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
15 secretary of the Legation Werlich for the U.S. Minister at San Josg to the Secretary of State, No. 1251 1 31 December 1932 1 Report on 1932 1 818.00/1401, Internal Affairs, 19301939.

17 ...
the newly elected President Jim,nez. 16

His previous popular-

ity and the stability of his 192,,.-1928 Presidency combined
with a gradual economic recovery to restore the pattern of
stability and a gradual pJ:tOgress by which this period was
charaoterized.17
As a direct consequence of this stability, Costa Rica began to return to policies which reflected its nationalistic nature.18

In the view of the United States Minister,

nationalism led to a resurgence of isolationism in Costa Rica by which it rejected all but the most necessary international relationships. 19 It is interesting to contrast this
assessment with the explanation offered by the Costa Rican
Foreign Minister in 1930 for the reduction of international
aotivities. 20 There is simply no means by which the causes
for Costa Rican cutbacks in foreign affairs can be ascertained.

In view of the obvious economic difficulties of the

world, it would be impossible to completely ignore their impact, or the use of this reasoning by Costa Rican officials.
However, when decisions had to be made with regard to budgetary
16 Ibid.
1 7Ibid.

1 8u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos& to
the Secretary of State. No. 1285• 25 January 1933, 818.00/
1~02, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
19 rbid.

20

Memorias • .ll!Q. 1 p. vii.
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reductions~

it is equally obvious that foreign affairs were

not of the highest priority to Costa Rican policy makers who
were traditionally characterized as isolationists.

In 1933,

the isolationist nature of Costa Rican policies took on a
new facet as it was reported that popular programs were designed to achieve Costa Rican self sufficiency in the areas
of food production, communications, and transportation. 21 A
press campaign was launched in support of this program, in the
important news publications in San

Jos~,whose

freedom from

government control was well known, and whose motives were unquestionably nationalistia. 22 The high literacy rate of the
Costa Rican population made such a campaign quite successful
and added even more to the public approval for the Presidency of Ricardo Jimenez.
Another new application of the traditional isolationism to national policy was developed in 1935.

A movement

led by former President Julio Acosta (1920-1924) called for
the creation of a standing Costa Rican army. 23 The immediate
reason for such a proposal was related to the alleged threats
21u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/

1402, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
22 Major A. R. Harris, G.S., M.A., "Costa Rica: Propaganda--Susceptibility of Public to Propaganda Effort," 27
March 1933, 818.911/40, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
23 u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1935 1 818.20/16, Internal Affairs,
1930-1939.
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posed to Costa Rican sovereignty by Guatemala's insistence
that the nation take part in a new Central American confederation. 2~

Initially, all that Acosta and his supporters called

for was the creation of a military school for the preparation
of Costa Rican officers and an investigation of the feasibility
of requesting military miseions from either the United States,
Britain, France, Germany, or Chile. 25 As will be discussed at
a later point, the military missions were eventually received

by Costa Rica, but in connection with preparations for World
War II rather than for purposes of Central American war.
The concluding months of Ricardo Jim'11ez's presidency
and the election of his successor were relatively uneventful. 26
Lie. Le6n Cortas, who served as president from 1936 to

19~0,

was known as a man o' great integrity and exceptionally conservative politios.2 7

His term of office continued the pat-

tern of stability and national progress established by Ricardo JimGnez.

In the realm of foreign policy, Le6n Cort&s empha-

sized the importance of Central America above all other regions
to the Costa Rican nation. 28 He based this emphasis on the
24 Ibid.

25
26
27

Ibid.
Busey• "Presidents of Costa Rica," p. 69.
Ibid.

28 Rep\'iblica de Costa Rica, Presidencia, "Mensaje del
Licenciado Don Le6n Cort&s al Congreso Constitucional," 1 de
mayo de 1939 (San Jos'z Imprenta Nacional, 1939), p. 6.
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spiritual union which existed among the Central American
states, including their shared natural wealth and conunon heritage. 29

In some respects, this represented a change, at

least superficially, in Costa Rican attitudes.

Rather than

an insistence upon the superiority of Costa Rica to its nearest n,eighbors, Leon Cort's seemed to believe that Costa Rican foreign policy should be formulated on a solid basis of
Central American amicability.

The proximity in time to the

World War must also be taken into consideration, since United
States policy during this period strongly emphasized the importance of hemispheric solidarity to the safety of individual nations.
Also reflecting this change in attitude was the offer
of Le6n Cort's to mediate a controversy between Honduras and
Nicaragua.30

More of this will be discussed in connection

with Costa Rica's Central American policies.

However, the

changes in foreign policy were not solely due to the external
forces which have been noted.

As the 1930's progressed, polit-

ical party activity increased and became more sophisticated so
that by 1940, one analyst noted the beginning of a modern political age for Costa Rica.31

At that time, the Partido

29 Ibid.
30 Repablica de Costa Rica, Presidencia, "Mensaje del
Licenciado Don Leon Cort's Al Congreso Constitucional," 1 de
mayo de 1938 (San Jos': Imprenta Nacional, 1939), p. 6.
31 nenton, Costa Rican Politics, p. 28.
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Republicano Nacional (PRN), founded by
Jim'11.ez in sup-port
of his candidacy in
elected the immensely popular
Ric~do

1932,
Rafael Calder6n Guardia. 32 Calder6n Guardia, regarded as a

progressive in domestic affairs, favored aligning Costa Rica with the policy of the United States in view of the iminence of war. 33

He recognized that the defenae of the West-

ern Hemisphere would rely heavily on the potential of the United States, supported by a unanimous Latin American community.

However, in the decade preceding the election of Calder~n

Guardia, such attitudes were only beginning to emerge

in a clear fashion.

Throughout the 1920 1 s the Latin American

community of nations had begun to demand the diminution of
the overwhelming control of the Hemisphere by the United
States.

The outcome of these developments, combined with the

priorities established by the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations concerning the Latin American policy of the United States,
was that by

19~0,

a Costa Rican President could make an inde-

pendent choice to follow the United States in world affairs or
to X"9ject United States leadership.

This change in the rela-

tionships among the Latin American nations, labeled the Good
Neighbor Policy by the Roosevelt administration, which will
be

discussed in greater ·detail below, did not emerge immedi-

32 Blutstein, Handbook fot Costa Rica, p. 24.
33 u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos' to
the Secretary of State, No. 379, 20 August 1938, Memorand"J.m
on the Views of R. A. Calder6n Guardia, 711.18/44, Intei"I'lal

Affairs, 1930-1939.
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ately at the end of the 1920's.

Nor was it suddenly brought
to fruition by the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 34
It was not until the eve of World War II, with a number of

years of visible implementation of the policy, that the Latin
American nations were willing to accept the serious intentions
of the United States in permanently denouncing any and all intervention in Latin American affairs. 35 These changes also
had the effect of making certain aspects of Latin American
foreign policy somewhat difficult to examine due to attempts
being made, more and more throughout the 1930•s, to present a
united front on issues of inter-American relations.

An exami-

nation of the oase of Costa Rica should make these problems
clearer, comparing its bilateral and multi-lateral policies
in the 1930's with those of the 1920's which were discussed
in the previous chapter.

Since the relations between Costa

Rica and the United States are extremely important to an assessment of the Good Neighbor Policy, these will be discussed
first.
In general, the overall good impressions made on Costa
Rica by the withdrawal of United States Marines from Nicaragua, plus the realization of a potential threat of domination
by Mexico, set the stage for a promising decade in the 1930 1 s.

34 nexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean
(Revised Edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1966), P• 118.
35 wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 118.
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Further, the economic

•

relat~onship

between Costa Rica and the

United States had become more binding by 1932 than it had been
in previous years.

Imports into Costa Rica came from a wide

variety of sources, with the United States providing 42.7 per
cent of all imports and

G~eat

Britain acting as the next high-

est source with 10.9 per aent. 36

On the other hand, Great

Britain received 47.8 per cent of Costa Rican exports, while
the United States received 39.3 per cent. 37 This state of affairs can also be seen as contributing to the increased reliance on the United States, as shipping to Europe and Great
Britain in particular was interrupted or made difficult with
the onset of the war.

However, these factors did not neces-

sarily result in a change in policy for Costa Rica, since the
war and its impact on shipping did not become an inunediate
problem until much later in the decade.

The inaugural message

of President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the effect of starting
the process of improved relations, 38 but only the passage of
time and the demonstration of the willingness of the United
States to act upon the stated policy would bring the process
36 u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1933 1 611.1831/11, United States,
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers, 1934 CS Vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office;-1'952), V:86.
37 Ibid.
38 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 1396-G, 11 April 1933, General Conditions Report, March, 1933, 818.00G.C./57 1 Internal Affairs,
1930-1939.
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to completion.
The progress of United States-Costa Rican relations in
the 1930's is not truly measurable in large steps.

The po-

tential damage from the events surrounding the Costa Rican
denunciation of the 1923 Washington Treaty in the matter of
recognition of the Martinez government in El Salvador was mitigated to a great ex.tent by the concerted efforts of both
sides to avoid a conflict.

Costa Rican Foreign Minister Guar-

di&l hastened to assure the United States Minister in Costa
Rica, Charles Eberhardt, that anti-American demonstrations,
which occurred in San

Jos~

early in 1934, were attributable

to the activities of a small group of chronic "yankee baiters. "39

Further evidence of Costa Rica's attempts to respond

in kind to the United States reaction to the Martinez question
was the expulsion from Costa Rica of a group of Nicaraguans
who had been found guilty of insults to the United States
flag. 40 IT is obvious that both the United States and Costa
Rican policy makers were working diligently to maintain the
rel~onship

between their nations on at least an even keel.

In the opinion of one United States Minister in this period,
however, the efforts put forth by the Costa Rican politicians
39 u.s. Minister Charles

c. Eberhardt at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, S March 1934, 711.18/40, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
40 u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
Secretary of State, No. 164, 13 April 1934, 818.00/1454, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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were occasioned by their desire to enlist the aid of the
United States and its representatives in their own political
causes. 41

In keeping with this view, the "Guardian law" was

passed by the Costa Rican legislature in December of 1934. 42
This law provided criminal penalties for anyone found guilty
of insulting the representatives or leaders of any friendly
foreign government a.nd was the cause of some popular protest
on the grounds that it inhibiTed freedom of speech. 43

None-

theless, it can be argued that policies such as the Guardian
law were part of the overall Costa Rican efforts at amicability.

It is entirely understandable that there would be pro-

tests over such a policy, since it came at virtually the same
time as the stated policies of isolationism and self suf ficiency for the nation.

The discrepancy between this policy and

the Guardian law can be explained in te:rms of political expediency or as a realistic evaluation of the fact that Costa
Rica needed the amicability of the United States for its economic survival.
Not all Costa Ricans supported the efforts to improve
relations with the United States.

A g:r'Oup of critics of Uni-

41u.s.

Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos& to the Secretary of State, No. 695, 25 April 1933, 818.00/1486 1 Internal
Affairs, 1930-1S39.

42 u.s.

Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 832, 4 September 1935 1 818.911/54, Internal
Affairs, 1930-1939.
43

Ibid.
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ted States policies in Latin America had existed for many
years, and during the mid-1930's they were led by liberal intellectuals, like Vicente Sa'11z, who had written a denunciation of United States diplomatic and economic policies in Central America entitled Rompiendo Cadenas, which was published
in Mexico in 1933. 44

However, it is important to stress the

fact that official government policy was simply not influenced
by criticism leveled by the likes of

Sa~nz

due to their al-

liance with Mexicans which made them immediately suspect.
Another indication of the vulnerability of the cordial
relations between the United States and Costa Rica can be seen
in a reported attempt made by a San

Jos~

newspaper editor to

coerce the United States Minister, Charles

c.

Eberhardt, into

payment of a bribe to prevent unfavorable stories about the
United States.

45

But here, too, there is little probable

correlation between the official acts of the Costa Rican
government and the attempted bribery by a single private citizen.
The generally favorable nature of United States-Costa
Rican relations allowed for the conclusion of a Reciprocal
Trade Agreement in 1936. 46

But within the course of two

44 u.s. M5.nister Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 940, 18 November 1935, 818.00/1504, Inter-

nal Affairs, 1930-1939.
45 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, 24 June 1931, 818.911/31, Internal Affairs,
1930-1939.
46

United States, Department of State, 'fiteaties and
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years, this amicability was once again threatened.

Mexico's

nationalization of oil holdings reportedly received favorable
conunent and support from the Costa Rican press as well as from
official government spokesmen. 47 The issue was complicated
by reports in the press that Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles had referred to the "Costa Rican menace" in regard to
the current amicability of Central American relations due to
their support of Mexico. 48

Welles sent copies of the speech

in question, as well as press coverage of it, to the United
States legation in San Jose, asking that as soon as possible,
the matter be straightened out, since hff."'hatl made no such comment.

Because he was unaware that there were any specific

problems with Costa Rica, he hoped to avoid any misunder.
.
49
s t an d ing
o f t h at point.

Costa Rican officials took advantage of the United
States preoccupation with hemispheric security in 1938 to put
forward the sale of the Cocos Islands to the United States
once again.

They attempted to persuade the United States Min-

Other International A~reements of the United States, 17761949, Vol. 6, Canada- zecholovakia (Washington, D.C.: Government' Printing 0-fice, 1971) 1 p. 1048.
47
u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, No. 72, 12 December 1938, 711.18/45 1
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
48

Ibid.

49 Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jose, 13 December 1938•
711.18/45~ Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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ister to visit the islands, although William Hornibrook had
been specifically instructed to avoid this invitation so that
there would be no possible misunderstanding that the United
States was interested in the purchase. 50 Then, an attempt was
made to convince the United States that the sale of the islands was essential to the Costa Rican economy in view of a
bad crop year, and that if the Uni tecl. States would not purchase them, someone else would. 51 This understated ttsomeone
else," of course, related to a potential German or Japanese
purchase, a constant worry in the 1930 1 s which United States
military advisors and strategists recommended preventing in
the .interests of hemispheric defense. 52 This issue as well
as other defense- related questions will be discussed at greater length in the context of Costa Rica's preparations for war.
But it should be remembered that the pressures of the approaching war and the related concerns for the defense of the hemisphere would have an important bearing upon the course of United States-Costa Rican relations in the late 1930 1 s.
50 secretary of State to U.S. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jose, 4 January 1938, 818.014C/94, United States,
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers, 1938 Cs Vols., Washington, D.C.; Government Print1ng Office, 1956), V:4G7.
51 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary
of State with the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, 28 January 1938, 81$.51/718, ibid., V:46R.
52 u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, 29 December 1938, 818.014C/104, ibid.,
V:471.
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Perhaps the most important single event in the realm
of Costa Rica's relations with its Central American neighbors
in the 1930's who reflected the same basic progress in their
relations with the United States as did Costa Rica, was the
crisis occasioned by the question of the recognition of the
Although ultimately Costa Ri-

Martinez regime in El Salvador.

ca chose to act independently of the other Central American
states, first indications were that Costa Rica would act in
conjunction with them.

In fact, the Costa Rican Foreign Minis-

ter had told the United States
of

Charg~

that any planned course

~ction

would be discussed with the other Central American
nations to preserve the "harmony of action." 53 The next stage

of the process was that the Costa Rican government informed
its neighbors and the United States that it did not intend to
extend recognition to the Mart1nez government in compliance
with its obligations under the 1923 Washington Treaty. 54 Within six months, Costa Rican officials began to sound out the
United States and the other Central American nations to the
possibility that it might change its policy and extend recognition to Mart!nez. 55 The inunediate response to these inqui53 u.s. Charg~ Werlich at San Jos~ to the Secretary of
State, 21 December 1931, 816.01/30, United States, Department
of State, Pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the United States,
Vos., as ingtont D•• : Government rinting Office, !§'lt'6"), II:204-205.

u.s~ Charg~ Werlich at San Jos~ to the Secretary of
State, 24 December 1931, ibid., II:208.
54

55 u

•
• s • Mi nister
Charles

c.

Eberhardt at San Jos' to the
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ries was that Costa Rica was bound by the Treaty which it had
signed and ratified and could not repudiate that agreement for
reasons of "momentary expediency. n 56 This response overlooked
several factors which played into the Costa Rican decision in
the end.

There was, of course, the result of the anti-Ameri-

can sentiment which had been prominent during the 1920's and
which made it important for Costa Rican government officials
to dissociate themselves from policies identifiable with United States domination.

Then too, as has been discussed pre-

viously, there was the special nature of Costa Rica's relations with El Salvador arising out of their conunon grievance
over the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, plus the all too obvious association of the situation of the 1fo.rt!nez government with the
situation of the Tinoco regime.
Thus, when it was reported, then confirmed, that Costa
Rica intended to change its policy and recognize the Mart!nez

government~ 57 the change was no real surprise to the Central
American governments or to the United States.

The Guatemalan

Foreign Minister, A. Skinner Klee, offered to summon a conferSecretary of State, No. 41, 11 May 1932, 816.01/175, Papers
Relating to Foreign Relations, ..!!.2l• V:597-598.
56 Acting Secretary of State Castle to the u.s. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San Jos~, No. 23, 13 May 1932,
816.01/175, ibid.t V:598-599.
57
secretary of State to U.S. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose, 11 November 1932, 713.1311/121, ibid., Vi
330; u.s. Ydnister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, 12 November 193'2, 71~.1311/108, ibid.
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ence of the Central American states to discuss the issue but
offered little hope for its success in dissuading the Costa
.
d ecision.
. .
58 Costa Rica indicated interest in such a
Rican
conference, but Foreign Minister Pacheco readily admitted that
his purpose in attending such a conference would be to convince the other Central American republics to follow Costa
Rica's lead in the denunciation of the 1923 Treaty and the recognition of the Mart!nez regime. 59
During the visit of Foreign Minister Pacheco to Guatemala, which he undertook despite the fact that no conference
had been convened, the motivations for Costa Rica's policy
were further clarified.

One crucial aspect of the decision

to recognize Martinez was that the Costa Rican consensus, as
seen by President Ricardo Jimenez, held that non-recognition
was an inadequate and faulty policy for whatever purposes it
was employed.

Rather, the signatories of the Washington

Treaty should consider policies by which positive assistance
could be rendered to constitutional governments to avoid re.
60
.
vo l utionary
overthrows b e f ore they could begin.

. sugThis

58 u.s. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, No. 816, 14 November 19 32 1 813. OOWashington/
388, ibid., V:331.
59 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, 15 November 1932, 713.1311/117, ibid., V:
333.
60 u.s. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, No. 834 1 30 November 1932, 713.1311/132, ibid.,
V:340.
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gestion essentially :represented a request tha.t the U;iited
States and the Central Al'!lerican nations pool resources to
maintain the status quo and was a considerable departure from
the mentality which prompted the
:Martinez and Tinoco coups.

justificatio~

0f both the

If such a policy had been in op-

eration in either case, there is little likelihood that either could have succeeded.

For the time being, however, the im-

plementation of such a policy was not given serious consideration.

The subsequent course of events concerning the recogni-

tion of the Mart!nez government has already been discussed.
In summary, Costa Rica and El Salvador's joint denunciation
of the 1923 Treaty weakened the viability of the treaty to
the extent that the remaining signatories eventually extended
recognition to Mart!nez, leaving the treaty effective only
between the United States, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala,
and an effective return of Costa Rica to a position of isolation. 61

In the final analysis, the entire episode was a

testing ground for the serioua intent of the Good Neighbor Policy.

The United States was put in the position of choosing

between direct interference in Costa Rican aff aire by denying
the right of the nation to denounce the 1923 Treaty or of al60 u.s. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, No. 834 1 30 November 1932, 713.1311/132, ibid.,
V:340.

61u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Joa~ to the
Secretary of State, 26 January 1933, 818.00/1402, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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lowing Costa Rica to determine its own policy in the matter.
The choice made was stated by ·the United States Secretary
of State to the United States Minister in Costa Rica as follows:
We feel that Costa Rica has freely exercised its right
to denounce the Treaty and therefore do not desire
that you should even unofficially suggest that it rescind its action or otherwise indicate what course
of action it should pursue with respect to the Treaty. 62
Following the lead of the United States, the Central American states also respected Costa Rica's right of self-determination, at the same time extending recognition to the Martinez government.
The atmosphere of mutual respect and the obvious suecess of the Good Neighbor Policy mentality led to a proposal
for a Central American Conference in 1934.

There was an ini-

tial problem, however, occasioned by the preparation of an
agenda for the Conference without consultation of Costa Rican officials. 63 Through the United States Minister in San
Jose, Leo Sack, the other Central American nations received
a warning that the normal Costa Rican reluctance to involve
62 secretary of State Cordell Hull to U.S. Minister
Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose, No. 30, 31 October 1933,
713.1311/185, United States, Depdrtment of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States Di lomatic Pa ers, 1333

Government

rinting Office,

1950),

63 u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 30 January 1934 1 713.1311/225, Pa2ers Relating to Foreign Relations. ~' IV:426.

191

itself in any

attempt~d

Central American unity of action would

be complicated by the hard feelings engendered if it was not
consulted on the agenda before its publication. 64 Since the
stated purpose of the Conference was a consideraticn of the
1923 Treaty, it is questionable whether Costa Rica had any

legitimate grievance, since by its own choice it had denounced
the Treaty. 65

However, President Sacasa of Nicaragua indica-

ted that there was no intention to plan a conference without
previously consulting both Costa Rica and El Salvador. 66

When

Costa Rica was formally invited to the Conference, it agreed
to attend but requested a postponement of the scheduled date
due to the death of Foreign Minister Pacheco. 67

Another po-

tential complication arose when President Ubico of Guatemala
was temporarily moved to demand that the date of the Conference remain fixed and that Costa Rica either attend at the
scheduled time or be excluded. 68

Once again, through the good

offices of United States diplomats in the Central American
64Ibid., IC:427.
65 u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
Secretary of State, 1 February 1934, 713.1311/228, ibid., IV:
430.
66

Ibid.

67

u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
Secretary of State, 13 February 1934, 713.1311/239, ibid., IV:
433.
68 u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
Secretary of State, 16 February 1934, 713.1311/246, ibid.,

IV:434.
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capitals pressing the importance of neighborly behavior among
the Central American states, the problem was avoided and the
conference was re-scheduled. 69
Since the preliminary problems were re&olved, albeit
through the efforts of the United States diplomatic corps in
Central America, the Conference was able to consider the real
issue which brought about the meeting, the issue: of nont>ecognition as a means of
ment.

discou~agiug

revolutionary changes of govern-

Guatemala circulated its proposal prior to the Confer-

ence, which reasserted the principle of nonrecognition of revolutionary governments but provided that recognition would be
extended once suoh a government had " ••• been legalized in the
constitutional manner provided by law. 70 This proposal did
not go neaI""ly far enough to satisfy eithet• Costa Rica or El
Salvador, both of which had already made their positions clear
through the statements of Costa Rican Foreign Minister Pacheco.

The United States, on the other hand, felt that any pro-

posal suggesting recognition of illegally constituted governments was unacceptable. 71 However, the United States decided
that this position must not be made known to any of the parti69 u.s. Charg~ Lawton in Guatemala to the Secretary of
State, 17 February 1934, 713.1311/250, ibid.
70
Article VII, Proposed Guatemalan Treaty, cited in
U.S. Charge Lawton in Guatemala to the Secretary of State,
16 February 1934, 713.1311/247• ibid., IV:436.
71 secretary of State to the u.s. Minister Hanna in
Guatemala, 3 March 1934, 713.1311/2'17a• ibid., IV:441.
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cipanLS of the Conference so that there would be no suspicio:i1 of attempted interference in the fr:ae deliberations of

the Central American states. 72

As a consequence, there were

no United States representatives in atte::1dance at the sessions in Guatemala. 73
Notwithstanding the efforts put forth by the United
States to assure the success of the Conference, there was yet
another obstacle to be overcome which no amount of diplomatic
maneuvering seemed able to resolve quickly.

Relations between

Costa Rica and Guatemala had never been amicable and the overt
hostility manifested between the two nations before and during
the Conference seemed to assure the failure of all attempts
at compromise between their positions relative to the agenda. 7 ~
In fact, an additional postponement of the Conference was suggested as a means of allowing this hostility to subside. 75
However, since it was generally accepted that neither Costa Rica nor El Salvador would be willing to accept a compromise on
the issue of nonrecognition, it was held that any further postponements would serve no useful purpose.76
72 Ibi<l.
73 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 229.
74 u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at 'Managua to the
Secretary of State, 5 March 1934 9 713.1311/269, Pa2ers Relating to Foreign Relations, ~' IV:444.
7 5.L... b_..J. d •

76 u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the
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Initially, it appeared that compromise beti.reen the
Costa Rican position and that proposed by President Ubico
could be worked out, since the written Costa Rican response
to the Guatemalan proposal contained reference ~o minor dis77 I n a dd"ition,
.
'
agreements on1 y on f rP-e tra d e po1 icy.
Costa
Rican President Ricardo Jimenez approached the United States
Minister in San

Jos~

with a. request for the State Department's

good offices in easing the "strained relations" between his
government and that of President Ubico. 78 This request was
carried out by the United States Minister in Guatemala but
the solution was not easily accomplished as the first step
suggested by Minister Hanna was the exchange of diplomatic
representatives between the two states. 79 The problem was
then over which state would take the first step by sending
or even agreeing to send a dip~omatic agent to the other. 80
Secretary of State, Report of A Conversation with President
Sacasa of Nicaragua, 13 March 1934, 713.1311/288, ibid., IV:
450.

7 7u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jose to the Secretary of State, 16 March 1934, 713.1311/299, ibid., IV:453;
U.S. Minister Hanna in Guatemala to the Secretarv of State,
19 March 1934, 713.1311/302, ibid., IV:453.
78 U. s • Minister
. .
Leo R. s ack at San J ose, to the s ecretary of State, 7 December 1934, 714.18/22, United States, Department of State, Forei n Relations of the United States
Diplomatic Papers,
35 4 Vols., Was ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office;-1953), IVa230.
79 secretary of State to U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at
San Jos~, 19 December 1934, 714.18/22, ibid., IV:231.
80

u.s. Minister Hanna in Guatemala to the Secretary of
State, 8 February 1935, 714.18/28, ibid., IV:232-233.

195
In addition, the Guate.ma.lans claimed that the decision was
made especially difficult by the bad press they had received
in Costa Rica. 81

In fact, the United States Minister in

Guatemala reported that
••• both the Minister of Foreign Affairs a'ld the President ap;>ear to be quite incapable of comprehending why
the press there is not controlled as it is here. They
manifestly think that the government restraint which
prevents the press here from criticizing neighbord.ng
republics is a valuable contribution to good understanding among them and should be imposed in San Jose. 82
Although this and other difficulties slowed the process, it
was finally agreed that on March 1, 1935, at a designated
hour, both Costa Rica and Guatemala would send each other telegrams which indicated their intention to exchange diplomatic
representatives. 83
Other than the beneficial results of these negotiations
in long term Central American amicability, the immediate purpose was not really served.

The outcome of the 1934 Guate-

mala conference, which came and went during these squabbles,
and which was colored by the cngoing problems, was a watered
down pact of fraternity among the Central American states. 8 ~
To the majority of Central Americans, however, the events
81 Ibid.
82

Ibid.$ IV:233-234.

83u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jes~ to the Secretary of State, 22 February 1935, 714.18/29, ibid., IV:234.
84
Karnes, Fa.ilure of Union, p. 229.

196

could only be viewed as concrete evidence that the United
States intent was to stand by the Good Neighbor Policy.

This

evidence, without a doubt, would have an important effect
on the determination of Costa Rican statesmen to follow the
lead of the United States in world affairs and made possible
the Presidential candidacy of Calder6n Guardia who clearly
. i ntention.
.
85
s t a t e d th a t as h is
Between the isolationist tendencies of the presidency
of Ricardo
Leon

Cort~s

Jim~nez

and the Central American emphasis of the

presidency, there was little of importance in

the area of Costa Rican relations with the American commWlity
of nations other than those events already mentioned.

There

are only two possible exceptions to this generalization.

In

1932, at the start of the isolationist period and before the

advent of unrest in Central American affairs and their resolution along amicable lines, an editorial appeared in El Diario
de Costa Rica which pointed out the very real economic threat
posed to Costa Rica by Brazil as opposed to the imaginary
threat of "Yankee imperialism."86

The basis of this threat

lay in Brazil, "which through its gigantic pI'Oduction has
85 u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, No. 379, 20 August 1938, 711.18/44,
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
86 nr. Modesto Mart!nezt "The Real and Imaginary Perils,"
El Diario de Costa Rica (San Jose), 29 June 1932, cited in u.s.
Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the Secretary of
State, 7 July 1932, 711.18/38, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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driven down our coffee industry to depression limits. 1187
This threat of Brazilian domination of the Costa Rican ecoRomy served as additional evidence which justified the need for
Costa Rican self sufficiency and for the desirability of increased friendliness in relations with the United States which
might protect Costa Rican interests.
The other event of some significance was the offer
made by Costa Rica in 1937 to serve as a mediator in the boundary dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua.

The favorable

development of Central American relations prior to that date
had prompted the offer to mediate which received a great deal
. Costa R'ica. 88
o f popu 1 ar support in

In the end, Costa Rica

was joined in the mediation efforts by the United States and
Venezuela in compliance with the agreements reached at the
89
.
Con f erence on Conci'l'1at1on
.
'
1936 Buenos Aires
an d Ab'
r itration.
Although the mediation from all three nations was extremely
active in the attempt to find an equitable solution, they met
87 Ibic.
88 v.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, 6 September 1937, 715.1715/552, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Di lomatic Pa e:;:-s, 19 S7 ( 5 Vols., Washington, D.
Government Printing 0 ice, 195'4T';' V:66.
89
.Acting Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions
in the American Republics Except Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela, 21 October 1937, 715.1715/751~, ibid.,

c.:

V:93.
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with little er no success. 90

Regardless of the success or

failure of the mediation efforts, the event

d~rnonstrated

the

cooperativeness toward which Costa Rican policy was directed
throughout the 1930's.

It allows a broader perspective of

the isolationism of the Ricardo

Jim~nez

presidency in that

this policy was a retrenchment and establishment of a firm
national basis upon which the gradual increase of international involvements was based.

It confirms once again the

importance of a strong nationalism in the foreign affairs of
the Costa Rican nation.
Before this pattern can be conclusively demonstrated,
howtver, the inter-American conferences of the 1930's must
be taken into consideration.

It will be remembered that de-

velopments in the inter-American conferences during the 1920's
were directed toward the diminution of the authority of the
United States in inter-American affairs.

In some respects,

these attempts were quite successful and it appeared that this
trend would continue at the Montevideo Conference in 1933.
However, the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy, as expected,
had some bearing on those developments.
One topic which appeared likely to be brought up for
discussion by Mexico was the Monroe Doctrine.

The Mexican

Minister of Foreign Affairs had indicated to Josephus Daniels,
90 Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in Central And North America and the Caribbean (New
York: Octagon Books=;- 1971), p. 143.

199
the United States Minister in Mexico, that the renunciation
of aggression agreed to by the United States obviate the

necessity for the existence of a unilateral policy such as the
91
The United States delegation at Montevideo
Monroe Doctrine.
was therefore instructed that "it is not the desire of this
Government that the Monroe Doctrine should be discussed at
the Conference. 1192

However, on the integrally related issue

of intervention, the United States government was more than
willing to respect

th~

national autonomy of all Latin Ameri-

can states as long as it reserved the right to intervene on
.
.
.
1 s. 93
b e h a lf o f t h e l ives
an d property o f its
nationa

The

Mexican delegation was thus blocked from causing any problems, but it did introduce the broader issue of intervention
as opposed to arbitration binding on all states in the context of "Economic and Financial Problems. 1194 The matter of
the maintenance of peace was finally resolved by its referral
95
to a special conference to be convened at a later date.
The
91 u.s. Ambassador Josephus Daniels in Mexico to the
Secretary of State, 29 September 1933 1 710.G1A/220, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1i2l' IV:18-19.
92

Instructions to the Delegates to the Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay, 10
November 1933, 710G/371, ibid., 1V:137.
9 3 I,1) i . (1•

,

IV:140.

94
united States, Department of State, Report of the
Delegation of the United States of America to the Seventh International Conference o/ American States Montevideo Uru ua
December 3::'26 1 19 3 3, Conference SerieR No. 19 Waslungton, D. c.:
Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 294.
95 Ibi·d.,
PP• 32 - 33 •
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reasons cited for the postponement of the discussion, in keeping with the good intentions of the United States in not attempting to avoid any free and open discussion, we?.\e that the
delegations present at Montevideo, in particular that of the
United States, had not been empowered to discuss this point
due to possible conflicts with existing bilateral treaties. 96
The willingness of the United States to commit itself
to a discussion of its unilateral policies, such as binding
arbitration of disputes and the essence of the Monroe Doctrine,
was a significant step.

Besides this commitment, the United

States signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States whioh effectively eliminated intervention as
a method of national polioy. 97
Another area on which the United States delegation apparently surrendered was on the question of the recognition
as a means of national policy.

The Mexican delegation at

Montevideo raised the question of nonrecognition as a means of
direct intervention and this was included in the foregoing
agreement.

The Estrada Doctrine presented by Mexico was pre-

mised on the principle that diplomatic recognition was extended by the people of one nation to the people of another
and therefore could not be interrupted by any change of government unless intervention were intended. 98 The Estrada Doo96

Ibid., p. 28.

97 Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean, P• 122.
98Neumann, Recogpition, p. 28.
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trine was based partly on the theory of the Costa Rican scholar. Luis Anderson, that the constitutionality of any government was a matter of domestic law 1 of which any foreign interpretation comprised intervention. 99
Although Costa Rica, through one of its leading thinkers in the field of international law. seemed to have a vested interest in the proceedings at Montevideo, it was the only
American nation not represented there.

A special message sent

by the Conference to President Ricardo Jim,nez expressed regret that Costa Rica was not represented. 100 A reply from
Ji~nez

offered no excuses or explanations why Costa Rioa did

not participate but concurred with the aims of the Conference.101

Within the context of Costa Rican foreign policy in

1933 9 it is not surprising that there was no attendance at

Montevideo.

The isolationism which characterized Ricardo Ji-

m&nez's presidency would certainly have militated against any
desire to participate at Montevideo.

An

inconsistency can be

seen, however, in the faot that the Montevideo Conference did

take up questions regarding the many treaties which existed
in the Americas for the maintenance of peaoe. 102 In view of
the support which Costa Rica had given the Central American
99 Luis Anderson, "El Gobierno de facto," Revista de derecho internacional, VII (June, 1925)• cited in ibid., P• 2d.
100 Report of u.s. Deleg1tion at Montevideo, P• 2.

101Ibid.
l0 2 Ibid •• pp. 7-8.

203

Court of Justice and its proposals for an Inte!'-American Court
of Justice in the 1920's, it would seem likely that the nation
would be interested in any conference that would advocate the
ideas of an American source of arbitration and reconciliation
of disputes.

It might be concluded that the rebuff adminis-

tered to the Costa Rioan proposals at Havana in 1928, in combination with the general outbacks in international activity
in the early 1930 1 s, explain the failure to be represented at
Montevideo.

Whatever the reasons were, and because of the un-

availability of Costa Rican sources on this matter, it is all
the more difficult to speculate.

Costa Rica was in the posi-

tion of a "loner" in American affairs in 1933.
The InteJ:t-Amerioan Conference for the Maintenance of
Peace held in Buenos Aires in December of 1936 provided Costa
Rica an opportunity to reflect any changes in its international

policies which had occurred with the election of Ledn Cdr-

tes.

This oonferenoe resulted in part from the unresolved

discussions on arbitration and peace left over from the Montevideo Conference but also in part from the concern for the
unity of the hemisphere in the faoe of the potential threat of
war threatening Europe. 103 Ho;wever, the Latin American states
whose interests were primarily directed to a final denunoiaD. Roosevelt to the Opening SesStates, Department of State, Reunited St tes of
erioa to the
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tion of intervention sought to have the 1936 Buenos Aires
Conference reflect their wishes.10 4
In keeping with the modification of Costa Rican foreign policy, the nation was represented at the Buenos Aires
Conference by a delegation of only two members. 105 Because
the two Costa Rican delegates were physically limited as to
the variety of activities in which they could participate,
Costa Rica was not a member of the most important committee
of the Conference, that concerned with the organization of
peace. 106 Before drawing any significance from the size of
the Costa Rican delegation, reference must be made to the Annual Report of the Costa Rican Foreign Minister for 1936.

In

that Report, the Foreign Minister catalogued an immense list
of conferences, exhibitions, and fairs to which the Costa Rican government had received official invitation.

He indica-

ted that it was economically feasible for the nation to support representatives at only a fraction of these events and
that volunteers had been sought who would represent the nation
for patriotic reasons alone. 107 Thus, when it came to the
most important event of the year, the Inter-American Conference
for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires, there were few
104 wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 119.
105 ReI?prt of U.S. Delegation at Buenos Aires, P• 52.
106 Ibid., p. 65.
107Memorias, 1936, pp. vii-viii.
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funds remaining so that the nation could only afford to sponsor two delegates, although "patriotic" individuals had been
invited to attend at their own expense. 108
While it is perfectly feasible that this explanation
is accurate, there is again no doubt that the priorities established by the Costa Rican nation had something to do with
the decision.

President Le6n Cort's's emphasis on the pri-

macy of Central American affairs in the realm of foreign re-

lations would make the Buenos Aires Conference less important
than other matters closer to home.

Further, while this em-

phasis may have led to a consideration of sending no representatives at all, this was not practical because of the importance placed on this conference by the United States, as indicated by the opening address by President Roosevelt to
which Costa Rica was very responsive. 109
When it came to a consideration of the matters which
had prompted the conference, however, Costa Rica did not show
up very well.

In an effort to evaluate the existing mechan-

isms for the settlement of disputes, the conference reviewed
the status of the five treaties which it felt reflected the
best efforts of the inter-American system& 110 the Gondra
iOSibid., P• xii.
109 Ibid.
110Table Showing Ratification of or Adherence to Instruments for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
Report of u.s. Delegation at Buenos Ai.res, p. 208.
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Treaty (1923), 111 the Pact of Paris (1928), 112 the Washington Conciliation Treaty (1929),113 the Washington Arbitration Treaty (1929), 114 and the Rio Pact (1933). 115 Costa
Rica, which had ratified the 1923 Gondra Treaty and merely
adhered to the 1928 Pact of Paris was matched in its poor
performance only by Argentina and Bolivia. 116 These five
treaties formed the core of the proposal for peaoe machinery for the hemisphere, woven together by a Coordinating
Convention proposed by the United States. 117 In the end,
111The Gondra Treaty specified reduction of military
and naval expenditures by the signatories and suggested arbitration of international disputes in the Americas through the
use of ad hoc commissions of inquiry. The author of this trea•
ty was tne""'eiiiinent Paraguayan Dr. Manuel Gondra. Mecham, Inter-Amer1can Security, p. 98.
112 The Pact of Paris, more comm.only known outside the
Americas as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was a broad war renunciation agreement. Ibid., p. 118.
113The Washington Conciliation Treaty was a general
convention designed to supplement the Gondra Treaty in that it
invested conciliatory functions in permanent diplomats as well
as in the commissions of inquiry which were established to
meet specific problema. Ibid., p. 106.
114The Washington Arbitration Treaty bound all signatories to submit international disputes of any nature to arbitration. Ibid., P• 107.
115The Rio Pact was basically a duplication of the
Pact of Paris, although it had been authored in the Americas,
by the Argentine statesman Saavedra Lamas. Ibid., p. 118.
116 Table Showing Ratification of or Adherence to Instruments for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
ReJ?OJ1 of U.S. De;egation at Buenos Aires, P• 208.
117 Address of Cordell Hull to the First Plenary Session
of the Conference, 5 December 1936, ibid., p. 86.

.

.

-
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this kind of program, which would coordinate existing instruments for the preservation of peace, was approved by the Con118
ference.
But the language of an allied resolution, calling
for the coordination of these pacts with the League of Nations,
led to an abstention from both the United States and Costa Ri119
ca.
Costa Rica abstained from voting on the resolution because, in the first place, since it had resigned from the
League of Nations, it was felt that the path of its national
policy took it away from association with that organization. 12 0
In the second place, while there was no disrespect intended
for the League or its high ideals and goals, in the Costa Rican view, an American question such as the maintenance of peace
in the Americas should not be linked with an organization in
which so few of the American states maintained membership. 121
Another possible motive for the abstention, not Jilen:tioned by
the Costa Rican Foreign Minister in his report, was the desire to follow the lead of the United States in the matter.
1 1 8 Resolution of the Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace, Approved 21 December 1936, Carnegie En-

dowment for International Peace, International Law Division,

The International Conferences of American States, Flirst

!lement, 1933-1940 (Washington, b.c.z
nternatlona1 Peace, 1940), p. 162.
119 Ibid.
1 2 0Memorias, l!!§., p. xiv.
121rbid., p. xiii.

Su~

Carnegie Endowmentor
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The United States delegation's abstention was rooted in somewhat different motives than that of Costa Rica.

In its offi-

cial report, the United States delegation pointed out that the
best possible path for the conference to take was not to associate the American machinery with any outside institutions
or organizations, since such association would provoke the opponents of the League and give undue satisfaction to the loyal
adherents of the League. 122

The delegates felt that the suc-

cess of the American peace machinery oould be assured only by
avoiding the potential of sqabbles among the American statee
over the rightness or wrongness of membership in the League of
Nations. 123

In the end, the report concluded that the con-

ference had succeeded in this effort, 124 which was essentially correct, since the League resolution was an addition to
the Coordinating Convention rather than a part of it. 125 So
it seems that the United States and Costa Rioa coincidentally
took the same action in regard to the resolution.
For Costa Rica, this resolution was by no means the
most important issue raised by the Buenos Aires Conference.
In fact, the so-called Consultation Pact was viewed as the
most important in that it established a means by which war
122 Report of

u.s.

Delegation at Buenos Aires, p. 13.

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.

125 Mecham

9

Inter-.American Security, p. 134.
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and/or intervention could be avoidea. 126

On the same basic is-

sue, the matter of an Inter-American Court of Justice was
raised in that the Conference passed a resolution which empowered the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to study
and report on all of the proposals for such a Court which had
been submitted to the conference and all previous Inter-American Conferences. 127 The first proposal listed for consideration was that made by Costa Rica at the 1923 Santiago Conference.128

Of the eight conventions, two treaties, one protocol and numerous resolutions approved by the Conference, 129

this resolution was one of the few which noted any special
contribution from Costa Rica.

Because of Costa Rica's his-

tory of isolation and lack of involvement on some of the broader issues dealt with by the conference, it is not altogether
surprising that Costa Rica took so small a part in the conference.

Nonetheless, their contribution was recognized in a

congratulatory message sent by Cordell Hull to the head of the
Costa Rican delegation• Dr. Manuel Jim'1iez. 130
In the same spirit, Hull commended the good will and
126 Memorias, 1936 PP• xiv-xv.
9
127 Resolution of the Confer.ence, Approved 16 December
1936, Conference of American StateA, 1933-1940, p. 144.
128Ibid., p. 144, n. 1.
129 Mecham, Inter-Amerioa.n Seouri;ty, P• 125.
130 seoretary of State Cordell Hull to Dr. Manuel Jim€nez, 24 de diciem.bre de 1936, Memorias, .!!!§_, p. xix.
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determination of all twenty-one delegations in his address to
the closing session of the Conference, 131 which prepared the
way for the next conference of American states scheduled for
1938 in Lime.

The Lima Conference was the last regular con-

ference before the outbreak of World War II, but it was almost entirely preoccupied with matters relating to the defense of the hemisphere.

Due to the European events which

preceded the Lima Conference and the growing awareness of the
Roosevelt administration of the necessity of preparation in
the hemisphere, " ••• an intensification of the tone of good
neighborliness was beamed on Latin America. n1 3 2
Once again, Costa Rica made itself prominent by sending the smallest delegation to the conference. 133 In spite of
its size, the Costa Rican delegation benefitted with all the
other Latin American states from the attitude of the United
States delegation which, " ••• in accordance with the tenets of
the Good Neighbor Policy, endeavored scrupulously to respect
at all times the dignity and interests of each nation represented at the Conference." 134

This goal was not always simple

131Address of Cordell Hull to the Closing Session of the
Conference, 23 December 1936, Report of u.s. Delegation at Buenos Aires, p. 93.
132 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 136.

133 united States, Department of State, Report of the
Delegation of the United Statts
America. at the Ei~hth International Conferenoe of Amerlcantates, Lima, Pe:t'U,ecember 9-2,, 1938 teonference Series No. so, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), P• 228.

§f

134!bid., p. 38.
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for the United States delegation,which sought a demonstration
of solidarity against the threat of the Axis powers, since
not all of the nations represented at Lima took this threat
as seriously as did the United States. 135 However, the basic resolution on continental solidarity did receive the approval of the conference.136
In the interests of achieving the success of the resolution, the United States saw that issues dear to the hearts
of some Latin American states received the close attention of
the Li:na Conference.

For example, when Costa Rica abstained

from the initial vote on continental solidarity, along with
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 137 the question of the
Inter-American Court of Justice, a favorite project of Costa
Rica in previous conferences, was brought up for discussion. 138
Although no steps were really taken to make the Court a reality, it was clear that any demonstration of its potential success would assure its formation. 139 In addition, the idea of
135Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 140.
136 chairman of the American Delegation at Lima Cordell
Hull to the Acting Secretary of State, 15 December 1938, 710.H
Continental Solidarity/74, PaRers Relating to Foreign Relations,
1938
........... 1 V:81 •
137 rbia.
138

Report of U.S. Delegation at Lima, pp. 16-17.

139 Resolution of the Eighth International Conference of
American States, Approved 22 December 1938, Conferences of American States, 1933-1940, p. 254.
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an American League of Nations was revived and referred to the
International Conference of American Jurists for study with
the stipulation that a report be issued before the next InterAmerican Conference. 140 Such blatant politicking by the United States for its resolutions' success at the Conference may
have led to somewhat sarcastic comments by one analyst about
good neighborliness being "beamed" on the Latin American
states, but the effectiveness of the program cannot be denied.141
It is questionable whether such devious means were necessary in the case of Costa Rica.

From all indications, po-

litical maneuvering was not necessary on their behalf but may
have been for Chile, Brazil or other nations who were as yet
unconvinced of the necessity of a unified program of hemispheric defense, or who suspected the motives of the United
States in suggesting such a program.

Costa Rica was predis-

posed to favor the proposals offered by the United States by
this time, due to the favorable status of their bilateral relations as well as the thrust of long range Costa Rican policies.

The development of Costa Rican inter-American policies,

beginning in the 1920's was marked at first by the fluctuation
between strong sentiments in favor of isolationism and the consideration of membership in a Central American confederation.
i40Report of U.S. Delegation at Lima, p. 243.
141 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 140.
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Costa Rican national self-esteem prevented a firm commi ttment
to the Central American Confederation of 1921, while at the
same time relations with the United Ste.tes ranged from the
low level of the period immediately following the Tinoco regime and the problems with the League of Nations to the moderately good level of amicability which characterized the
general policy of the first presidency of Ricardo Jimenez.
Periodically throughout this decade, Costa Rica seemed to
flirt with closer association with Mexico until the threat of
Mexican domination of Central America was realized and resulted in a disenchantment with that nation•
The 1930's showed a far more consistent pattern of
development in Costa Rican inter-American relations.

Early

in the decade there was a cutback on all foreign affairs activities which served a dual purpose in that it made possible
substantial economies during a difficult financial period and
at the same time permitted the consolidation of nationalistic
sentiments which were directed into programs of national self
sufficiency.

From this foundation, Costa Rican policy was

broadened to an intense involvement in Central American affairs.
The nation maintained its independence of action supported by
the Good Neighbor Policy which prevented United States interference but which protected Costa Rica, as well as other Central American states, from the threat of overt hostilities
among themselves.
Thus, by 1938, Costa Rica achieved the status of an
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independent and sovereign state which would choose the policies best suited to its national interests.

It had an ad-

vantage over some other Latin American states in that its
national interests were clearly defined and would not necessarily suffer by association of its policies with those of
the United States.

To some extent, it could be argued that

Costa Rican self sufficiency in inter-American affairs relied
heavily upon the United States's enforcement of the inviolability of the sovereign rights of all American states.

How-

ever, since by the late 1930's Costa Rican policy was premised on this realistic assessment of its own stature in the
American community of nations, this was not a negative aspect
of Costa Rican policy.

The extension of Costa Rican national

image into broader fields of world affairs will be considered
in the next chapter.

This broader view, as applied to non-

American affairs, should serve as further confirmation of
the foregoing views.

CHAPTER VIII
COSTA RICA AND EUROPE, 1919-1939
Costa Rica's relations with Europe, as well as its
infrequent contacts with Asia, were quite different in many
respects from the patterns noted in regard to inter-American
affairs.

Yet in many ways, formal diplomatic relations with

El "ope followed the same long range policy goals evidenced

in inter-American affairs.

The 1920's were characterized by

a seemingly haphazard waxing and waning of Costa Rican enthusiasms for various alliances or affiliations in the Americas.
During that same period, with the exception of a few major
issues which will be discussed in the course of this chapter,
there was little activity in the realm of non-American relations which can be said to have had any meaningful bearing
upon the development of Costa Rican internationalism or of a
Costa Rican self-image in international affairs.

During the

1930's, when inter-American affairs were characterized by
long range goals and planning to the ends of those goals,
Costa Rican relationships with European nations were primarily
directed to events which were related to preparations for
215
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World War II.

However, before considering the preparations

for hostilities, some analysis of the preceding events should
be undertaken.
Costa Rican relations with the world community of nations during the 1920 1 s were conditioned by the events surrounding the Tinoco coup d'etat.

In fact, one of the primary

events of the 1920's in this realm related to the nullification of the acts of the Tinoco regime.

The Amory oil conces-

sion, granted by Federico Tinoco, was included in the general
nullification of his acts after the overthrow of his regime.
Amory represented a syndiaate comprised of British citizens.
As a consequence, the British government entered into negotiations with the government of Julio Acosta concerning their
rights, although the Costa Rican government did not recognize
the right of the British government to act on behalf of private citizens in the matter. 1
Initially, the British felt that the Acosta goveI>nment
had no right to confiscate the private property of its citizens which was acquired in good faith by the .Amory concern, although the United States had taken the position that no business deals with Tinoco entered into by United States citizens
were worthy of its diplomatic support and extended the principle
1 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 2 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/60, MC 669.
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to other claimants. 2

However, this conclusion was drawn after

it had been determined that there were no United States citizens involved in the nullification. 3 The Department of State
notified the British government that the matter of nullification was a domestic affair of the Costa Rican republic in
which the United States could not interfere, despite British
requests that it do so. 4

Since the British government hoped

to rely on the intervention of the United States to aid its
position in the negotiations, this attitude occasioned some
hard feelings. 5

Nonetheless, the United States supported Cos-

ta Rican off ioials in their contention that the Costa Rican

courts had jurisdiction over the question of the rights of
the concessionaires who had received their grants from the
Tinoco administration. 6

The continuing negotiations which

surrounded the settlement of claims made by the Amory group
colored British-Costa Rican relations throughout the early
1920's until a final agreement was reached.
It is not the purpose of this study to judge the
2secretary of State to u.s. Charge at San Joe~, 9
December 1919 1 818.6363Am6/29, MC 669.
3secretary of State to u.s. Charge at San Jos~, 29
August 1918, 818.6363Am6/18a, MC 669.
4 secretary of State to u.s. Charg~ at San Jos~ (Martin), No. 7, 13 December 1920, 818.6363/61 1 MC 669.
5u.s. Ambassador (Davis) at London to the Secretary
of State, No. 1205, 11 August 1920, 800.6363/--, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, .!ilQ., II:665.
6 secretary of State to U.S. Charg~ at San Jos' (Martin), No. 7 1 13 December 1920, 818.6363/61 1 MC 669.
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decision of the Acosta administration to refer the British
claimants to the Costa Rican courts.

It was inevitable that

the repudiation of the Tinoco regime would include a repudiation of its acts.

Therefore, consistent with the policy

demonstrated by the Acosta government which sought the favor
of the United States by a complete rejection of association
with Tinoco, the Amory concession was nullified.

Further,

when that nullification was questioned, the matter was referred to the courts as a point of national policy which
covered the rights of foreign investors.

The support re-

ceived for that decision from the United States added to the
strength of the Costa Rican determination to remain firm in
asserting its national sovereignty. 7
It is interesting, although not particularly relevant, to speculate as to the possible differences in Costa
Rican policy had there been properties of United States citizens affected by the nullification act.

The diplomatic cor-

respondence between the State, Department and its representatives in Costa Rica clearly indicates that a thorough investigation was conducted to assure the fact that there were no
United States properties involved before a decision was made
•

• •

to support the Costa Rican position.

8

However, Costa Rican

?secretary of State to U.S. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston
at San Jose, 19 July 1921, 818.6363Am6/90, Papers Relating to
Foreign Relations, 2J!ll, !:664-665.
~U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Sec-
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policy was also determined by the relative importance of relations with Great Britain to those with the United States.
As was noted previously, the economic links between the British and Costa Rican nations gradually diminished in the early
years of the twentieth century so that by the end of the
1920's, the primary commercial interests of the Costa Rican
nation centered on the United States.

However, at the time

of this controversy, the threat of a commercial boycott of
Costa Rican goods in British markets was an extremely serious
tr ~eat to the well-being of the nation. 9 Such a threat was
made in veiled terms to President Acosta by the British representative at San Jose, 10 which led to the negotiation of
issue which the United States regarded as a cut and dried
legal precept. 11 While Costa Rica essentially was forced to
an

negotiate on the nullification of the Amory concession, the
leadership of the Acosta administration expressed hope

that

the United States would provide unqualified support for their
retary of State, 22 May 1920, 818.6363/30, Papers Relating to
Foreign Relations, 1920 1 I:839; Secretary of State to U.S. Consui Benjamin F. Chaie"at San Joe,, 4 June 1920, 818.6363/30 1
ibid., I:840; Secretary of State to u.s. Charg~ at San Jose,
29 August 1918, 818.5363/18a, MC 669.
9
.
U.S. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Joe~ to the
Secretary of State, 14 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/60, Papers
Relating to Foreign Relations, ~' !:646.
10ibid.
11Ibid., !:647.
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position. 12
In the end, this complex issue was settled fairly
amicably.

The United States supported Costa Rica's right

to settle the matter without interference.

The Chief Jus-

tice, White, of the United States Supreme Court agreed to
serve as a ~ediator and Costa Rica readily acceptect. 13 Further, it was agreed that the Amory concession would be put
into Costa Rican hands as the Central Costa Rican Petroleum
Company, with the British shareholders maintaining sizeable
investments in the venture. 14 By the time the mediation was
completed in 1924, the original Amory claim, which was held to
be legitimately nullified, 15 no longer existed.

As a conse-

quence, British-Costa Rican relations were able to continue
on a fairly amicable level, although the shift of trade to
the United States minimized the importance of that cordiality
to the Costa Ricans.
While preoccupied with the negotiations concerning the
Amory concession, Costa Rican officials also entered into ne12u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, 25 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/66, Papers
Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:647; U.S. Chargi Roy
T. Davis at San Josi to the Secretary of State, No. 321, 31
August 1923, 818.00/1079, MC 669.

1 3Pan American Union, Bulletin LV (October, 1922), p.
404.
14 Ibid.

15 Pan American Union, Bulletin LVIII (February, 1924),
P• 196.
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gotiations with several different groups for tracts of Costa Rican land for use as foreign settlements.

One such group

was a Japanese concern interested in the establishment of a
' Costa R'ica. 16
co l ony a l ong a. ti"de water in

Another example

was reportedly a German offer of $1,000,000 in 1918 for a
large tract of land. 17 While the United States representative in Costa Rica investigated the matter and found out that
th.ere had been no such offer, 18 the original news of the proposed sale to Germany came from the Costa Rican Minister in
Italy. 19 Th.is leads to .the possible conclusion that Costa Rica was not serious about the colonization proposals.

In fact,

it might be that negotiations for colonization projects were
conducted to please the nations interested in the establishment
of Costa Rican settlements at the same time that the projects
kept the United States alert to the possibility of problems
with Costa Rica and therefore more receptive to Costa Rican
views.
A possible exception was a French colonization proposal,
sponsored by the Costa Rican consul in Paris, which had ended
16 u.s. Charg~ Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the
Secretary of State, No. 42 1 15 October 1918, 818.52/-- 1 MC 669.
17 u.s. Minister in Italy to the Secretary of State, No.
85, 23 November 1918, 818.52/1, MC 669.
18u.s. Charg' Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the
Secretary of State, 10 December 1918 1 818.5213, MC 669.
19 u.s. Minister in Italy to the Secretary of State, No.
85, 23 November 1918, 818.52/1, MC 669.
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"disastrously," com:plicated by the general dislike for the
French consul at San Jose. 20
available correspondence

a~

There is no indication from
to the seriousness with which

Costa Rica entered into these negotiations.

However, the

United States was quite concerned about the potential threat
to the Panama Canal posed by the proximity to i~ of large
European or Asiatic colonies. 21 The idea that colonies located within Costa Rican territory were a threat to the security of the Panama Canal would recur throughout the 1920 1 s
and 1930 1 s as reports of various proposals for the establishment of such colonies were ma.de.
The most serious colonization proposal came in the
late 1930 1 s

in connection with the impending European war.

In mid-1937 1 representatives of the Refugee Economic Corporation, based in the United States, approached officials of
the State Department to request United States intervention
with Costa Rica in regard to a relaxation of its immigration
restrictions. 22 Their purpose was to arrange for the purchase
of a tract of land in Costa Rica upon which they intended to
20 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Joa~ to the
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1 9 MC 671.
21 war Department U-HLA to the Secretary of State, 21
May 1919, 818.52/6, MC 669; Secretary of State to u.s. Consul
Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose, 5 June 1919 1 818.52/4, MC 669.
22
Memorandum, Department of State, Division of Latin
American Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, Division of
Western Europe, 12 May 1937 1 818.52G31/1, Internal Affairs,
1930-1939.
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sponsor a settlement of German Jews. 23

The United States de-

clined any official action at that point, although it was indicated that a "humanitarian recommendation" would be passed
on to the appropriate Costa Rican officials. 24

Initial in-

vestigation by the State Department revealed that one of the
reasons for Costa Rica's stringent immigration policies related to some previous bad experiences and that a lengthy process of education would be required to distinguish the German
Jewish immigrants from other groups. 25
None of these initially unfavorable responses seemed
to discourage the Re.fugee Economic Corporation.

In August,

1937, the group purchased the Tenorio Ranch, comprised of ap-

proximately 50,000 acres at a price of one dollar per acre
from the Bank of Costa Rica which had foreclosed its mortgage
some years before. 26

The purchase is only allud~d to in the

official correspondence concerning the activities of the Refugee Economic Corporation and that there are no details
ported there.

l~-

It is possible that the Corporation hoped to

evidence their good faith and financial backing by the purchase, although they had received no guarantees that any
2 3 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25

Internal Memorandum, State Department, to Mr. Duggan, 21 July 1937, 818.52G31/7, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
26 rreland, Boundaries and Conflicts, p. 7.
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. h enugres
. ~ would be allowed to enter Costa Rica.
.
27
J ewis

While

the United States was supporting the Corporation by humanitarian arguments, it is apparent that the Costa Rican government was also receiving recommendations from the German embassy in San

Jos~

as to the undesirabili·ty of a Jewish settle. costa Rica.
. 28 At this time, the United States reprement in
sentatives retreated somewhat from the issue to avoid the
appearance of attempting to influence the Costa Ricans. 29
Further, there was some concern that the hostility felt toward immigrants in general might be " ••• fanned into a wave of
anti-American sentiment which would be unfortunate from the
standpoint of our present cordial relations. ,, 3 o
In the end, the Costa Rican goverrunent resolved the issue by declaring the Tenorio Ranch to be an area prohibited
for a colonization project. 31 Despite this, the Refugee Economic Corporation continued its efforts to have its settlement project recognized for another two years, although these

27u. s. Charge ad interim Harold M. Collins at San Jos'
to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1937, 818.52G31/9, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
28 Ibid.
29

Ibid.

30 u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, No. 2, 6 September 1937, 818.52G31/12,
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
31 u.s. Military Attach~ Cohen in Panama to the Secretary of State, Report No. 4030, 30 September 1937, 818.52G31/
22LH, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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efforts failect. 32

The importance of this series of events

to the course of Costa Rican foreign affairs lies in the potential impact of both United States and German policies toward the question of Jewish settlement in Costa Rica.

The

United States took precautions to avoid any interpretation
of its actions as interference with
cisions.

Cos~a

Rican policy de-

On the other hand, it seems evident that German

diplomats took advantage of Costa Rican prejudices and policies against immigration.

They also brought pressures by

alluding to a potential purchase of canal rights from Costa
Rica to influence the Costa Rican decisions.

It is difficult

to ascertain the relative importance of these factors in Costa Rica's final decision.

What is evident, however, is that

Costa Rican policy makers chose their own path on the Jewish
settlement question, as they would in other areas in the 1930's.
On an indirect basis, Costa Rica was involved with
several European nations in this period.

There was concern

over the placement and employment of numerous European immigrants.

33

Potentially serious problems were caused by Costa

Rican unemployment due to the

worldwid~

depression, not to

mention the competition presented by immigrants to Costa Rica
3 2There are several boxes of State Department corres-

pondence relating to the continued efforts of the Refugee Economic Corporation. All are filed under the 818.52G31 designation in Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
33 Memorias, l11Q_, P• viii.
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for available jobs. 34

Unfortunately, there are no statis-

tics available to substantiate these fears expressed by
Foreign Minister Octavio Beeche in his 19 30 annual report.
In addition, Beeche maintained that European irrunigrants were
using Costa Rica as a "stop off" on their way to the United
States by acquiring the status of naturalized Costa Ricans
and then applying for visas to enter the United States. 35
Latin American nations su.ch as Costa Rica traditionally had
larger United States immigration quotas than did European nations.

Therefore, it was advantageous for immigrants to ac-

quire naturalized Costa Rican status before they tried to enter the United States.

Added to these factors were problems

of political unrest being attributed to the immigrants by
Beeche.

36

Therfore, Costa Rican governments decided to re-

strict immigration and to toughen up the naturalization laws
as well as to make increased use of expulsion of undesirable
immigrants. 3 7

Besides the impact of such a program on tne

general level of immigration, there was also an important
effect upon colonization projects, similar to those already
mentioned, undertaken in the 1930 1 s.
34 rb id.,
·
p. ix.

35Ib 1a.
..

36 Ibid.
37 rbid.
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One rather large group of immigrants, whose status was
effected by the tightened up policies,was the Italians.

Since

the early 1920's,a good many Italians had entered Costa Rica
.
.
. commercia
. 1 circ
. 1 es. 38
an d h a d b ecome active,
especially
in
These Italian immigrants were well-accepted in Costa Rican
society and presented no serious problems until 1932 when
negotiations were under way between Costa Rica and the United
States to ease and improve the availability of the Panama
Canal to ships of Costa Rican registry. 39

The question arose

whether Costa Rica would, by virtu.e of its amicable trade relationship with Italy and by the naturalized status granted to
Italian businessmen residing in Costa Rica, have to grant
that same status to Italians shipping through the Canal from
Costa Rica. 40

However, since the Costa Rican government as-

sured the United States that there was no formal agreement by
which it was bound to give Costa Rican national status to Ital41
.
ian tra d era, t h ere wou1 d b e no d 1"ff'1cul ties.
The issue of special status for Italians arose again in
38 u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
39 secretary of State to U.S. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~, No. 174, 15 March 1932, 718.652/Sa, Papers
Relating to Foreign Relations, 1933, V:266.
40 Ibid.

-

41 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to the
Secretary of State, No. 836, 29 March 1932, 718.652/6, Papers
Relating to Foreign Relations, ~, V:267.
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the 1930's when Costa Rica attempted a regularization of its
trade relations with a number of European states.

The pur-

pose of this was to limit the tariffs which restricted the importation of Costa Rican coffee, bananas, and cacao to European markets. 42 Of particular importance was the proposed agreement with Italy which included Costa

Rica~ ~ational

tus for Italian businessmen residing in Costa Fica. 43

staAs was

indicated, however, that special status never reached the
44
stage of a binding agreement.
But it was obvious that Italy
cuntinued to hold a special place in Costa Rican policy.
One possible explanation for this special stature for
Italy was offered by the United States Minister in San

Joa~,

William Hornibrook, supported somewhat by the concerns of the
State Department.

He speculated that Fascism had taken on a

great deal of importance in Costa Rica and that it had to be
watched, since the potential for war existed in Europe.

The

"watching" resulted in a report• late in 1939, about the attendance of Costa Rican officials at a reception at the Italian
embassy in San

Jos~

in honor of King Victor Emmanuel's birth-

42 u.s. Charge Werlich at San Jos~ to the Secretary of
State, No. 1251, 31 December 1932, Report on 1932, 818.00/
1401, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
43 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, No. 1485, 8 June 1933, 718.653/1401,
Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, lill., V: 269.
44 Ibid.
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day. 45

From the fact that the attendance of high government

officials, including the President, at the party was not reported in the semi-official daily press, it was concluded by
Hornibrook that the influence of Fascism had waned and was
therefore no further worry to the United States. 46
The worries of the United States's Costa Rica watchers
were not reserved to such nebulous concerns as ·the importance
of Fascist influences.

As was mentioned previously, during

the inunediate pre-war years, there were reports of the intention of Germany to purchase canal rights through Costa Rica. 47
The primary concern of the United States with such a proposal
was, of course, the potential threat to the security of the
Panama Canal in the event of war. 48 However, this threat was
not held to be equally serious by different branches of the
United States government, since the State Department felt that
the threat was minimal and that a German canal would most
likely be used for supply purposes rather than as an offensive
45u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to
the Secretary of State, No. 962, 13 November 1939, 818.46465/1,
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
46

Ibid.

47 U••
s Mi·1·itary Attache"' Lt. Col. J. B. Pate at San

Josg, Military G-2 Report, 18 March 1938, 818.812/SLH, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
48

1 Division
. . .
.
'
Memorandum f rom tle
o f American
Repub l ics,
Department of State, 26 March 1938, attached to U.S. Minister
William H. Hornibrook at San Jose ~o the Secretary of State,
19 March 1938, 818.81217, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
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outpost. 49

On the otl1er hand, military observers were grave-

ly concerned, not only by the potential threat to the Panama
Canal, but also by the threat to the constructiou of the pro.
posed N1caraguan
canal. 50
In the end, the civilian viewpoint won out.

It was

concluded that no action could be taken by the Urdted States,
since it might be construed as interference with Costa Rica's
rights of self determination. 51

It can be argued that this

decision not to interfere was premised on indications from
Costa Rican sources that no German offers had been accepted
nor were any likely to be. 52 However, the factors leading to
the Costa Rican decision with regard to a German canal project were Costa Rican in origin, albeit influenced by the
pragmatic acceptance by Costa Rican leaders of the status of
the nation relative to the strength of the United States.
Perhaps as an indication of its independence

f~om

United

States influence, the Costa Rican government also gave serious
consideration to the employment of a German military mission
49 Ibid.
50 u.s. Military Attache Lt. Col. J. B. Pate in San
Jose, Military G-2 Report, 18 March 1938, 818.812/BLH, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
51
u.s. Hinister William H. Eornibrook at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, No. 72, 12 December 1938, 711.18/45,
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
52 Ibid.
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during 19 39.

53

Al though this plan was never brol..i.ght to frui-

tion, it too served as fair warning to the United States that
Costa Rica could and would choose its own path in its relations
with the European powers aa well as with Wes·tern Hemispheric
nations.
The abortive

Serm~"'l

military mission v.as in direct con-

trast to the Spanish mission 1 which visited Costa Rica in 1922,
to improve Costa Rican police forces and militia units.

54

This mission resulted from the wave of good feeling which
characterized Costa Rican-Spanish relations at that time. 55
However, the presence of an officer of the Spanish Civil Guard
in Costa Rica occasioned a minor crisis for the Acosta ad.ministration in that the Congress balked at approving the agreement with Spain on the grounds that the increased militarism
which it represented was
policy. 56

con~rary

to traditional Costa Rican

Thus, al though the special nature of the relation-

ship between Spain and Costa Rica may have contributed to an
interest in a Spanish military mission, in the final analysis
53

u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jose to
the Secretary of State, 27 June 1939, 818.20/18, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939 •
•
54 u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 102, 7 September 1922 1 818.105/--, MC 669.
55
u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671.
56u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-

tary of State, No. 215, 14 March 1923 1 818.105/2, MC 669.
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the strength of Costa Rican national tradition held firm.
Generally, by the late 1920 1 s there were very few, if
any1 events of notoriety in Costa Rican relations with Europe.

A few commercial ties were maintained, although none was outstanding in any way. 57

The relationships with individual na-

tions were, for the most part, not significant enough to
merit individual attention.

Costa Rica's Foreign Minister,

Rafael Castro Quesada, characterized European relations as
having become more concerned with hwnanitarian interestsJ
wrich occasioned numerous conferences and meetings dealing
with social issues such as narcotics and labor problems. 58
These issues were not viewed by Costa Rican officials as important enough or as

~ielding

enough demonstrable results to
warrant any special efforts on their part. 59 As was discussed in connection with Costa Rican participation in the League

of Nations, Costa Rica had never been able or willing to send
representatives to any sessions of the International Labor Organization.

Even in the realm of inter-American affairs in

this period, Costa Rica's representation was at best minimal
due, in part, to financial problems, a.a was discussed in the
previous chap·cer.
57

Memorias, ~' P• x.

58

Memorias, ~' pp. vi-vii.

59Ib.ic.l.' p. vii.
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The path of Costa Rican foreign affairs changed markedly in the 1930's, beginning with the budgetary difficulties
which led to outbacks in diplomatic missions throughout the
world. 60 According to Foreign Minister Roberto Smyth, an
additional handicap to Costa Rican diplomacy in Europe was
the death of Manuel de Peralta during 1930, after more than
fifty years of service in the Costa Rican diplomatic corps. 61
It should be remembered that Peralta represented Costa Rica
at the League of Nations and had been responsible for notifying
the European nations of Costa Rica's declaration of war against
Germany in World War I.

Therefore• between the loss of its

premier European diplomat and its financia1 difficulties, Costa Rica began the 1930's on less than an active level in its
relations with Europe.
One problem which intruded on this relative inactivity
was that of the formal diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia and the potential for the spread of Communism throughout
Costa Rica.

Rather than ·being a simple matter of reoogni ti :)n

of a new government• the extension of diplomatic relations t-_>
Soviet Russia was construed as the recognition of the Communist ideology of the government. 62 There was considerable
60

Memorias, 1!!.Q., pp. v-vi.

61 Ibid., P• v.

62u.s. Charg' Roy T. Davis at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 75, 7 December 1929, 861.77 Chinese Eastern/
633, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the

2 31J

discussion in the Costa Rican Congress that the establishment of relations with Soviet Russia oould enhance the image o f

•
•
Costa R.ioa. 63
in
Communism

As a result, while offi-

cial channels of communication were opened with Russia, it
was only through the diplomatic missions maintained by both
nations in Paris. 6 ~
The rather speedy resolution of this potantially unsettling question of Soviet-Costa Rican relations oan be taken to indicate any one of a number of possibilities.

The

isolationism whioh characterized the inter-American polioy
of the early 1930's may have already been in operation for
relations outside the Americas by the late 1920's.

There

is the equally likely possibility that financial considerations motivated the limited relationship with Soviet Russia
as it limited other relationships in the early 1930's.
In contrast to the limited sphere of Costa Rican
foreign relations, the 1930's was a time of great activity
for the Ge!rman government in Latin Amerio.a.

An important

goal of German foreign policy was to assure the neutrality
of all of Latin America if a war were extended to include
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929 (3 Vols., Washington,
GOvernment Printing o/tici';-r943), II:408.

b.c.:

63

U.S. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San Joa' to the
Secretary of Stkte, No. 1216, 6 December 1929, 718.61/1 1 MC
671.
64u.s. Charg' Roy T. Davis at San Jos4 to the Secretary of State, No. 75, 7 December 1929, 861.77 Chinese Eastern/
633, Papers Relating to Foreisn Relations, !!!!.• II:&JOB.
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the United States. 65

The German government felt that the

prevailing anti-German sentiment in Latin America would have
to be met by a lengthy educational process and the expenditure of considerable sums of money to pI'Oduce a propaganda
66
effort to counteract that of the United States.
German
ministers throughout Latin America felt that few if any Latin Americans truly understood the aims of the Third Reich
and the New Order.

Further, they were concerned about the

negative attitude of the Catholic Church in Latin America toward Germany and its influence on Latin Americans. 67 German policy makers were convinced that economic motivations
would prompt the majority of Latin American nations to remain
neutral,despite the urgings of the United States that they
join in the war effort. 68 However, to assure this course of
events and to avoid arousing any additional hostility toward
Germany, the German missions throughout Latin America were
65 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Freytag), 17 September 1939t Doc. 86-4497/E 105434-37, United States,
Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 19181945, Series D (1937-1945), (Washington, D.C.z Government
Printing Office, 1953), VIII:87.
66 Ambassador in Argentina (Thermann) to the Foreign
Minister, 2 August 1938, Enclosure #1, Memorandum of the Meeting in Montevideo by the Chiefs of Mission in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 28-29 July 1938, Doc. 624-6903/E
518244-56, ibid., V:BSS-66.
67 Ibid.
68 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Freytag), 17 September 1939, Doc. 86-4497/E105434-37 1 ibid., VIII:
86.
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instructed to act with great reserve in expressing opinions
on political matters and to confine themselves to economic
.
69 The reasons cited for this were
or cult ural ques t ions.
primarily related to the impact of the Good Neighbor Policy
and the effectiveness of the program of inter-American solidarity resulting from the Conferences of American states. 70
Perhaps the only positive or direct policy which the German
missions were encouraged to recommend was that all of the Latin American states join in protests over British "violations
of international law," with regard to interference with neutral shipping. 71 This recommendation was a logical one for
the Latin American states, including Costa Rica, to follow in
any case, since the shipping in question was primarily of
Latin American registry. 72 As long as Latin America continued
to support the rights of neutral shipping, there was an assurance of German markets for Latin American products. 73
69 copy of a Communication to All Diplomatic Missions
in America, Enolos ed in the letter from the Director of th, ·.
Political Department (Woermann) to the Embassy in Spain, 1'.'
October 1939, Doc. 165-4218/£073923 1 ibid., VIII1304.
?Oibid.
71 Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX
(Freytag), 17 September 1939 1 Doo. 86-4497/E105434-37, ibid.,
VIIIs88.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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In more specific terms, Germany was also directly interested in Central America although not in Costa Rica individually.

Generally, it was felt that the Central American

states would follow the lead, if not the dictates, of the
United States. 7 ~

Onoe again, however, it was indicated that

an extensive German propaganda effort could at least postpone any action by these nations which would be unfavorable
to Germ.an interests. 75

Nonetheless, the German observers

felt that the Good Neighbor Policy would work to Germany's
advantage only if these nations believed their independence
of action in foreign affairs was being maintained. 76 Since
this was approximately the same rationale which motivated
United States policy during this period, it would seem that
all of Latin America, including Costa Rica, would truly be
free of any excessive pressures on the course of their foreign policies.
As a consequence, at the end of the 1930's, Costa Rica was confronted with a choice between the neutrality which
would in effect support the policy purposes of Germany in
that Costa Rica would retain its rights to export foodstuffs
74 Minister for Central America and Panama (Reinbeck)
to the Foreign Ministry, 14 November 1938 1 Doc. 634-257/
168874-75 1 ibid., V1884.
75 Ibid.

1

Vt885.

76 Minister in Mexico (Freiherr von Ludt) to the Foreign Ministry, 8 April 1938 1 Doc. 600-257/168777-79, ibid.,
V:928-829.
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to Germany.

Or, Costa Rica could choose to respect the "new

bonds of solidarity," which characterized the inter-American
community of nations in the late 1930's7 7 and join the United States in the defense of the bemisphere. 78

Although there

had been a growth of Costa Rican nationalism during the early
1930 1 s, leading to policies of self sufficiency and isolationism, 79 which had been extended to discussions of increased
armaments and militarism in Costa Rica, by the mid-1930's, 80
the choice was eventually maee to act within the structure of
the American community of nations.
As was indicated at the beginning of this chapter,
there were few events of any great significance which characterized Costa Rioan relations with Europe once the Tinoco interlude ended and Costa Rica resigned from the League of Nations.
In part, this can be attributed to the conscious policy of
Costa Rican statesmen and in part to the realistic evaluation
77 Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru to the Government of the United States, 2 August 1938 1 Conferences of A~~
can States, 1933-1940 1 p. 215.
78 Extract of President Roosevelt's Comments, White
House Press Conference, 15 November 1938, Radio Bulletin No.
267, 710.H Continental Solidarity/2, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations,.!!!!• Va39.
79 u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos4 to
the Secretary of State• No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/
1402 1 Internal Affairs, 1930-1939.
80 u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos6 to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1935, 818.20/18, Internal Affairs,
1930-19390
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of Costa Rica in the world community of nation during the
1920's and 1930's.

As has been demonstrated, Costa Rica was

affected by the Great Depression and by the diplomatic maneuvering which characterized the rise of the Third Reich.
Consequently, Costa Rican statesmen dealt with the problems
whieh surrounded European immigration and colonization projects.

Costa Rican statesmen became more aware that the

first basis for foreign policy rested in the security of
their inter-American relations and in their realistic appraisal that European powers and their concerns were simply
not that important to Costa Riaa.

Thus, Costa Rican policy

once again refleated the independence of action which characterized its inter-American relations.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
The international attitudes and policies of Costa Rica gradually became more sophisticated through the use of
diplomatic means in the service of national interests.

Be-

fore attributing that increased sophistication to any particularly Costa Rican factors, it should be observed that the
conduct of foreign affairs by all of the American states
seemed to acquire a polish and maturity during the same time
period.

However, certain patterns which are peculiar to Cos-

ta Rica may be discerned.
Internal political conditions to a large degree dictated the nation's foreign affairs inunediately after World
War I as the Tinoco administration sought to regularize its
international status.

The personal intransigence of Wood: ow

Wilson in refusing to accord diplomatic recognition to the
Tinoco regime placed Costa Rica's relations with the United
States in a primary position which may not have truly reflected
the priorities dictated by national interests.

In spite of

Tinoco's desire to win recognition from the world community of
240
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nations through his declaration of war against Imperial Germany, Costa Rica's international status continued to be dominated by the United States even after Tinoco was overthrown.
As a consequence, Costa Rica was not admitted to the Paris
Peace Conference;nor was it granted original member status
in the League of Nations.
The efforts of Julio Acosta, President of Costa Rica
in 1920, to ameliorate relations with the United States jeopardized his own popularity.

His administration sought and

received membership in the League of Nations but the remainder of Costa Rica's foreign policy demonstrated no discernible
patterns.

It would be possible to characterize Costa Rican

foreign policy under Acosta as a status quo policy which had
as its only design the nation's return to pre-Tinoco stature
in the world community of nations.

The problems which arose

with Great Britain over the nullification of the Amory oil
oonoession, as well as the reaurrenoe of the bounda:t:'y dispute
with Panama, were settled with the mediation of the United
States in an attempt to achieve the goal of status quo.

In

addition, in traditional Costa Rican fashion, the Central
American Union of 1921-1922 was considered and then rejected
by Costa Rican leadership.
The problem of ties binding Costa Rica to the United
States was
of 1924.

impo~tant

in the presidential election oam.paign

Characteristic of the campaign and subsequent presi-

dency of Ricardo

Jim~ez

was a repudiation of such ties and
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the attempts to seek means of conducting relations with the
world community of nations which were not associated with the
United States.

There was a period of closeness with Mexico

prompted in part by shared unfavorable experiences with the
United States's interference and in part by the growth of
Hispanismo which stressed the ties among all Latin nations.
At the same time, relations with Spain were strengthened aR
evidenced by Spain's aid in protecting Costa Rican property
and lives in Germany during World War I.

In keeping with

these sentiments, as well as a growing sense of which policies best served national interests, Costa Rica tendered its
resignation from the League of Nations during the Jim,nez administration.

There had been few,if any, benefits to that mem-

bership for Costa Rica,and the financial burden of membership
was no longer considered justifiable, in view of pressing
needs for internal improvements.
Further, in the search for alternative means of conducting international affairs, the Jim,nez administration
sought to free itself from all appearance3 of United States
domination.

There was a reported wave of anti-American press

as well as some anti-American demonstrations.

This anti-

American sentiment can be partially attributed to Mexican influences in Costa Rica which related more correctly

~o

in-

ternal Mexican conditions than to the matters under consideration here.

However, the main thrust of the anti-Americanism

reflected during the Jim6nez administration can be found in
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the desire to free the nation from all external influences in
the determination of its foreign policy.
The succeeding administration of Cleto

Gonz~lez

v1-

quez, from 1928 to 1932, was primarily characterized by its
attention to the restoration of internal stability and the renewal of the economic strength of the nation as a continuation of part of Jim,nez's programs.

In the realm of foreign

affairs, this administration promoted Costa Rican plans for an
American League of Nations and an Inter-American Court of International Justice.

Both of these programs reflected the

growing awareness of Costa Rican statesmen that the foundation
of Costa Rican foreign policy should rest on its inter-American relations and in the realization that European concerns
were not of primary importance to Costa Rica.
The assessment that Costa Rica should diminish the level of its foreign involvements was reflected in presidential
messages during the late 1920's and early 1930 1 s.

The empha-

sis, however, was on the economic necessity for such a
rather than on any long term foreign policy goals.

pro~ ~am

The thrtut

of foreign policy during the same period can be seen as an isolationist approach by the second
1932 to 1936.

Jim~nez

administration, from

In his second administration, Jimenez articu-

lated isolationism as a need for self sufficiency and stronger
nationalistic feeling on the part of the Costa Rioans.
The ultimate success of these plans was assured by the
Good Neighbor Policy upon which the United States embarked

244

in 1932.

United States policies of noninterference with the

affairs of all American states aided Costa Rican plans for
independent action as the nation availed itself of the good
offices of United States diplomats in Central America to
avert conflicts with its closest neighbors,as in the case of
the Guatemalan dispute of 1934.

As part of its isolationist

policy, Costa Rica also did not attend the 1933 Montevideo
Conference of American States,which resulted in the confirmation of the nonintervention consensus among all American
states.
By 1936 1 it could be observed that Costa Rica had succeeded in its attempts to reawaken nationalistic sentiments
among the population.

With the inauguration of Le6n Cort6s

as President in that year, the tone of Costa Rican foreign
policy changed in that it was broadened to include the concern
of the nation with Central American affairs, as opposed to the
strict isolationism enunciated during the previous administration.

As plans for hemispheric defense ceveloped with the ap-

proach of World War II, Costa Rica deferred to the United
States on broad policy issues, while it retained the right of
ohoice in other areas.

This was evidenced by consideration

given to proposals for colonization by Europeans and the canal project sponsored by German interests.

Within the context

of broad guidelines for hemispherio defense, Costa Rica was
free to act as it chose in all matters of foreign policy.
The increased ability and willingness of Costa Rican
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statesmen throughout the 1920's and 1930 1 s to accept realistic
limitations on Costa Rican international policies enhanced
their stature in dealing with other nations, for their decisions
were firmly based on a realistic assessment of their ability
to act.

Therefore, no energy was expended in attempts to

circumvent the United States so that the full attention of
Costa Rican leadership could be directed to those matters in
which their decisions were most meaningful.

For example, it

could be speculated that Federico Tinoco might have been far
m::>re successful in his attempts to acquire diplomatic recognition from the United States had he concentrated his effoI'ts
on the achievement of solidarity of opinion among Latin American states as to the legitimacy of his government.

The strat-

egy adopted by El Salvador, following the advice of Costa Rica, in the early 1930 1 s to achieve the recognition of the Martinez regime testifies to the importance of even one strong
advocate for a nonrecognized government.

However, before too

rash a conclusion can be drawn, changes in United States policy
between 1917 and 1931 must also be taken into consideration.
When the Good Neighbor Policy modified the prevailing attitudes
of the United States toward the right of self determination in
Latin America., Costa Ricar was in an advantageous position to
assist the Mart!nez

~egime, wherea~

in 1917 there ma.y have

been no strong advocate of similar strength for Costa Rica.
The international attitudes and policies of Costa Rica, as they emerged on the eve of World War II, combined many
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experiences from the preceding twenty years with favorable
policies on the part of the United States, which allowed the
nation considerable ft'eedom of action, and a readiness to
accept the limitations imposed by the nation's size and
strength relative to that of the United States.
nationalistic

sentiments~which

Rica throughout the nineteenth

The strong

were characteristic of Costa
century~continued

to serve

its leadership well in providing them a strong base of confidence upon which to rely in their dealings with the world
community of nations.

The lessons of the Tinoco debacle pre-

vented Costa Rican statesmen from making grave overestimations
of their influence or authority and therefore added an aura of
strength and independence of action to their policy decisions
which were carefully chosen not to exceed the real strength of
the nation.
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